TWO-TIMING TURKEY

Two-time:
TRANSITIVE VERB: Inflected forms: two-·timed, two-·tim·ing, two-·times
Slang 1. To be unfaithful to (a spouse or lover). 2. To deceive;
double-cross.
OTHER FORMS: two-timer —NOUN

~ American Heritage Dictionary.

Found something interesting today while slumming around in Technorati. I'm going to post the relevant part of it here in its entirety, thanks to the Anti-Mullah blog. This analysis is from the Global Information System/Defense and Foreign Affairs, published by the International Strategic Studies Association (ISSA), dated August 7, 2006:

Turkey, Installing New Chief of General Staff, Escalates Plans for Operations in Iraqi Kurdistan, and in the Ægean, and Retains Key Links with Iran

Exclusive. Analysis. From GIS Stations in South-East Europe, Ankara, and Mosul.

The Turkish Armed Forces are positioning themselves to ensure that, in the event that the Iran-Israel conflict strengthens the position of Iran, then Iran does not use its position to move quickly through Iranian Kurdistan to control the oilfields of Iraqi Kurdistan. Although the Turkish ground force presence in northern Iraqi Kurdistan is not highly visible at present, Turkish Special Forces units are working within the area arming and supporting Turcomen Iraqis in preparation for what they believe could be imminent Iranian attempts to destabilize and control the region. The Turkish Army and the Turkish Jandarma (paramilitary police) have some 260,000 to 265,000 forces already stationed in south-eastern Turkey, ready to move in strength into Kurdistan if necessary. Since March 2006, the Turkish Army has conducted 53 operations into Iraqi Kurdistan, ostensibly against bases and assets of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan), but in reality much of the activity has been to build a network of capabilities based on the Turcomen of the region. Significantly, one of the Turkish operations against the PKK was conducted with Iranian forces, and the Iranians have themselves conducted eight operations against the PKK since March 2006.

The PKK responded with 69 operations against Turkish targets, and during the ongoing operations from March 2006 until the end of July 2006, the Turkish forces suffered 165 casualties, including 144 soldiers, seven junior Army officers, and a lieutenant-colonel. As well, 36 Iranian troops were killed during the period, and 43 PKK combatants were known casualties.

It was reported by highly-reliable first-hand sources that Turkish forces, using chemical weapons, killed 14 Kurds on March 25, 2006. Documentary evidence has been seen by GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs on issues relating to Turkish manufacture of chemical and biological weapons, as well as a 1986 written order by a Turkish general authorizing use of chemical weapons against Kurds.

Also, according to highly-reliable sources, the operational command center for the Turkish forces to invade into southern Kurdistan (northern Iraq) was constructed in the mountainous area of Gabar, in Simak region. The rapid construction has meant that two company commands have been stationed in military containers. Turkish Gen. Ergun Saigun has frequently visited the camp and he is the Chief of Staff of the operation, which was, until the end of July 2006, directly under Commanding General YaNar Büyükanit, the Commander of the Turkish Land Forces.

The decision for the foundation of this command was taken on February 25, 2006, during a meeting of the Turkish National Security Council.

It is understood that the Turkish invasion plan for Iraqi Kurdistan involves 80,000 troops entering from four different points on the Iraq-Turkey border. Apart from the routine Turkish Special Forces penetration of the area, Turkey maintains UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) reconnaissance of the area.

As of early August 2006, it was understood that Turkey and Iran have planned combined operations against the PKK, despite the fact that both states have mutually competitive — although undiscussed — grand strategic objectives for the area. It is understood that the main target of the proposed new combined Iranian-Turkish operation would be the PKK base on Mount Kadil. The Iranian branch of the PKK, PEJAK, is based on Mt. Kadil. [Significantly, despite some key strategic differences at a formal level, some elements of the Turkish Government have cooperated with Iran on matters relating to the creation and sustenance of the Turkish (Sunni) branch of HizbAllah, largely because the Turkish General Staff reportedly wanted to use Turkish HizbAllah against the PKK.]

The Turkish forces were given authorization during the last few days of July 2006 from all key elements of the Turkish Government process to proceed with the invasion.

Significantly, on July 31, 2006, Gen. Büyükanit was named Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, replacing Gen. Hilmi Özkök, whose retirement had been anticipated, although not this suddenly. The move was made, presumably, at this time to ensure that the command structure would be in place before Turkey embarked on a major strategic operation. There was little or no fanfare for Gen. Özkök on his departure, which was regarded as significant.

Clearly, the switch of the most senior commanders was done in an unusual manner, although Gen. Büyükanit — who is known as a tough commander and a committed anti-Kurd — was clearly prepared for the assignment. Sources told GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs that the most likely timeframe for the invasion was September 10-15, 2006, although it is conceivable that the currently-escalating Iran-Israel conflict could, should it escalate as it possibly might to strategic weapons, could either hasten or delay the Turkish plans for Iraqi Kurdistan.

In any event, PKK forces are reportedly well aware of the pace of Turkish invasion planning and report themselves to be ready for the confrontation. Turkish sources have indicated that they do not believe that Iran would escalate to full nuclear confrontation with Israel before the end of 2006, but that before that time Israel would be expected, because of the escalation of attacks on Israel, to strike against Syrian targets.

There is some suggestion that the whole period of conflict in the region — not just the ongoing war in Iraq and the Turkish invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan, but also the Iranian-sponsored conflict against Israel — would provide extensive cover and rationale for Turkey to widen its military operations to consolidate its position in Cyprus and certainly to attempt to create a de facto end to Greek control of much of the Ægean Sea. Some Greek sources anticipate Turkish military confrontations with Hellenic forces in the Ægean to resume toward the end of October and/or early November 2006.

Essentially, some observers believe that, after delivering a punishing intervention against the PKK in northern Iraq (Kurdistan) — while commensurately building up Turcoman strength and influence — Turkey will demand from the US and EU concessions in the Ægean as part of the price for withdrawal from Kurdistan. The Greek Government essentially believes that the US could, and would, pressure Turkey to abandon its plans to invade Iraqi Kurdistan, given the importance of the area to the US, especially at the current state of the overall conflict in Iraq. Moreover, the PKK itself has been helpful to the US in the context of operations against both Iran and Syria.

But several sources have indicated that if the US was successful in forcing Ankara to abandon a major invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan, then Turkey would still take advantage of US (and other) preoccupations with the regional conflicts to escalate its position against Greece in the Ægean. This would almost certainly also come within the context of the rejection of Turkey’s progress in entering the European Union (EU), either provoking rejection or responding to it.

Whatever the trigger, the Turkish General Staff appears to believe that the end game with regard to the EU negotiations process is at hand, and with it an end to the need for constraint on the question of territorial claims in the Ægean and with regard to Cyprus.

Pretty nifty, eh? Most of this information is very familiar to those who follow the flow of information out of Turkey, the situation in South Kurdistan, and that of our brave boys and girls at Qandîl and elsewhere. We knew there had been quite a number of HPG operations against the occupying force in North Kurdistan. We knew there were between 250,000 to 300,000 Mehmetciks in Turkish-occupied Kurdistan along the border with South Kurdistan. We knew Buyukanit Pasha made a quick ascension to the throne.

We knew that the occupying Turkish forces were using chemical weapons against the gerîlas, something that DTP had demanded inquiries into, something that şehîd families had also demanded inquiries into. This analysis from GIS/D&FA only mentions the use of chemical weapons against the Muş şehîds at the end of March, 2006. These were the killings that eventually led to the largest serhildan in Amed and other cities in fifteen years, a serhildan that also enjoyed wide, popular support. The use of chemical weapons by the Ankara regime was a key point fueling the anger of the people.

However, there were rumors before the Amed Serhildan, of the use of chemical weapons by the Ankara regime against the Dargeçit şehîds at the end of February, 2006. In April, photos were made available on DozaMe of the bodies of HPG killed by the Turkish security forces in August, 2003. The suspicion is that their deaths were caused by chemical weapons.

Murat Karayilan made a statement shortly after the Dargeçit clashes, calling for an investigation into the possible use of chemical weapons by the Ankara regime. As a signatory to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Turkey's sincerity in abiding by the Convention is questionable, given that the rumors persist. It's significant, therefore that GIS/D&FA mentions "highly-reliable first-hand sources [indicate] that Turkish forces, [are] using chemical weapons." It's also significant that GIS/D&FA states that there exists "a 1986 written order by a Turkish general authorizing use of chemical weapons against Kurds."

By the way, GIS/D&FA reports are not available to "non-governmental subscribers". In other words, only governments can subscribe and access the information. This information is not likely to be propaganda manufactured to sway the masses.

Naturally, the Ankara regime maintains itself in a position of plausible deniability. This was confirmed for us by the regime's recent decision to perform autopsies of gerîlas in the field only, and forbid the return of the gerîlas' bodies to their families for burial--a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights as reported by Bianet earlier this year. More on that from an earlier Rastî post, including a link there to DozaMe's write up on the same subject. By hiding all forensic evidence, Turkey covers up its own atrocities against the Kurdish people, while maintaining the appearance of compliance to the Convention prohibiting chemical weapons. For Turkey, appearance isn't everything, it's the only thing.

Since Turkey has been working more closely with Iran against the Kurdish people in recent months, I have suspected that they are going to play appearances for the Americans in any move against the evil mullah regime. That the GIS/D&FA analysis appears on a blog about regime change in Iran fuels my suspicions even more. Turkey, the Two-Timing Turncoat, is fixing to gum up the works again, and in a big way. Exactly what kind of aid did the Turkish Red Crescent take to Lebanon and Syria? Was it similar to the aid Turkey sent to their Turkmen brothers in Kerkuk, in April, 2003? How many rockets and missiles from Iran were in that aid? Is Turkey playing go-between for Hezbollah and Iran, as this article suggests, with an AKP MP cheerily chatting it up with Hezbollah? Hezbollah, like HAMAS, is widely regarded as a terrorist organization by the US and EU.

Maybe Turkey has gone even farther than this, much farther than serving as a covert shipping organization for Iran:

Turkish sources have indicated that they do not believe that Iran would escalate to full nuclear confrontation with Israel before the end of 2006. . .

This means that Turkish sources believe Iran already has, or is on the very brink of possessing, nuclear warheads . . . before the end of 2006, vastly sooner than the "experts" concede. How much has Turkey contributed to that acceleration?