“Desperation is like stealing from the Mafia: you stand a good chance of attracting the wrong attention.”
~ Doug Horton.
Back in February, there was an opinion published at TDN and written by
Dogu Ergil. In that opinion, Ergil acknowldeged what he called a 'stark truth of the so-called Kurdish question." His truth was:
. . . [W]e have never asked the Kurds what their problem was. Yet we punished them for their unruly behavior until the imbroglio reached the dimensions of an unnamed civil war, waged between 1984 and 1999, that has not yet ended, although its flame has subsided.
The brilliant clarity in that quote is the acknowledgement that Turks, nor anyone else for that matter, have ever asked Kurds what the problem is. On the other hand, we have plenty of examples of everyone else telling Kurds what the problem is and how to fix it. The most recent of these can be found by Yavuz Baydar at
The New Anatolian.
Apparently, Baydar made a recent trip to Dogubayazit, not to ask Kurds what the problem is, but
to tell them what the problem is. Accompanying Baydar, was Oral Calislar, of
Cumhuriyet.
Cumhuriyet, as we all recall, was one of those Turkish dailies responsible for the attempted murder of Akin Birdal back in 1998. We also recall that it was a target of the pashas' Deep State-sponsored attacks earlier this year. The bombings at
Cumhuriyet offices sent everyone into a panic, condemning the attacks as attacks against free expression and democracy--as if such things actually existed in the TC--and then it turned out that it was the pashas who committed the attacks, with the
assistance of the guy they sent to shoot judges.
Anyway, on to Baydar's message to Kurds.
Kurds should stop believing that Abdullah Öcalan, convicted leader of the outlawed PKK, should be freed from prison in the considerable future. European Court’s decision on the complaint by Öcalan’s lawyers meant, that the entire process be considered and will remain to be considered in the realm of law, not politics.
What was Ocalan's trial then, a matter of law or a matter of politics? Were Turkish violations of European legal conventions a matter of law or a matter of politics? Was the fact that the trial was neither fair nor impartial a matter of law or a matter of politics? Is Ocalan's solitary confinement a matter of law or a matter of politics?
The fact is that Ocalan's trial is symbolic of all trials that Kurds undergo in Turkey; they are all conducted in violation of European legal conventions, conventions to which Turkey is a signatory, and they are neither impartial nor fair. It is impossible for a Kurd to have a fair trial in Turkey or under Turkish occupation and the recent turn towards a more extreme enforcement of so-called anti-terror laws is proof of this fact. Take another example, that of DTP politicians who are constantly harassed with charges over actions that are normal in free societies. Are those charges a matter of law or a matter of politics?
As Ocalan's trial is symbolic of the application of justice to Kurds under occupation, so is Ocalan's solitary confinement. We see evidence of this admitted by Baydar himself, when he mentions the lack of tourism in Turkish-occupied Kurdistan. Why is this so? Because the Turkish state does not encourage any visit to the region, especially since such visits would expose the conditions of life under Turkish occupation to the outside world. Instead, the rumor flies around that "The Region" is unsafe, a lie which is told by Turkey's allies as well. It's a much more lucrative proposition for the state if tourists remain in resort areas but, more importantly, keeping tourists in resort areas maintains "image," something which is all important to the state, and an integral part of the propaganda machine itself.
Baydar mentions that the local governor--a Turk, as all local governors are--has ordered an end to smuggling, which will have the effect of starving the population. I wonder if the Turks got the idea from Iran, because this is the slow-kill method employed by Iran's mullahs against their Kurdish population. In the meantime, Turkey claims to be spending vast sums in Turkish-occupied Kurdistan, as reported on
From Holland to Kurdistan, but one look at those places receiving the largest amounts of funds should set off some alarm bells. Except for Ankara, all the other places listed (Dersim, Çulemêrg, Elezîz and Çewlik), have been locations of gerîla activity and, therefore, security force activity. The Ankara regime is spending more money to support the increased numbers of its occupation force; it is not spending the money on the Kurdish people, infrastructure or economic incentives.
Besides, PKK is listed as a terror organization within the EU. In an era of “war against terror”, this consideration would not be altered. Particularly as long as the PKK continued to wage a campaign of violence against the Turkish Army.
The List® is irrelevant. It was created by outsiders who have never publicly acknowledged Turkish atrocities against the Kurdish people, much less have the creators of The List® ever stood for any justice for the Kurdish people. It serves to maintain the status quo by the West and to maintain the image of the TC as "victim," when in fact, the TC is the criminal. Besides, let's be honest here, shall we? There is only one way that the PKK can be destroyed, and that is by murdering every single Kurd under Turkish occupation, because the idea of resistance, which is at the heart of the PKK, has saturated the Kurdish people so that it is now a part of them.
The reality of PKK is something DTP has emphasized over and over again, and something about which the TC and the EU have demanded an end, in contradiction to the will of the Kurdish people, and in violation of any idea of democracy.
Consequently, if Kurds really want a democratic and peaceful solution, PKK should lay down its arms immediately and unconditionally.
This is not going to happen because Kurds have the right of legitimate armed struggle against the racist Ankara regime. However, if the Turkish people really want a democratic and peaceful solution, it could happen overnight by removing TSK and all security forces from Kurdistan immediately. The aggressor must leave and end its occupation. This is the only way to democracy and peace. When this happens, a dialog can begin--not a moment before.
It is not only EU representatives that draw attention to this fact, but the entire elite of Turkey, that feel concerned about the outcome of the reform process, expect it.
EU representatives are not representatives of the Kurdish people. They are representatives for the economic organization known as Europe and, as such, they have no position whatsoever to demand anything of the Kurdish people. Can anyone tell me right now, what has the EU ever done for Kurds? Where is the solid, practical evidence on the ground, something that we can all examine with our hands and eyes? Instead we have EU representatives parroting the demands of the state, telling Kurds that the AKP knows what's best and has Kurds' best interests in mind. If that were true, then why haven't these self-appointed representatives of the Kurdish people pressured the Ankara regime to sit down to negotiations with DTP?
What is this about "the entire elite of Turkey?" Is that supposed to be a joke? I mean, the entire elite of Turkey consists of those individuals who are deepest into the deep shit of the Deep State, and Kurds should owe them any kind of obeisance simply because they are elite? Or is that a threat against the Kurdish people, one made by a member of the Master Race to all of the sub-humans with their sub-identity, a comment designed to intimidate?
No, let me tell everyone what the "entire elite of Turkey" ought to respect, and that is Kurds, especially when they come down from the mountains. This is what all the members of the Turkish elite fear right now, and that is why there is all this nonsense about laying down arms, and cries for peace and democracy, the begging and hand-kissing of Americans and Europeans to go take care of PKK; it is because they are afraid. They know they cannot get rid of PKK without outright genocide. Let me tell everyone what the elite of Turkey can do with themselves and their attempted intimidation: Go to hell.
If you don't know who the Turkish elite is, keep reading. I've already given a hint.
Insistence on keeping the armed fighting as a “condition” will only lead to more misery, more hatred, more problems.
Insistence on keeping the armed struggle will only lead to more fear, more weakness, more mistakes, more desperation for the elite. Let me reiterate for those who are ignorant: There has never been one concession won through political means in Turkey. It has only been through the use of armed struggle that Kurdish existence was ever acknowledged. As long as the aggressor remains in Kurdistan, armed struggle remains legitimate.
Kurds, as they distance themselves from the cult of Öcalan and weapons, should at the same time focus their attention on expressing their needs and demands by demaocratic means domestically, and using EU mechanisms more effectively. Local Kurdish politicians should work to inform their own communities about the EU process, increase dialogue outwards. At the same time, Kurdish political movements, if they believe in democracy in Turkey and have hopes about a better future – as they often say it – they must increase the pressure on the parliament to lower the threshold from 10 to, say, 3 %.
There is no point in dialog since the Ankara regime will not engage in dialog. Furthermore, there is the example of the five-year unilateral ceasefire observed by the Kurdish people and the PKK from 1999 to 2004, a ceasefire which did not see any steps coming from the enemy side. There were a number of unilateral ceasefires before that, none of which inspired the enemy to negotiate, but now Kurds are expected to believe that if the armed struggle is halted, an immediate dialog will begin? A healthy dose of extreme skepticism is in order here.
In addition, how is DTP supposed to lower the parliamentary threshold when the regime will not even discuss immediate problems with them? If the Europeans want to pressure the regime to lower the threshold, let them go ahead and do it, but let's give up this farce of Kurds having any power to work through "democratic" means in Turkey. Such means do not exist.
I stated that Kurds that stress ethnic identity and other ideas – that may sound provocative to some Turks – should express their views in the parliament by words, rather than useless, murderous bullets in the mountains. Killing an innocent soldier can be easy, but a cowardly act, but defending a rational – albeit extreme – view over a political session can only be respected.
I have eight words in reply to this: Leyla Zana, Hatep Dicle, Selim Sadak, Orhan Dogan. Enough said.
Baydar leaves Dogubayazit in a gloomy mood, blaming the situation on PKK and never acknowledging that the regime itself is responsible for the misery Baydar claims to have encountered. Remember January, and the outbreak of bird flu in Dogubayazit? Where was Baydar's government then? It wasn't until the word broke in the outside world that the regime was dragging its feet over Kurdish deaths, that the regime finally began to respond. Still, that response was far less vigorous than it had been in October, in Western Turkey.
Baydar, desperate to get the Kurds to end their "unruly behavior" for the sake of EU accession, calls on the government to deal with the situation by launching a new reform program, but this is not going to happen. Instead, Ankara will rely on the means by which it has relied for some 80 years--military means. Everything we have seen since the Amed serhildan indicates that this is what is happening on the ground, and there is no reason to believe that any other campaign is coming down the tube.
Here we have another example of someone not asking Kurds what the problem is, but telling them how the problem
must be corrected. The very best thing about Baydar's article is that it clearly shows Turkish chauvenism and desperation, and we couldn't buy that kind of advertising.
There were two articles on TDN, Friday, one
here and the second,
here. The subject of the articles is opinion polls. Not only do polls indicate less support for the EU among Turks, but they also indicate a low level of trust in the EU. None of this should be a surprise however, especially given that Turkey is being forced to confront its most painful, and embarrassing issues, such as the problem it has created for Kurds, the Cyprus issue, the Armenian issue, and the criticism it has received for its violations of free expression.
Conversely, Turkish trust in its own military is on the rise, a little subject that was discussed briefly by
Mehmet Ali Birand the other day. He claims that between 75 and 85 percent of Turks trust the military, for the following reasons:
In the eyes of the Turkish people, the military represents the state. This symbol is a source of respect, some fear and most importantly trust in the established mechanism.
The internal discipline the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) maintains, its honesty, lack of involvement in corruption allegations and organizational structure impresses society.
How are a lack of enthusiasm and trust in the EU, plus an increase in trust for the TSK, related to desperation in Dogubayazit? It's very simple and it goes back to the mention of "the entire elite of Turkey. There is only one elite in Turkey, the military, the people who are deepest into the deep shit of the Deep State.
The Turkish military has a lot of business interests, especially through
OYAK, interests which are intimately dependent on the Turkish economy. They have unique ways of
manipulating business deals, too. The military's extensive business interests link them to lesser mortals, like Turkish businessmen and industrialists. Add politicians to that mix and you get a picture of the entire power structure of the TC. Just make sure you understand who is at the top and which two support the throne.
All of these want EU accession for the economic advantages it's supposed to bring, but "the entire elite of Turkey" does not want to change any of its policies on important political issues, such as Kurds, for the sake of financial gain.
In other words, the elite wants its cake and to eat it too.
When Baydar goes to Dogubayazit and attempts to intimidate Kurds with talk of the elite, he is talking about the pashas and their military-industrial clique. It's an intimidation message from the pashas to the Kurds, so that Kurds will remember their place and not upset the elite's financial dreams.
In the meantime, it would appear that the soft coup in May had its desired effect. The military's involvement in Susurluk, its connections with Turkish Hezbollah, the bombing at Semdinli, its attack on the Council of State--all of these--are forgotten by the non-Kurdish masses. The patient has fallen asleep again while the wound continues to fester.
And there is one little fly in the medication, one that can't be bought or intimidated, nor is it so easily removed. That fly is the big, bad PKK.
PKK Fighters, Qandîl mountains, 2004.
