A MATTER OF TIMING

"Since the Ergenekon case represents the advanced level of classical Turkish chaos, this is not a good time to start learning about Turkey unless you are experienced in this ‘lonely and beloved country’."
~ Ece Temelkuran.

Some weird shit--more weird than usual for Turkey--is going down with these recent detentions in the Ergenekon fiasco. They're going deeper into the Susurluk Affair, to include the "soft coup" of 1997:

In fact, the apprehension of former Special Police Operations Deputy Chief İbrahim Şahin, who served six years in jail for links to Susurluk, in the latest wave of detentions signaled that the Susurluk case will also be included in the Ergenekon investigation.

[ . . . ]

Meanwhile, the fact that 10 active officers -- five colonels, two majors and three captains -- were detained over their alleged links to the Ergenekon terrorist organization in this latest wave has served to strengthen the previous indictment, which established links between the group and some active officers within the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK).

The indictment in question, which an İstanbul court accepted prior to opening the ongoing trial, read: "It has been understood both from the attached documents as well as from tapped telephone conversations that the Ergenekon terrorist organization has been engaged in secret organizational work within the TSK and that there have been members of this organization who come from the TSK, from the lowest to the highest ranking (officers)."

ARABASLIK Generals linked to Feb. 28 postmodern coup

The detention of three former generals and a number of civilians, including former Higher Education Board (YÖK) President Kemal Güriz, in the 10th wave of operations on Wednesday brought to the agenda their links with the Feb. 28, 1997 postmodern coup.

Several papers established the links of those detained on Wednesday with the Feb. 28 coup that resulted in the overthrow of an Islamic-oriented coalition government under then Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan.

This was the fourth military coup staged in Turkey since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. The fifth, and last, military intervention in Turkish politics came in 2007 in the form of an e-memo posted on the TSK's Web site.

What made the Feb. 28 intervention a postmodern one was the mobilization of an army of civilian allies who voluntarily defended the military over "fundamentalism" by evoking the reactions of the press and many nongovernmental organizations as well as YÖK and the judiciary.

The TSK carried out the aforementioned coups based on Article 35 of the Internal Service Law. The problem with Article 35 is that the authority designated to appoint the duty of protection and supervision is the TSK and not a civilian political authority.

There's more on the characters involved in this latest round of detentions at Zaman with information gleaned from Taraf. Check also another article at Zaman, in which it looks like AKP is going to go after the Kemalists under Article 288 of the Turkish penal code (TCK), which reads:

A person who explicitly makes a verbal or written declaration for the purpose of influencing the public prosecutor, judge, the court, expert witness or witnesses until the final judgment is given about an investigation or prosecution will be imprisoned for a term from six months to three years.

If this offence is committed through press or media, the penalty to be imposed shall be increased by one half.

The article has a small discussion of Büyükanıt's influence in the media over the Şemdinli bombing as an example. There's also a discussion of what legal experts are saying about Ergenekon at Hürriyet. Of note, also, is the meeting that the paşas held among themselves late Wednesday and Turkish chief of general staff Başbuğ met with Erdoğan for an hour and a half before his weekly meeting with Gül. Details, such as they are, from Reuters and the Guardian.

Reuters remarks:

Critics of the ruling AK Party say Erdogan's government is using the case as revenge for court moves by the secular establishment last year to outlaw the party for anti-secular activities. The AK Party denies any link.

And the Guardian quotes Gareth Jenkins:

Some analysts believe that yesterday's response shows its patience may be wearing thin. Gareth Jenkins, an Istanbul-based expert on Turkish security affairs, said: "The army will have issued a stern warning to the government to back off and that this has to be the last of such arrests. Most of those arrested on Wednesday were not involved in the Ergenekon plot.

"It was just a political move, and has destroyed any hope that the probe will find the real culprits. The question is what happens next. What we are going to see is a power struggle between two fundamentally undemocratic forces using their influence in the judicial system."

Another interesting thing about these recent detentions is the timing, which takes place as the Turkish media has stirred up a frenzy over the crisis in Gaza. Olmert visited Erdoğan and Gül on December 21. My money says Olmert told them about Israel's upcoming operations in Gaza. Here's a hint:

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is visiting Turkey in order to discuss the latter's mediation in the indirect peace talks between Israel and Syria, but Monday's meeting with President Abdullah Gul also focused on the ongoing fire from Gaza.

"Israel cannot refrain from responding to the criminal fire on its citizens," Omert told Gul during their meeting in Ankara.

More:

Olmert met President Abdullah Gul before holding talks with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan over dinner.

"What you don't do today in the Middle East – you may not be able to do tomorrow," Olmert said to Erdogan regarding the progression of the negotiations, adding that efforts must be focused on promoting direct talks with Syria.

The two leaders met in private for nearly an hour, and were then joined by their respective entourages for further discussion. After dinner the two resumed their tête-à-tête.

Earlier in the day Olmert met with Turkish President Abdullah Gul. "Israel cannot refrain from responding to the criminal fire on its citizens," Omert told Gul.

There's no reason to believe that the Israelis did not inform their only military ally in the region of their plans for Gaza, so Erdoğan knew. And the AKP decided to use this timing to make another Ergenekon sweep. What AKP's exact intentions are with these recent detentions and where they'll go from here, I haven't figured out yet. Is the US involved, as another Zaman article suggests? It's possible. Are Turkey, Israel, and the US working together? It wouldn't be the first time. Will the paşas allow it to continue? We'll definitely know when the troops leave the barracks.

I have to echo Jenkins: "The question is what happens next"?

One thing is for certain: The Ergenekon investigation has not gone east of the Fırat (Euphrates), so this certainly isn't about cleaning out and dismantling the Deep State.

One last item . . . the editor of Taraf, Adnan Demir, faces five years' imprisonmnent for Taraf's reporting of the Bezele (Aktütün) operation and TSK's major FAIL at the time. From Reporters Without Borders:

Reporters Without Borders today voiced support for Adnan Demir, editor of the liberal daily Taraf, who is facing trial for publishing confidential military information.

The worldwide press freedom organisation said it hoped the Turkish justice system would prove itself capable of resolving a case which involved a journalist who had done his job with professionalism.

"Adnan Demir has revealed information that is telling about the actions of the Turkish Army and raises several questions about possible mismanagement. The people have the right to be informed about the circumstances in which its citizens risk their lives."

[ . . . ]

The prosecutor at the Istanbul higher court yesterday called for a sentence of three to five years against Demir.

Isn't democracy wonderful?!

BAŞBUĞ KNOWS WHAT HAPPENED AT AKTÜTÜN, PART 3

"Besides, to solve the Kurdish question, Öcalan must be contacted, must be talked with. There is no one in Turkey, with the exception of him [Öcalan] to solve this problem. There is no one with the exception of him that can contribute as much as him to solve this problem."
~ Avni Özgürel.

Today is the third and final part of the interview between Taraf's Neşe Düzel and researcher Avni Özgürel (Part 1; Part 2):

ND: Aktütün is being raided frequently and we have martyrs there. Doesn't PKK increase its morale by giving the Turkish army such casualties?

AÖ: Of course, yes. Even the press statement that the Chief of General Staff had, in which he revealed his anger, resulted in increasing PKK's morale and motivation by saying, "We make the world's eighth largest army's commander go crazy".

ND: The Chief of General Staff gave a very rigid and very angry response to our newspaper's statement that the raid was known well before. The people who were supporting him the most also said it is not an acceptable thing. Why do you think he had such an angry reaction?

AÖ: Actually, the Chief of General Staff is projecting his anger for those in his ranks onto others. Otherwise, someone who rises to a general's position, it is impossible for him not to know what happened at Aktütün. He does know what happened there, who is responsible, and what was wrong in the mechanism that was running. However, in Turkey, all the institutions have the attitude of "let's cover it". But right now in Turkey, the situation is changing. Society is questioning, as "What happened at Aktütün". For that reason, the Chief of General Staff's statement is not persuasive; it is not satisfying them anymore.

ND: The government, on the other hand, rather than opening an investigation of Aktütün, supported the Chief of General Staff. The Prime Minister took General Başbuğ's side. Erdoğan had done the same thing in Şemdinli as well. However, AKP has not emerged from the shadow of Şemdinli yet. How do you think creating a second Şemdinli will affect AKP?

AÖ: It will affect them negatively. This attitude will affect AKP's constituencies in a negative way, and has already done so.

ND: Do you think Erdoğan had a deal with the military?

AÖ: I think Erdoğan desires very much to have a deal with the military. However, the military still has some reserve against him.

ND: Do you think AKP is reinforcing its ruling power or weakening its ruling power by supporting the general's angry statement instead of investigating the reason for the incident?

AÖ: It weakens. In Turkey, no ruling political entity has a concern about being capable. All of them are trying to have a deal with the military. In all Turkish history, only Turgut Özal tried to be capable of ruling rather than having a deal with the military, and he paid the price.

ND: The Kurdish question lies under all these raids, clashes, and bloodshed, and AKP is not taking any concrete step to solve the problem. Did ruling political parties pass the question to the military?

AÖ: They cannot pass it because this is not a job the military can do. This is not a security issue. This is an issue of Turkish democratization. And, of course, when you democratize Turkey, you won't have any problem with head scarf, you won't have any problem with the Kurdish question. In Turkey, if the EU's democratic standards become dominant, neither the military will be unquestionable nor will our distorted judiciary be the way it is. Neither will corruption be at the level it is today. However, in this country, it is not wanted to solve the Kurdish question, because there are people who are profiting from it, not only the soldiers, but the security units, politicians, businessmen. In short, a big part of society benefits from this question. The Kurdish question is feeding all the ommissions and illegal money.

ND: How do you think the Kurdish question be solved?

AÖ: Starting from cultural and political rights, all the disturbing texts, including the constitution in Turkey, must be rewritten. The notion of Kurds and Turks are like [finger]nail and flesh must be reflected in the law. Besides, to solve the Kurdish question, Öcalan must be contacted, must be talked with. There is no one in Turkey, with the exception of him [Öcalan] to solve this problem. There is no one with the exception of him that can contribute as much as him to solve this problem.

ND: Why? Is PKK under Öcalan's control?

AÖ: By and large, yes, it is under his control. A formulation must be created that Öcalan can convince his grassroots. Meanwhile, the İmralı era must also end. His release may not be the case, but Öcalan can be imprisoned in very good conditions and his wish is not to be released anyway. In Turkey, in a place wherever he wants, leaving him away from politics, somewhere may be bought for him, and let him see his visitors there. Turkish punishment and execution laws are available for this change. I know that the solution must be in this way. I know that the analysis that says this issue must be solved in this way exists in Turkey's hands today.

ND: Will the soldiers be close to such a solution?

AÖ: I know that, in terms of the military, they are getting closer to this end. Even now, it is being written in several places that Öcalan has been spoken to by general-ranked commanders. Look, the Kurdish question is not merely a law or violence issue, there is also a psychological dimension to it. We call PKK a "terrorist" organization; however, is PKK only a "terrorist" organization? There is no single European country where they don't have a representative. They have diplomatic relationships with states. Thousands of Öcalan's posters are being held in protests. PKK has exceeded being a "terrorist" organization. It is in a well-advanced form right now.

ND: What do you think Öcalan was talked to about in İmralı?

AÖ: Especially the intelligence unit talked to him and the answer to the question, "Can the Kurdish question be solved?" was sought at that time. The answer was revealed as "Yes, it can be solved". Both the military and intelligence units know this answer. However, on the military side, it is a matter of courage to do this.

ND: Ergenekon paşas also went to İmralı. What did they talk about with Öcalan?

AÖ: "This man can finish terror. If terror ends, what are we going to do?" is one dimension of this job. There are some people who have benefits from an unsolved Kurdish question. Turkey is buying very serious numbers of arms from abroad. Unmanned aircraft. Do you know how much AWACs cost? Turkey must immediately solve its Kurdish question, otherwise it will lead to separation. Kurdish nationalism is becoming a very big danger.

ND: The relationship between PKK and Ergenekon has been mentioned. What kind of relationship do they have?

AÖ: In the past they were intertwined. This relationship is not only in drug-trafficking but also in operational levels. It might have been said to PKK that "You guys have been cowards. You better do some noisy stuff [shooting] or we will step in".

ND: DTP's closure case is ongoing. Are they going to shut it down?

AÖ: I hope they do not. The Kurdish question will get damaged very badly in DTP's closure. The defense that, "Hmm, this question is not being solved politically, well, the people on the mountains are right". This logic will become prevalent in people's minds. Thus enlistment in the mountains will increase and the support for the struggle in the mountains will increase at the same time.

ND: Does Ergenekon have a share in the rising terror?

AÖ: Not the Ergenekon that we're investigating, but the real Ergenekon has. Ergenekon is a structure in MİT and in the military and, in Turkey, Ergenekon will never end. The current Ergenekon was the formation that was revealed at Susurluk. One part of this imprisoned Ergenekon was revealed at Susurluk and it is eliminated. There will be another version of such a formation.

ND: Regional elections are getting closer. How do you think Prime Minister Erdoğan's recent statements will affect the vote in the Southeast?

AÖ: Today's jargon will make AKP lose in Diyarbakır and I think the votes that create a gap between AKP and DTP is getting wider in favor of DTP.

ND: Today in Turkey, is there any politician that can solve the Kurdish question and make peace feasible?

AÖ: No, there is not. The main problem is this anyway: the job is not being done just by raising Diyarbakırspor to promote it to the first league from the second or third league. Let the Kurds be everywhere in this country, in politics . . . . the Kurdish question is not about their songs or folklore or their football. Turkey must discuss if you eliminate Kurds from politics.

In addition, today on NPR's evening news program, All Things Considered, was a radio report on the media feeding frenzy in Turkey over the military and the Bezele (Aktütün) operation. Included is a short discussion of Taraf's leading role in the criticism of the paşas and you can hear Yasemin Çongar present Taraf's reasoning for publishing the evidence which has damned the paşas over HPG's Bezele operation. Listen here or read the transcript, on the same page.

BAŞBUĞ KNOWS WHAT HAPPENED AT AKTÜTÜN, PART 2

"The people who are executing PKK's struggle, including Bayık and Karayılan, have been there for 25 years. We don't have any general that has served in the Southeast more than two years. "
~ Avni Özgürel.

Here is part 2 of the interview between Taraf's Neşe Düzel and researcher Avni Özgürel (Part 1 is here):

ND: Has drug-trafficking been used in financing the struggle against PKK?

AÖ: Of course it has been used. From the Southeast to Edirne (NW Turkey), drugs were transported along with official escorts. The people who got involved with this, after some time, said, "Why should I endanger myself on the mountain while there is an option to share the drugs and to extort and to form gangs? Why should I go into PKK and collect information for JITEM?"

ND: However, in Aktütün, there was the case that there was no lack of intelligence.

AÖ: That's true. For the Aktütün raid, there were additional things, let alone receiving intelligence. There are TV's that are close to PKK; they have their publications. For instance, in Roj TV, "on 21 August our congress is assembling in Qendil" they broadcast. The administrators, including from Europe, joined this congress. Cemil Bayık, Murat Karayılan, all of them were there. The meeting lasted for ten days and there were scenes and interviews in Roj TV. 21 August means two weeks before the Aktütün raid. PJAK also joined PKK's congress, which lasted until 30 August.

ND: You mean Iran's PKK also joined?

AÖ: When PKK said, "we have serious casualties because of Turkish aerial attacks", the head of PJAK, which is a branch of PKK in Iran, joined the Qendil congress and PJAK's chief Hacı Ahmet said, "From now on our first target is Turkey," all these things happened ten days ago. In Qendil there weren't just three people, there were twelve hundred people that assembled. However, the armed forces did not have a single aerial operation in August.

ND: Why didn't they do that?

AÖ: We have to explain this. People want to know the answer to this question. If you are willing to finish PKK, and if you are so angry, PKK's whole administrative groups were there. PKK could have been annihilated. This congress did not take only one day, but ten days. Let's say you could not see those people who came to the border, you said the geography is very mountainous, and so forth. Haven't you even watched the party's television? After this congress, seventeen youths were killed at Aktütün. Right after that, police were shot in Diyarbakır and there were some explanations or statements that were labeling the journalists who were asking about the errors in this incident as traitors to the country.

ND: Our army is fighting in the Southeast for years, and they must be very experienced in this. How come these kinds of raids are still occuring?

AÖ: If you send the youths, who have eight months of military training, and you send them to fight against PKK at the very far point of the border, this is a normal result. Look at the people who were killed at Aktütün, they were inexperienced kids. The people who are executing PKK's struggle, including Bayık and Karayılan, have been there for 25 years. We don't have any general that has served in the Southeast more than two years. Whoever stays there longer than that goes crazy.

ND: How?

AÖ: In advanced countries, the people who serve in hot zones more than one or two years, the army gives them a new assignment, say in airports, for a six month period in order to rehabilitate, to let them see people. We don't have such a thing. One time, an old friend of mine came to Istanbul and I took him to an entertaining place. There, at the table, he became like he would use his weapon against me [saying] "we are dying there and you are dancing here". He had cut himself off from the real world.

ND: Back to Aktütün, what happened there and what will happen there?

AÖ: Now we are sending a new unit to Aktütün. Now you imagine the family that has a son that has been sent to this place again. After one year they say they are going to move the garrison 300 meters away. Why are you defending there? You are defending a 300 meter height? As an excuse they say, "Well, in Lausanne our borders were drawn wrong and for that reason let's form a buffer zone". They are making very stupid suggestions and supposedly they are going to tell this to Iraq. Iraq will say, "Okay, form a buffer zone"; but they will include, "You form that buffer zone within your borders. Why do you think particularly of my territory when you suggest a buffer zone?" they will ask. Nevertheless, until Arbil (Hewler), that region is also mountainous. Where are you going to form the buffer zone? Besides, the US will say, "We gave you Öcalan and you could not solve the problem; we are giving you intelligence and you cannot solve the problem again." And when we come to the Iraqi regime, we are pressuring them, and still it's not doing anything.

ND: Don't you think the people who've been trained as chiefs of general staff are thinking with this logic?

AÖ: In politics, despite their failures, they do the same old thing. Similarly, they do the same old thing in the military as well. Everyone does their period [of service] and retires, and I don't think they know comprehensively about the region's history very well.

ND: Okay, but how can we explain the fact that the ommission of the intelligence that was received way before? Don't they take the intelligence seriously?

AÖ: There will be two consequences of the Aktütün investigation. Either you will say, "We received all the intelligence and we did all the evaluation; however, we could not complete the required protection web with helicopters within six hours." In this case, those responsible for this failure must immediately be taken before the highest military court. Or, "There may be intelligence, but we did not give credibility to its occurrence". Then, this means this will lead to questions of your military capabilities and your chief of staff's capabilities. If the Aktütün investigation does not take those responsible, who are in a command level . . .

ND: What will happen?

AÖ: This means there is a very hopeless situation in Turkey. This investigation must end up with finding the responsible commanders and give a satisfying explanation to the public, and take these people who were responsible in front of the military court.

ND: An operation that is known way ahead of time, and that is being watched through aerial surveillance, how can it not be prevented?

AÖ: This incident definitely must have several responsible parties in various positions. Otherwise it is not very credible to say, "It is not Aktütün; these scenes being broadcast are all lies"--this kind of fake explanation--Publishing these radio transcripts [of HPG guerrillas], all these are lies. It is hard to be very persuasive with this mentality. In Turkey, including the armed forces, every institution must be held accountable. If you spend all the world's money for Foca [in Izmir] and you say that you do not have money for the Aktütün garrison, someone definitely question this. And I think they must do so, too. In Turkey there was a very serious change. People are now asking, they are questioning, and they are not seeing the people who are silent.

ND: Okay, when one knows about a raid like Aktütün ahead of time, with deterrent precaution, can we stop such raids?

AÖ: Of course it would deter. In the Aktütün raid, the people who condoned the implementation of this raid, or the people who did not take sufficient precaution, in whatever position they are, those people, whether in the rank of general or a force commander--any position--they must be taken before the public. And the Chief of General Staff's statement that "the investigation has started and the result will be declared" this must be considered as a commitment. On every occasion, the press must ask the chief of general staff what is the result of the Aktütün investigation.

ND: A while ago you touched on the issue that the Aktütün garrison would shut down. Even last May, after it had a raid, why was such a garrison not shut down after that raid? Is not shutting down such a place consistent with military logic?

AÖ: Of course it is not consistent. I went to Aktütün. It is a ghetto-like place. Indeed it is a guarding garrison. In a raid, it gets damaged remarkably; however, Aktütün seems like an honor issue for our army. Of course there is a moral meaning about those people who were martyred there, but indeed all these border garrisons are actually graveyards. We never know what's going to happen to those kids. It is not certain there. When an artillery shell explodes, we don't know how many people will die. All these border garrisons must be removed.

ND: Can the borders be protected without garrisons?

AÖ: Well, what's going to happen by protecting there anyway? Is the place that you defend your country a place 3,000 meters high in the mountains? You get down on the slopes of the mountain and prevent infiltration there. These border garrisons were established for those Iraqi villager smugglers who were bringing kaçak tea, tobacco, cigarettes, and drugs. And they put four jandarma [there] in order to tell those people to raise their hands and surrender. They have established those garrisons with this mentality. These garrisons were not established to prevent guerrilla attacks. The problem is not where the garrisons are located; the problem is the existence of these garrisons. There is no profit or gain from these garrisons. Until this time they could not even prevent any single entrance.

Part 3 tomorrow.

BAŞBUĞ KNOWS WHAT HAPPENED AT AKTÜTÜN

"PKK is not something that can be finished with one person's decision, or Öcalan's decision, or the Chief of General Staff's decision."
~ Avni Özgürel.

Today, Land Forces Commander Işık Koşaner firmly denied any mistakes by TSK during HPG's Aktütün (Bezele) operation. If TSK's perfect operational performance resulted in the deaths of 62 Turkish soldiers, then you have to ask yourself how good it would be for HPG if TSK really screwed things up.

Not everyone agrees with the paşas' self-serving analysis, however. Last week Taraf interviewed Avni Özgürel, a Turkish researcher who has written books on Turkish political history, "terrorism", and the Kurdish question, after some analysis he had made about the Aktütün (Bezele) operation. Here's some of the information from that interview:

Başbuğ knows what happened at Aktütün


According to Avni Özgürel it is impossible for Başbuğ not to know the real dimensions of Aktütün and those responsible. The anger that he reflected actually is against his own ranks.

Aktütün must render an account--Avni Özgürel, who was interviewed by Neşe Düzel, talked very clearly while evaluating the Aktütün incident: Either we received all the intelligence but failed the required protection or the intelligence might have been received but we didn't give it any credence. In either situation the responsible ones must be taken before the court, otherwise the situation is hopeless.

They fear that PKK will end--"There is also a dimension of 'what if terror ends'" said Özgürel; and he thinks the policy of terrorism enables one to control politics. Terror creates an enormous amount of profit. PKK is not a job that can be finished by only one person's decision, the profit is big. In this country, they transported narcotics even with official escorts.

Öcalan must intervene for a solution--PKK is, by and large, under Öcalan's control. There must be a formula for a solution of which Öcalan can convince his supporters. The İmralı era must end. The execution law is available for this, including the constitution--the text that disturbs the Kurds--must be rewritten. The phrase, "Turks and Kurds are like fingernail and flesh," must be reflected in the law.

Can the Kurdish question be solved? Yes--The intelligence units talked to Öcalan anyway. They have searched for an answer to the question, "Can the Kurdish Question be solved?" and the answer was revealed as "Yes, it can be solved". Both soldiers and intelligence know this situation. In Turkey this question certainly must be solved. Kurdish nationalism is at very dangerous levels. Otherwise, the state may be divided.

From the interview itself:

ND: In spite of the intelligence report and the information and warnings received, why were the required precautions not taken?

AÖ: There is a problem in the mechanism of the armed forces. It is always a minus score in a commander's promotion to have casualties in a clash. For that reason, in the armed forces, everyone conveys responsibility to one's higher rank and when the highest one goes to play golf, the mechanism just stops. Whereas, according to the troop's statements, reinforcements arrived after eight hours.

ND: Can't the incidents that occured in Aktütün be explained with this?

AÖ: This is a factor. It is known that PKK was preparing for this attack for one month. They had planted mines along the routes leading to Aktütün village. This means the garrison had been seized from four sides and, moreover, this fact is not being denied. Because right after the incident it was said, "the intelligence we received from the US is perfect. We have no lack of intelligence." However, there is this situation: the intelligence is not being collected for memories. The intelligence is gathered for evaluation.

ND: Actually, I'm asking exactly this: Why then, despite the whole intelligence, the required precautions were not taken?

AÖ: In this job there is also the dimension of "what if terror ends?" Let me give you an example from Fatih. Fatih goes to Albania and gets defeated. And when he investigates what happened, he finds out that the commanders thought that if they win this war, the sultan would no longer need them. For that reason, they just retreated from the front. Today in Turkey, PKK is a cause of several things for security units.

ND: It's a cause of what, for example?

AÖ: Terror is something that enables you to control politics. This was so in the US, too. It was because the US could not generate a political decision, that they could not end the Vietnam War for a long time. Everyone knew to get out of Vietnam but the war was such an enormous economic benefit that if Vietnam ended, their enormous benefits would end.

ND: Is terror still a source of a huge amount of profit in Turkey?

AÖ: Yes, very. [Because] it is so big that enables this problem not to be finished. Years ago in Damascus, when I had an interview with Öcalan. Öcalan told me, "If I finish this, they are going to finish me." PKK is not something that can be finished with one person's decision, or Öcalan's decision, or the Chief of General Staff's decision. This job has the arms sellers, politicians, military and security units and their associations, and it is similar for PKK. PKK also has televisions and representatives abroad. There, there is money that they cut from each Kurd from their salaries for this. There is something for everyone that cannot be finished because it is that profitable. Do you know how much each rocket costs that is used in aerial strikes? And there is also a dimension of drug-trafficking. In the past in Turkey there were people at the level of professors in universities saying, "In the US they're financing anti-terrorism through drug-trafficking; we also must do that," and they wrote such reports.

Part 2 tomorrow.

TURKISH ARMY: WE JUST DON'T GIVE A SHIT

"Boys, I may not know much, but I know chicken shit from chicken salad."
~ Lyndon B. Johnson.

What I said on Sunday:

In other news, the Turkish General Staff has decided to relocate five garrisons and the Bezele garrison will move to a nearby hill, Berçar Tepe, although the general staff claims that plans to move the Bezele garrison were in the works last year.

I find this very difficult to believe and, most likely, it's a cover story for the paşas. They don't want to have to disclose who it was that, in their utter stupidity, chose the location for the Bezele garrison. Given that it's located on low ground and completely surrounded by much higher terrain, attacking the garrison is like shooting fish in a barrel. HPG has been very smart to exploit the weakness inherent in the location of the Bezele garrison.

What Yusuf Kanlı said today, in TDN:

The awful statement of a top general "after the heinous ambush on the Aktütün military outpost at Şemdinli district of border province Hakkari, killing 17 of our soldiers" that the military outpost was constructed at a strategically wrong lower ground; the decision was made to move it some 300 meters away on top of a nearby hill but due to financial constraints could not be achieved but would be done within 2009 together with relocation of four similarly vulnerable other outposts indeed underline that there is a serious mistake in the civilian and more so in the military decision making mechanism in setting priorities.

Whatever explanation the military and the government may provide, if an outpost was believed to be located at a vulnerable lower level; that outpost was ambushed by some 38 times by the separatist gang over the past several years and 44 of our sons died in those ambushes, and if the outpost was decided to be relocated at a more appropriate location, is it possible to understand why it was not removed or how few million new liras could not be found to relocate that and other similarly vulnerable outposts to more appropriate places?

Numbers here are interesting only for their creativity; the fact is that 62 Turkish soldiers were killed at Bezele last weekend alone, not 44 over a period spanning an alleged 38 times.

But that's not the news that's causing the feeding frenzy in Turkish media today. The real news today, the news that has everyone on the attack against the paşas, is golf:

For decades Turkey's armed forces have been virtually beyond criticism in a country where the military sees itself as a defender of the modern secular state.

But its status is being questioned after a senior commander was pictured playing golf hours after 17 soldiers were killed in clashes with Kurdish militants.

General Aydogan Babaoglu, head of the air force, took part in a golf tournament in the Mediterranean resort of Antalya last weekend after reports emerged of a deadly attack on a military outpost in Aktutun, near Turkey's border with Iraq, by the Kurdistan Workers' party (PKK).

He later claimed to have coordinated, the military's response from the golf course, which included air strikes against PKK bases in northern Iraq and ground manoeuvres inside Turkey. But he only returned to headquarters in the capital, Ankara, on Saturday evening, when the country was deep in mourning.

Now Babaoglu, 64, has been subjected to a media grilling hitherto unknown for military top brass after photos of his outing appeared on the front of two newspapers, Vakit and Taraf, both supporters of the Islamist-leaning Justice and Development party (AKP) government.

Golf Paşa has an excuse, though:

. . . Babaoglu said his golf trip been cleared in advance by a commander and accused his critics of seeking to undermine the military. "This should not be the way to criticise someone," he said. "By the time I got the news about the attack, I coordinated every move of our soldiers' counter-operations with my fellows in Ankara. Were there any shortcomings in the role of the air forces in the incident? Were there any mistakes? No."

But Babaoglu's claim appeared to be undermined by a statement from the general staff, which said he only learned of the attack on returning to Ankara.

And in connection with the "financial constraints" mentioned in TDN by Kanlı, it appears there have been no "financial constraints" when it comes to constructing costly golf courses on nine Turkish airbases. From Zaman:

While Turkey’s General Staff complained that it lacked the financial resources required to relocate military outposts in risky areas, it funded the construction of golf courses at nine air bases and one military academy, the Vakit daily reported yesterday.

[ . . . ]

Responding to criticism at a press conference last Sunday, Deputy Chief of General Staff Gen. Hasan Iğsız said, “The military outposts have not been renovated because of financial difficulties.”

According to Vakit, Air Forces Commander Gen. Aydoğan Babaoğlu, a golf enthusiast, had golf courses constructed on nine air bases, costing hundreds of thousands of dollars.

The beauty of this feeding frenzy is that it's also caught the chief of the Turkish General Staff, İlker Başbuğ, blowing it out of his ass in Holland. When a Dutch counterpart mentioned that he enjoyed golf for relaxation, Başbuğ replied:

"In Turkey we don't have that luxury."

A writer at Taraf is refusing to do his compulsory military service and is calling for the entire population to join him in a mass act of civil disobedience by refusing military service, too.

And he's right to do so because I was wrong about bumbling incompetence on the part of the terrorist TSK. The truth is that the golf fiasco does not illuminate incompetence; it clearly shows that neither the TSK nor the paşas give a shit about those under their command.

Remember what happened to those Turkish POWs who were released in excellent condition to the TC after the Dağlıca operation? They sit in prison for having become prisoners of the big, bad PKK. No one---not the paşas, not Turkish media, not the Turkish population--rejoiced that those prisoners were released unharmed by PKK. Why? Because the lives of average Turkish soldiers have no value in the eyes of the regime.

On the other hand, I can't remember ever having seen, or heard about, the last time that Heval Dr. Bahoz Erdal was playing golf while those under his command were becoming şehîds.