MURAT KARAYILAN AND ÖCALAN'S ROAD MAP

"I have to state that those who couldn't weaken us during the most difficult years [for us], of 1999-2004, can't ever weaken us today."
~ Murat Karayılan.

There's an excerpted interview with Murat Karayılan featured at Zerkesorg. The most pressing question at this time is what PKK will do about the ceasefire at the end of Ramadan. Here's what Murat Arkadaş has to say:

We extended the conflict-avoidance phase until the end of Ramadan festivities for two reasons. The first reason is the respect we have for Ramadan. The second reason is that we expect the Turkish state to give us the roadmap during this time. Hiding the roadmap and not giving it [to us] will hurt the discussion environment. The process will not move forward without the roadmap. Let me put it clearly: it will be very problematic for us to extend the conflict-avoidance phase. Of course we are discussing the events from every angle. It is obvious that the current phase will face serious difficulties and problems unless the roadmap reaches us by some means. We too have sensitivities, we have a base, we have different organizations, forces. They [the state] say there is the army, the army will do this and that. We have an army too. There are organizations and matters we have to consider. We have to consider all these phenomena. Therefore, such approaches are not right. Our people make demonstrations for this and demand. Our people's expectation, our movement's and democratic organizations' expectation is that the state gives the roadmap right away. Because this is necessary for the continuation of the process. Not giving the roadmap, despite these, will mean that the state doesn't want a solution. Then it is up to them whether to give it or not.

Murat Arkadaş on "brotherhood":

You [the Turkish state] reject Kurdish identity and oppress Kurds and then talk about brotherhood. What kind of brotherhood is this? My language, culture, history, and names are forbidden, I can't own my identity but you say you are brothers. You say Kurds are our brothers but forbid everything belonging to them. This is slavery, slavery by force. We are in the 21st century and the Kurdish people have been enlightened with Apocu culture will not accept this [slavery]. Forcing slavery under the name of brotherhood and doing this by spilling blood with police batons and soldiers' weapons has nothing to do with brotherhood. In the current era this is not possible either. MHP and CHP need to understand this.

Murat Arkadaş has a message for the Turkish state and the international community, warning everyone that no one should "miscalculate":

It's being said that the international conditions are against us. No; that may be your opinion and it may seem that way to you. There is also the side that's visible to us. In this respect, we have reserves and potential to defend ourselves and advance our cause for years. Nobody should make miscalculations on this and approach correctly. We don't talk big. But we are not a simple force either. We are a force that successfully stood up, renewed itself, got stronger, and strengthened its belief and decisiveness despite the attacks against us, supported internationally. In this respect we are in a position in which we have established high morale and motivation, increased belief and decisiveness, and strengthened tenacity for success. I have to state that those who couldn't weaken us during the most difficult years [for us], of 1999-2004, can't ever weaken us today. There is no way for a movement that didn't weaken during that term to weaken today.

Let me add that there are those who have called for a "Sri Lankan Model" to be applied to the Kurdish situation. I would just remind all those with such ideas that the mountains of Kurdistan are not Sri Lanka's beaches.

Likewise there are those who complain about the deaths of Turkish soldiers and characterize the recent clashes as "PKK attacks". Those who are responsible for these deaths are the ones who send soldiers on operations; the guerrillas retain the right to their own self-defense. Such self-defense is hardly consistent with the characterization of "attacks". On the contrary, it is TSK which carries out "attacks" and we know this because we know when communications into the Kurdish regions are completely shut down. When communications are cut, it means TSK is conducting major "attacks", as it was doing during the first weekend in September. It was these TSK "attacks" that resulted in the needless deaths of Turkish soldiers. It is TSK which is trying to "block the peace process."

And while we're on the subject of the death of Turkish soldiers, let's look at an insightful analysis from Children of the Sun:

Turkish Ministry of Defence has published the statistics of dead security forces. Oral Çalışlar recently wrote an article about it. Of course, the data wasn't published widely in Turkish media. The data presents which cities the dead security forces are from. It turns out that in terms of highest losses, six of the top ten cities are Kurdish. The security forces from Kurdish cities (Kurds) are sent to the front lines to fight the PKK. The fascist regime's policy of pitting Kurds against Kurds continues regardless. A Kurd is worthless to the state even if he sides with the state.

Clearly it is in Kurdish interests to see an end to this conflict and that is why DTP and PKK are working for a solution. It's too bad there is no one from the state who is willing to work for the same solution. The fact remains that military-industrial complex and the Deep State continue to use Kurdish blood to lubricate the gears of The System.

And so we go from "Kurdish Initiative" to "Democratic Initiative" to "National Unity Initiative". Words, words, words with no more substance to them than air.

PKK IS NOT A "TERRORIST ORGANIZATION"

"International law calls this organization's actions "terror" if it conducts an armed struggle when it has an alternative way of struggle through the open door of politics and law."
~ Ahmet Altan, Taraf.

Ahmet Altan explains why PKK is not a "terrorist organization", from Taraf:

You Cannot Solve It by Saying It's Terror


I don't know how our generals came to the point that they believe they know the best of everything.

I guess they are getting educated like that in military schools.

They have ideas for every subject and they want their ideas to be implemented.

If the thing they wanted does not come about, they show their weapons.

For instance, they say, "A president whose wife wears a scarf cannot sit in Çankaya."

For this they write memoranda.

Then, in elections when people say, "Sure it can, why shouldn't it," they get surprised.

In addition to having ideas about the scarf issue, they have uncriticizable ideas about the Kurdish question, too.

While talking about the Kurdish question, the general staff talks about, "hitting the 'terrorist' organization."

Is this a solution?

The army is hitting against PKK for twenty-five years.

What is the result?

Thousands of dead, hundreds of millions of dollars spent.

And the Kurdish question remains unsolved in front of society.

PKK continues its existence in the mountains.

I guess before everything, we have to decide what PKK is.

Is PKK a terrorist organization?

The thing that you say as a terrorist organization has ten members, fifty members, one hundred members at the most.

However, PKK is an organization that has thousands of militants, fighting with an army for twenty-five years, can establish an electric power plant, builds a dam, has an organization that is spread throughout the world, has a large financial source, and has the support of an important number of people.

This cannot be called a "terrorist organization."

International law calls this organization's actions "terror" if it conducts an armed struggle when it has an alternative way of struggle through the open door of politics and law.

However this doesn't make PKK a "terrorist organization" but makes it an organization that conducts "terror".

If you think the reverse, I think it will be better understood.

There have been seventeen thousand extra-judicial murders in The Southeast.

Slowly it is revealed that most of these murders have been committed by JİTEM, which is under the authority of the army.

The informers tell everything; at the addresses where the secret witnesses point, bodies come out.

Collecting seventeen thousand people from the street and killing them is certainly terrorism.

Does this conduct make the army a "terrorist organization"?

No.

It makes it an organization that implements terror in The Southeast.

If we cannot understand what PKK is, we cannot comprehend the reason for its existence, and how it survived despite twenty-five years of war, and thousands of its casualties.

PKK is an organization that has its roots in people.

The Turkish view of PKK and the Kurdish view of PKK is very different.

PKK, for some Kurds, is a "holy" organization.

Among Kurds, it has several opponents, people who are angry with it, people who criticize it, but in general all the Kurds think the "Kurdish question" was brought to the country's attention by PKK.

Without understanding these, planning a strategy of "war" or "peace" is convicting yourself to failure.

I know that seeing the realities in this country discomforts some people, but it is impossible to solve the problems without seeing the truth.

Both Turkish and Kurdish politicians, the army, and PKK, too, must get out from the "cyber-world" which was created by a war that lasted for twenty-five years and confront the realities.

If the state's goal is the annihilation of PKK, this is a wrong goal.

Firstly, it is impossible to annihilate PKK with arms.

Secondly, even if you annihilate PKK, you will not be able to solve the problem. A new organization will show up in its place.

The problem is the usurpation of the rights of fifteen million people.

As long as the Turks hold the power of "granting rights" to the Kurds, this problem will continue.

We have to form a state in which no one has a right to "grant a right" to another and we have to form a state in which the rights of all people are guaranteed through a social contract.

The chief of the general staff says, "Cultural rights can be given, but on an individual basis."

He says Kurds cannot do politics.

He cannot say this.

In a normal country society will tell such a general, "It's none of your business."

These are the decisions that civilian politicians will decide.

Whether cultural or political rights will be given, who is going to talk with whom, are not the jobs of the military.

If the soldiers are going to do politics, who is going to do the military's job?

We have to take the military out of these issues.

Then we have to sit and evaluate the situation realistically.

The Kurdish question is not a question that can be solved by reducing it to a "terrorist" question by calling PKK a "terrorist organization", and passing the issue of "who will give rights to whom" to the military.

The Kurds and the Turks are going to sit and talk.

They will seek ways where everybody can feel themselves as "first-class" citizens, secured, comfortable, and happy.

Furthermore this is not an option anymore for the two sides. This is a "must"; because life commands it with its fearsome power.

For more on PKK's position on this subject, see:

Notes from Kandil, 1

Notes from Kandil 2: This Isn't Your Dad's PKK

Notes from Kandil 3: Where There's a Will . . .

Notes from Kandil 4: Possibilities

Karayılan in The Times

BAŞBUĞ KNOWS WHAT HAPPENED AT AKTÜTÜN, PART 3

"Besides, to solve the Kurdish question, Öcalan must be contacted, must be talked with. There is no one in Turkey, with the exception of him [Öcalan] to solve this problem. There is no one with the exception of him that can contribute as much as him to solve this problem."
~ Avni Özgürel.

Today is the third and final part of the interview between Taraf's Neşe Düzel and researcher Avni Özgürel (Part 1; Part 2):

ND: Aktütün is being raided frequently and we have martyrs there. Doesn't PKK increase its morale by giving the Turkish army such casualties?

AÖ: Of course, yes. Even the press statement that the Chief of General Staff had, in which he revealed his anger, resulted in increasing PKK's morale and motivation by saying, "We make the world's eighth largest army's commander go crazy".

ND: The Chief of General Staff gave a very rigid and very angry response to our newspaper's statement that the raid was known well before. The people who were supporting him the most also said it is not an acceptable thing. Why do you think he had such an angry reaction?

AÖ: Actually, the Chief of General Staff is projecting his anger for those in his ranks onto others. Otherwise, someone who rises to a general's position, it is impossible for him not to know what happened at Aktütün. He does know what happened there, who is responsible, and what was wrong in the mechanism that was running. However, in Turkey, all the institutions have the attitude of "let's cover it". But right now in Turkey, the situation is changing. Society is questioning, as "What happened at Aktütün". For that reason, the Chief of General Staff's statement is not persuasive; it is not satisfying them anymore.

ND: The government, on the other hand, rather than opening an investigation of Aktütün, supported the Chief of General Staff. The Prime Minister took General Başbuğ's side. Erdoğan had done the same thing in Şemdinli as well. However, AKP has not emerged from the shadow of Şemdinli yet. How do you think creating a second Şemdinli will affect AKP?

AÖ: It will affect them negatively. This attitude will affect AKP's constituencies in a negative way, and has already done so.

ND: Do you think Erdoğan had a deal with the military?

AÖ: I think Erdoğan desires very much to have a deal with the military. However, the military still has some reserve against him.

ND: Do you think AKP is reinforcing its ruling power or weakening its ruling power by supporting the general's angry statement instead of investigating the reason for the incident?

AÖ: It weakens. In Turkey, no ruling political entity has a concern about being capable. All of them are trying to have a deal with the military. In all Turkish history, only Turgut Özal tried to be capable of ruling rather than having a deal with the military, and he paid the price.

ND: The Kurdish question lies under all these raids, clashes, and bloodshed, and AKP is not taking any concrete step to solve the problem. Did ruling political parties pass the question to the military?

AÖ: They cannot pass it because this is not a job the military can do. This is not a security issue. This is an issue of Turkish democratization. And, of course, when you democratize Turkey, you won't have any problem with head scarf, you won't have any problem with the Kurdish question. In Turkey, if the EU's democratic standards become dominant, neither the military will be unquestionable nor will our distorted judiciary be the way it is. Neither will corruption be at the level it is today. However, in this country, it is not wanted to solve the Kurdish question, because there are people who are profiting from it, not only the soldiers, but the security units, politicians, businessmen. In short, a big part of society benefits from this question. The Kurdish question is feeding all the ommissions and illegal money.

ND: How do you think the Kurdish question be solved?

AÖ: Starting from cultural and political rights, all the disturbing texts, including the constitution in Turkey, must be rewritten. The notion of Kurds and Turks are like [finger]nail and flesh must be reflected in the law. Besides, to solve the Kurdish question, Öcalan must be contacted, must be talked with. There is no one in Turkey, with the exception of him [Öcalan] to solve this problem. There is no one with the exception of him that can contribute as much as him to solve this problem.

ND: Why? Is PKK under Öcalan's control?

AÖ: By and large, yes, it is under his control. A formulation must be created that Öcalan can convince his grassroots. Meanwhile, the İmralı era must also end. His release may not be the case, but Öcalan can be imprisoned in very good conditions and his wish is not to be released anyway. In Turkey, in a place wherever he wants, leaving him away from politics, somewhere may be bought for him, and let him see his visitors there. Turkish punishment and execution laws are available for this change. I know that the solution must be in this way. I know that the analysis that says this issue must be solved in this way exists in Turkey's hands today.

ND: Will the soldiers be close to such a solution?

AÖ: I know that, in terms of the military, they are getting closer to this end. Even now, it is being written in several places that Öcalan has been spoken to by general-ranked commanders. Look, the Kurdish question is not merely a law or violence issue, there is also a psychological dimension to it. We call PKK a "terrorist" organization; however, is PKK only a "terrorist" organization? There is no single European country where they don't have a representative. They have diplomatic relationships with states. Thousands of Öcalan's posters are being held in protests. PKK has exceeded being a "terrorist" organization. It is in a well-advanced form right now.

ND: What do you think Öcalan was talked to about in İmralı?

AÖ: Especially the intelligence unit talked to him and the answer to the question, "Can the Kurdish question be solved?" was sought at that time. The answer was revealed as "Yes, it can be solved". Both the military and intelligence units know this answer. However, on the military side, it is a matter of courage to do this.

ND: Ergenekon paşas also went to İmralı. What did they talk about with Öcalan?

AÖ: "This man can finish terror. If terror ends, what are we going to do?" is one dimension of this job. There are some people who have benefits from an unsolved Kurdish question. Turkey is buying very serious numbers of arms from abroad. Unmanned aircraft. Do you know how much AWACs cost? Turkey must immediately solve its Kurdish question, otherwise it will lead to separation. Kurdish nationalism is becoming a very big danger.

ND: The relationship between PKK and Ergenekon has been mentioned. What kind of relationship do they have?

AÖ: In the past they were intertwined. This relationship is not only in drug-trafficking but also in operational levels. It might have been said to PKK that "You guys have been cowards. You better do some noisy stuff [shooting] or we will step in".

ND: DTP's closure case is ongoing. Are they going to shut it down?

AÖ: I hope they do not. The Kurdish question will get damaged very badly in DTP's closure. The defense that, "Hmm, this question is not being solved politically, well, the people on the mountains are right". This logic will become prevalent in people's minds. Thus enlistment in the mountains will increase and the support for the struggle in the mountains will increase at the same time.

ND: Does Ergenekon have a share in the rising terror?

AÖ: Not the Ergenekon that we're investigating, but the real Ergenekon has. Ergenekon is a structure in MİT and in the military and, in Turkey, Ergenekon will never end. The current Ergenekon was the formation that was revealed at Susurluk. One part of this imprisoned Ergenekon was revealed at Susurluk and it is eliminated. There will be another version of such a formation.

ND: Regional elections are getting closer. How do you think Prime Minister Erdoğan's recent statements will affect the vote in the Southeast?

AÖ: Today's jargon will make AKP lose in Diyarbakır and I think the votes that create a gap between AKP and DTP is getting wider in favor of DTP.

ND: Today in Turkey, is there any politician that can solve the Kurdish question and make peace feasible?

AÖ: No, there is not. The main problem is this anyway: the job is not being done just by raising Diyarbakırspor to promote it to the first league from the second or third league. Let the Kurds be everywhere in this country, in politics . . . . the Kurdish question is not about their songs or folklore or their football. Turkey must discuss if you eliminate Kurds from politics.

In addition, today on NPR's evening news program, All Things Considered, was a radio report on the media feeding frenzy in Turkey over the military and the Bezele (Aktütün) operation. Included is a short discussion of Taraf's leading role in the criticism of the paşas and you can hear Yasemin Çongar present Taraf's reasoning for publishing the evidence which has damned the paşas over HPG's Bezele operation. Listen here or read the transcript, on the same page.

BAŞBUĞ KNOWS WHAT HAPPENED AT AKTÜTÜN, PART 2

"The people who are executing PKK's struggle, including Bayık and Karayılan, have been there for 25 years. We don't have any general that has served in the Southeast more than two years. "
~ Avni Özgürel.

Here is part 2 of the interview between Taraf's Neşe Düzel and researcher Avni Özgürel (Part 1 is here):

ND: Has drug-trafficking been used in financing the struggle against PKK?

AÖ: Of course it has been used. From the Southeast to Edirne (NW Turkey), drugs were transported along with official escorts. The people who got involved with this, after some time, said, "Why should I endanger myself on the mountain while there is an option to share the drugs and to extort and to form gangs? Why should I go into PKK and collect information for JITEM?"

ND: However, in Aktütün, there was the case that there was no lack of intelligence.

AÖ: That's true. For the Aktütün raid, there were additional things, let alone receiving intelligence. There are TV's that are close to PKK; they have their publications. For instance, in Roj TV, "on 21 August our congress is assembling in Qendil" they broadcast. The administrators, including from Europe, joined this congress. Cemil Bayık, Murat Karayılan, all of them were there. The meeting lasted for ten days and there were scenes and interviews in Roj TV. 21 August means two weeks before the Aktütün raid. PJAK also joined PKK's congress, which lasted until 30 August.

ND: You mean Iran's PKK also joined?

AÖ: When PKK said, "we have serious casualties because of Turkish aerial attacks", the head of PJAK, which is a branch of PKK in Iran, joined the Qendil congress and PJAK's chief Hacı Ahmet said, "From now on our first target is Turkey," all these things happened ten days ago. In Qendil there weren't just three people, there were twelve hundred people that assembled. However, the armed forces did not have a single aerial operation in August.

ND: Why didn't they do that?

AÖ: We have to explain this. People want to know the answer to this question. If you are willing to finish PKK, and if you are so angry, PKK's whole administrative groups were there. PKK could have been annihilated. This congress did not take only one day, but ten days. Let's say you could not see those people who came to the border, you said the geography is very mountainous, and so forth. Haven't you even watched the party's television? After this congress, seventeen youths were killed at Aktütün. Right after that, police were shot in Diyarbakır and there were some explanations or statements that were labeling the journalists who were asking about the errors in this incident as traitors to the country.

ND: Our army is fighting in the Southeast for years, and they must be very experienced in this. How come these kinds of raids are still occuring?

AÖ: If you send the youths, who have eight months of military training, and you send them to fight against PKK at the very far point of the border, this is a normal result. Look at the people who were killed at Aktütün, they were inexperienced kids. The people who are executing PKK's struggle, including Bayık and Karayılan, have been there for 25 years. We don't have any general that has served in the Southeast more than two years. Whoever stays there longer than that goes crazy.

ND: How?

AÖ: In advanced countries, the people who serve in hot zones more than one or two years, the army gives them a new assignment, say in airports, for a six month period in order to rehabilitate, to let them see people. We don't have such a thing. One time, an old friend of mine came to Istanbul and I took him to an entertaining place. There, at the table, he became like he would use his weapon against me [saying] "we are dying there and you are dancing here". He had cut himself off from the real world.

ND: Back to Aktütün, what happened there and what will happen there?

AÖ: Now we are sending a new unit to Aktütün. Now you imagine the family that has a son that has been sent to this place again. After one year they say they are going to move the garrison 300 meters away. Why are you defending there? You are defending a 300 meter height? As an excuse they say, "Well, in Lausanne our borders were drawn wrong and for that reason let's form a buffer zone". They are making very stupid suggestions and supposedly they are going to tell this to Iraq. Iraq will say, "Okay, form a buffer zone"; but they will include, "You form that buffer zone within your borders. Why do you think particularly of my territory when you suggest a buffer zone?" they will ask. Nevertheless, until Arbil (Hewler), that region is also mountainous. Where are you going to form the buffer zone? Besides, the US will say, "We gave you Öcalan and you could not solve the problem; we are giving you intelligence and you cannot solve the problem again." And when we come to the Iraqi regime, we are pressuring them, and still it's not doing anything.

ND: Don't you think the people who've been trained as chiefs of general staff are thinking with this logic?

AÖ: In politics, despite their failures, they do the same old thing. Similarly, they do the same old thing in the military as well. Everyone does their period [of service] and retires, and I don't think they know comprehensively about the region's history very well.

ND: Okay, but how can we explain the fact that the ommission of the intelligence that was received way before? Don't they take the intelligence seriously?

AÖ: There will be two consequences of the Aktütün investigation. Either you will say, "We received all the intelligence and we did all the evaluation; however, we could not complete the required protection web with helicopters within six hours." In this case, those responsible for this failure must immediately be taken before the highest military court. Or, "There may be intelligence, but we did not give credibility to its occurrence". Then, this means this will lead to questions of your military capabilities and your chief of staff's capabilities. If the Aktütün investigation does not take those responsible, who are in a command level . . .

ND: What will happen?

AÖ: This means there is a very hopeless situation in Turkey. This investigation must end up with finding the responsible commanders and give a satisfying explanation to the public, and take these people who were responsible in front of the military court.

ND: An operation that is known way ahead of time, and that is being watched through aerial surveillance, how can it not be prevented?

AÖ: This incident definitely must have several responsible parties in various positions. Otherwise it is not very credible to say, "It is not Aktütün; these scenes being broadcast are all lies"--this kind of fake explanation--Publishing these radio transcripts [of HPG guerrillas], all these are lies. It is hard to be very persuasive with this mentality. In Turkey, including the armed forces, every institution must be held accountable. If you spend all the world's money for Foca [in Izmir] and you say that you do not have money for the Aktütün garrison, someone definitely question this. And I think they must do so, too. In Turkey there was a very serious change. People are now asking, they are questioning, and they are not seeing the people who are silent.

ND: Okay, when one knows about a raid like Aktütün ahead of time, with deterrent precaution, can we stop such raids?

AÖ: Of course it would deter. In the Aktütün raid, the people who condoned the implementation of this raid, or the people who did not take sufficient precaution, in whatever position they are, those people, whether in the rank of general or a force commander--any position--they must be taken before the public. And the Chief of General Staff's statement that "the investigation has started and the result will be declared" this must be considered as a commitment. On every occasion, the press must ask the chief of general staff what is the result of the Aktütün investigation.

ND: A while ago you touched on the issue that the Aktütün garrison would shut down. Even last May, after it had a raid, why was such a garrison not shut down after that raid? Is not shutting down such a place consistent with military logic?

AÖ: Of course it is not consistent. I went to Aktütün. It is a ghetto-like place. Indeed it is a guarding garrison. In a raid, it gets damaged remarkably; however, Aktütün seems like an honor issue for our army. Of course there is a moral meaning about those people who were martyred there, but indeed all these border garrisons are actually graveyards. We never know what's going to happen to those kids. It is not certain there. When an artillery shell explodes, we don't know how many people will die. All these border garrisons must be removed.

ND: Can the borders be protected without garrisons?

AÖ: Well, what's going to happen by protecting there anyway? Is the place that you defend your country a place 3,000 meters high in the mountains? You get down on the slopes of the mountain and prevent infiltration there. These border garrisons were established for those Iraqi villager smugglers who were bringing kaçak tea, tobacco, cigarettes, and drugs. And they put four jandarma [there] in order to tell those people to raise their hands and surrender. They have established those garrisons with this mentality. These garrisons were not established to prevent guerrilla attacks. The problem is not where the garrisons are located; the problem is the existence of these garrisons. There is no profit or gain from these garrisons. Until this time they could not even prevent any single entrance.

Part 3 tomorrow.

BAŞBUĞ KNOWS WHAT HAPPENED AT AKTÜTÜN

"PKK is not something that can be finished with one person's decision, or Öcalan's decision, or the Chief of General Staff's decision."
~ Avni Özgürel.

Today, Land Forces Commander Işık Koşaner firmly denied any mistakes by TSK during HPG's Aktütün (Bezele) operation. If TSK's perfect operational performance resulted in the deaths of 62 Turkish soldiers, then you have to ask yourself how good it would be for HPG if TSK really screwed things up.

Not everyone agrees with the paşas' self-serving analysis, however. Last week Taraf interviewed Avni Özgürel, a Turkish researcher who has written books on Turkish political history, "terrorism", and the Kurdish question, after some analysis he had made about the Aktütün (Bezele) operation. Here's some of the information from that interview:

Başbuğ knows what happened at Aktütün


According to Avni Özgürel it is impossible for Başbuğ not to know the real dimensions of Aktütün and those responsible. The anger that he reflected actually is against his own ranks.

Aktütün must render an account--Avni Özgürel, who was interviewed by Neşe Düzel, talked very clearly while evaluating the Aktütün incident: Either we received all the intelligence but failed the required protection or the intelligence might have been received but we didn't give it any credence. In either situation the responsible ones must be taken before the court, otherwise the situation is hopeless.

They fear that PKK will end--"There is also a dimension of 'what if terror ends'" said Özgürel; and he thinks the policy of terrorism enables one to control politics. Terror creates an enormous amount of profit. PKK is not a job that can be finished by only one person's decision, the profit is big. In this country, they transported narcotics even with official escorts.

Öcalan must intervene for a solution--PKK is, by and large, under Öcalan's control. There must be a formula for a solution of which Öcalan can convince his supporters. The İmralı era must end. The execution law is available for this, including the constitution--the text that disturbs the Kurds--must be rewritten. The phrase, "Turks and Kurds are like fingernail and flesh," must be reflected in the law.

Can the Kurdish question be solved? Yes--The intelligence units talked to Öcalan anyway. They have searched for an answer to the question, "Can the Kurdish Question be solved?" and the answer was revealed as "Yes, it can be solved". Both soldiers and intelligence know this situation. In Turkey this question certainly must be solved. Kurdish nationalism is at very dangerous levels. Otherwise, the state may be divided.

From the interview itself:

ND: In spite of the intelligence report and the information and warnings received, why were the required precautions not taken?

AÖ: There is a problem in the mechanism of the armed forces. It is always a minus score in a commander's promotion to have casualties in a clash. For that reason, in the armed forces, everyone conveys responsibility to one's higher rank and when the highest one goes to play golf, the mechanism just stops. Whereas, according to the troop's statements, reinforcements arrived after eight hours.

ND: Can't the incidents that occured in Aktütün be explained with this?

AÖ: This is a factor. It is known that PKK was preparing for this attack for one month. They had planted mines along the routes leading to Aktütün village. This means the garrison had been seized from four sides and, moreover, this fact is not being denied. Because right after the incident it was said, "the intelligence we received from the US is perfect. We have no lack of intelligence." However, there is this situation: the intelligence is not being collected for memories. The intelligence is gathered for evaluation.

ND: Actually, I'm asking exactly this: Why then, despite the whole intelligence, the required precautions were not taken?

AÖ: In this job there is also the dimension of "what if terror ends?" Let me give you an example from Fatih. Fatih goes to Albania and gets defeated. And when he investigates what happened, he finds out that the commanders thought that if they win this war, the sultan would no longer need them. For that reason, they just retreated from the front. Today in Turkey, PKK is a cause of several things for security units.

ND: It's a cause of what, for example?

AÖ: Terror is something that enables you to control politics. This was so in the US, too. It was because the US could not generate a political decision, that they could not end the Vietnam War for a long time. Everyone knew to get out of Vietnam but the war was such an enormous economic benefit that if Vietnam ended, their enormous benefits would end.

ND: Is terror still a source of a huge amount of profit in Turkey?

AÖ: Yes, very. [Because] it is so big that enables this problem not to be finished. Years ago in Damascus, when I had an interview with Öcalan. Öcalan told me, "If I finish this, they are going to finish me." PKK is not something that can be finished with one person's decision, or Öcalan's decision, or the Chief of General Staff's decision. This job has the arms sellers, politicians, military and security units and their associations, and it is similar for PKK. PKK also has televisions and representatives abroad. There, there is money that they cut from each Kurd from their salaries for this. There is something for everyone that cannot be finished because it is that profitable. Do you know how much each rocket costs that is used in aerial strikes? And there is also a dimension of drug-trafficking. In the past in Turkey there were people at the level of professors in universities saying, "In the US they're financing anti-terrorism through drug-trafficking; we also must do that," and they wrote such reports.

Part 2 tomorrow.

TUMBLING DOWN THE RABBIT HOLE

"I imagine that right now you're feeling a bit like Alice. Tumbling down the rabbit hole?"
~ Morpheus, The Matrix.

Having reviewed a number of news links from last week on the Ergenekon case, I decided that the one to devote time to, was the one by Taraf's Yasemin Çongar, from 30 July, titled: "Deniz Baykal is also in Ergenekon's schema".

Taraf created a stir earlier this summer when it published the details of TSK's "Information Support Activity Plan". A few days after the news broke, Yasemin Çongar gave a summarized explanation of the plan in an interview with Spiegel Online. Taraf also broke the news about TSK's blundering of the Dağlıca raid, as discussed at Azadixwaz. Then there was the revelation in Taraf that Turkish constitutional court judge Osman Paksüt held several secret meetings with very-soon-to-be chief of the Turkish general staff, İlker Başbuğ. Paksüt was one of the judges hearing the for-show-only AKP closure case.

Taraf has been doing what journalists are supposed to be doing, exposing the ugly underbelly of political machinery. That's one big reason why I chose to work on Çongar's discussion of the CHP chairman's name in the Ergenekon lists.

Much has been made in the last few weeks in the Turkish media about alleged links between PKK and Öcalan and the Ergenekon gang; however, aside from an Ergenekon plan called "The Antidote", linked to Veli Küçük and, in the indictment (first part, pages 120-121), also linked to Ümit Oğuztan, there is no other mention of Abdullah Öcalan, in the first part of the indictment. "The Antidote" was a scheme by Ergenekon to take over control of the PKK through Öcalan, although the time frame involved here appears to be since Öcalan's incarceration at Imralı. There is no evidence presented in the indictment that "The Antidote" was carried out. Linked to the information on "The Antidote", is more information from a now deceased Ergenekon member, Kuddusi Okkır, that Ergenekon had other plans consistent with "The Antidote" in every way except for the mention of Öcalan or PKK. The consistency according to these plans was that Ergenekon envisioned "seeding" all kinds of state organizations--"from the Army to MİT, from the police to the Diyanet, from the judiciary to the state . . . "--and thereby takeover the TC.

Let me reiterate: There was only one of these plans, "The Antidote", that mentioned PKK as a target of Ergenekon "seeding," and there is no mention of evidence showing that any kind of "seeding" was actually carried out within PKK or with Öcalan. If there were a concrete cooperation between Ergenekon and PKK, as Turkish media asserts, then why would Veli Küçük need to covertly attempt to create a "linkage" with PKK by sending spies to take over the organization or gain Öcalan's consent for such a scheme? Cooperation is between two willing parties, but to have to create "linkage", as mentioned in the indictment, indicates that there is resistance to any cooperation on the part of the PKK.

The one hard piece of evidence cited is a very old, widely published photo of Serok Apo with Doğu Perinçek, the chairman of the Workers' Party, who has been indicted as an Ergenekon member. An old article of Perinçek's from 1995, in which he describes what should be the Workers' Party approach to the Kurdish situation is also available online. However, the fact that the photo of Öcalan and Perinçek was widely published proves nothing of a PKK link to Ergenekon. If anyone wants to go down that road, they will have to link Mehmet Ali Birand, Nazlı Ilıcak, Cengiz Çandar, Ahmet Altan, and Yasemin Çongar herself, among others, with the Ergenekon lists because all of them have interviewed either Öcalan or members of KCK's executive council at one time or another. But those people are not named in the lists. If they were, Yasemin Çongar would have found her name in the lists, along with the other famous Taraf journalist, Ahmet Altan, and she would have written her own defense instead of raising questions about Deniz Baykal's place on the list.

It would appear, however, that the lies surrounding the issue of "The Antidote" stem from Tuncay Güney, a one-time, small-time journalist in whose possession the original Ergenekon documents were found in 2001. Güney has been linked to Fethullah Gülen and Gülen's Samanyolu TV. Güney claims to have brought the photos of Öcalan and Perinçek to MİT. He claims to have taken a bribe of $15,000 to PKK in order not to shut down Gülen's schools in Hewler, although how PKK would have had any control over anything in Hewler is a huge question. Perhaps the KDP took the bribe by introducing themselves as PKK members? Güney also claıms to have delivered money from Fethullah Gülen to ultra-fascist Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu so that he could establish the BBP.

Zaman has some additional weird tidbits about Güney:

Meanwhile, in an interview with the Yeni Şafak daily, Tuncay Güney, a former journalist whose ties with various secret services, both domestic and international, have been documented, stated that Kurdish separatist terrorism would come to an end if the Ergenekon gang wanted that to happen. Güney, who now lives in Canada and works as a rabbi, has suspected ties to the group. Güney came to prominence when the first documents related to the Ergenekon gang were seized on his computer in a 2001 police raid.

Güney, currently a rabbi at the Jacobs House Jewish Community Center in Toronto, praised Ergenekon prosecutor Zekeriya Öz for having “done a great job” so far in the investigation, although he expressed doubts that the operation would be very successful in the end. “However, they are very close to the end and I think it is very difficult moving on further from this point. There is no power in Turkey that can stop Ergenekon,” he said, expressing doubts that the investigation will bring about the collapse of the crime group.

A check of YouTube reveals that Güney does, in fact, appear to be a member of an Orthodox Jewish community in Toronto, although he now denies any connection with Fethullah Gülen, as his appearance on Mehmet Ali Birand's 32. Gün indicates. If the first Ergenekon documents were found in Güney's possession, why has he not been indicted? Did he cut a deal and, if so, what kind of deal was it? Is his life now, in an Orthodox Jewish community in Toronto some kind of strange "witness protection" program?

Furthermore, during the 1990s, many who were named in Ergenekon's indictment were holding meetings with PKK and presenting themselves as active representatives of the TC, and PKK tried to negotiate with them in good faith with that representation. These meetings were held in order to reach a solution to the Kurdish situation, as discussed earlier this week on Özgür Gündem. As ÖG points out throughout the article, such meetings were publicized by the media forerunners of ÖG. It is impossible to blame PKK for having a connection with those people as members of a covert "terrorist" organization, when PKK accepted them as authentic representatives of government holding the power to carry out sincere negotiations, and that's with an authenticity that those people themselves presented as legitimate.

Finally, the almost 2,500-page Ergenekon indictment has been released to the public, Word document here or at Hürriyet. If there were a concrete relationship between Öcalan or the PKK, and Ergenekon, there would be plenty of ammunition to fill pages and pages of daily publications and hours and hours of broadcast airtime. But there is nothing . . . except an old photo that, for years before anyone knew the name "Ergenekon", has been widely available to anyone who can search Google, and a plan, unimplemented, called "The Antidote".

Instead, here is a summary of the indictment contents by Nabi Yağcı at TDN:

Although I wrote repeatedly that I had no doubts about some coup preparations, frankly I was not expecting such a loaded Ergenkon indictment and that the prosecutors can dare a thorough investigation. I think that's why the indictment caused a “shock” in the press. We had already heard so many matters, relations or incidents long before the indictment was publicly announced. But still, this indictment is shocking not because of its being an in-depth examination or not because of the well-known personas involved in this suit.

[ . . . ]

In short, my first impression of the indictment was first of all that the likelihood of a coup was so high, and secondly I was struck by its content. There are clear signs about the Susurluk and Şemdinli incidents. Although the indictment does not directly include the murders by unknown perpetrators in the Southeast, they were pointed out too. We see that some of the Ergenekon leaders are trained for operations against Kurds in the Southeast. This will be extremely important in the public eye. The indictment reaches the murders of Hrant Dink, Necip Hablemitoğlu and Uğur Mumcu, the Council of State attack, and even Cyprus.

Again, no mention of cooperation between Öcalan or PKK and Ergenekon.

Now, on to Yasemin Çongar's editorial piece, from Taraf:

Deniz Baykal Is Also in Ergenekon's Schema


Previously, we had written an article headlined in Taraf.

One part of the article, written on 11 July 2008, was as follows:

************

"It was about five years ago.

"The Turkish National Intelligence agency (MİT) sent a top secret report to the Prime Ministry.

"The topic was Ergenekon.

"MİT's document included the Ergenekon gang's schema, and this organization's investigation was requested.

"In the organization's schema, dated 2003, there were politicians', businessmen's, and journalists' names [listed] as Ergenekon members.

"Among the politicians, a party's chairman's name grabs attention.

"In the gang's list of journalists, a general editor of a big news daily, its Ankara representative, and a very popular journalist are listed.

"Among Ergenekon's businessmen, there were [listed] both industrialists and media bosses, too.

"It cannot be proof that those people on the Ergenekon lists were doing anything for Ergenekon, either consciously or unconsciously.

"But, it shows this:

"A series of names who are active today in politics, business, and media, were reported by MİT to the Prime Ministry that they might have a relationship with Ergenekon and should be investigated.

"MİT collected intelligence about Ergenekon, which is thought of as a "legend" by some people, conveyed this suspicion and intelligence, to the Prime Ministry with the emphasis that it should be investigated.

"I'm not going to write the names, in order not to implicate anyone.

"I will just let it go at this: the Prime Ministry conveyed this document on 2 July 2008 to the people who are responsible for the investigation of Ergenekon."

************

It was reflected in the indictment like this

Two weeks after the publication of this article [referring to the schema article above], and the headline in Taraf as "MİT has Ergenekon's organizational schema", the Ergenekon indictment was released.

On pages 49 and 50 of the indictment, the information which Taraf published was evaluated under the title, "MİT Undersecretariat's Report Regarding the Ergenekon Terrorist Organization".

In short, the MİT Undersecretariat presented this document, the information for which was received by an unknown source in 2002, and is considered as a booklet that contained information characteristic of an indictment, first, in 2003, to the General Staff, then to the Prime Ministry, and a summary of the study was sent to the Prime Ministry and General Staff again in 2006, as stated by the Ergenekon indictment.

The indictment, in this same section, gives a large quotation from a writing that was sent in 2003 from MİT to the Prime Ministry.

In this quote, under "Conclusions", MİT's evaluation is quoted as follows:

"Based on current information, though we are not certain, we have the impression that the works that are being implemented using the name "Ergenekon" are the endavours for organizing a group which targets "state/regime" for their own benefits."

"However, the information came about in an indictment form from various sources that are parallel and consistent with each other, gives meaning that is more than gossip, and it indicates the signs of a directed and organized activity.

"For this reason, the current information about the [indicates that the] subject aims to gain control over civilian will covertly, and the creation of a new administration with a new formation under the directed control of cadres of people who have a military origin, using some non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and political parties as well as the media."

The related part in the indictment concludes as "Ergenekon is identified as an illegal organization by MİT Undersecretariat itself and this has been recorded with an official report".

The names that MİT conveyed

Yesterday, we discussed CHP chairman Deniz Baykal's group speech in Taraf's editorial section.

He seemed like a "deep" attorney; he had a shallow defense.

He was targetting the Ergenekon prosecutors directly; he was belittling the indictment.

In one part of his speech, he used this ironic phrase: "According to the indictment, Ergenekon has a long history; however, MİT is unaware of this."

Actually Baykal's words were no different than the other volunteer gang attorneys' writings, who try to blacken the Ergenekon case.

Again, we had a hard time understanding the intention of his words, [coming from someone] whom we know as a pro-state party leader, which seemed to support an organization that the state's MİT and several more state departments, including TSK, think it would be beneficial to investigate this organization.

We thought Baykal was defending not the state, but the "Deep State".

With this thought, today while preparing our first page of the newspaper, we learned that the MİT report that I wrote an article about on 11 July, would be among the annexes of the Ergenekon indictment, which would be released on 1 August.

We remembered that among the politicians linked to the organization, the political party leader Deniz Baykal existed in the schemas of the annexes of the mentioned document [the report from MİT] in 2003, named "Ergenekon".

We don't know whether Baykal or the people listed in the MİT document that will be released on Friday, have any link with Ergenekon.

However, as I mentioned on 11 July, all we can say is "it is reported from MİT to the Prime Ministry that today there are names that are active in the political arena, business, and media, that might be linked to Ergenekon".

Based on the details in the indictment, we learn that this claim might have been conveyed to MİT by an unknown source.

Maybe this claim is not true, but it is obvious that MİT felt compelled to report this schema to the Prime Ministry in 2003.

In addition, a summary of the study was resent to the Prime Ministry in 2006; the General Staff also received the same reports in 2003 and 2006.

Inevitably, one gets curious:

What did the Ergenekon prosecutors, who are aware of these reports, the schemas, the lists of names, think about Deniz Baykal's severe criticism against them?

And I wonder whether or not Baykal knew there were documents about his links with Ergenekon, when he first started acting like Ergenekon's attorney?

And I wonder why the first Ergenekon documents were found in 2001, another anonymous source gave information in 2002, MİT notified Erdoğan and the TSK in 2003 and again in 2006, and nothing was acted upon until 2008? I wonder why the Ergenekon investigation only began in earnest in July 2007, with the discovery of Ergenekon's weapons cache in Istanbul Ümraniye, during the same month as the last general elections and two months after the May 2007 Dolmabahçe Deal between Erdoğan and Büyükanıt? I wonder why only those well-known as Deep Staters have been indicted and not the entire, active organization?

And I wonder how deep the rabbit hole really goes?

JOINT OPERATION IN DERSIM: YJA-STAR AND TKPML-TİKKO

"After this the soldiers stopped distinguishing between the male and the female fighters. I think they are now more afraid of the women because the women are more disciplined and they will never surrender. We will either kill or be killed. For me it is freedom, success or death. It is simple."
~ Heval Surbuz, YJA-STAR.

On 10 July there was a significant news item on Özgür Gündem which described a recent joint operation between YJA-STAR women guerrillas and the women guerrillas of the TKPML-TİKKO (Türkiye Komünist Partisi/Marksist-Leninist-Türk İşci ve Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu; Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist-Turkish Workers' and Peasants' Liberation Army). I call it significant because I cannot recall a time in the past where PKK has conducted joint military operations with other groups inside Turkey, particularly with TKPML-TİKKO. Here's the link and a translation:

Joint operation with YJA-STAR and TİKKO women guerrillas

HPG announced that an operation that was implemented with heavy weapons against Çemişgezek (Dersim) police station was a joint operation of YJA-STAR and TKPML-TİKKO women guerrillas. In this joint operation, three police and eight Turkish soldiers were killed.

Mentioning the women guerrillas implemented three different operations, HPG said that on 8 - 9 July, three police and eight soldiers were killed around Çemişgezek's downtown. In the operations in Malazgirt and Savur, five Turkish soldiers were killed.

HPG-BİM revealed the details of the operation: "On 8 July YJA-STAR and TKPML-TİKKO women guerrillas carried out an operation from three directions toward Çemişgezek's downtown police guard shack, police station, and the hill where the military garrison is located," BİM also said that the guard shack was fired at by rockets at 22:40 hours; thus two police were killed and several soldiers suffered injuries.

In the operation, which lasted 45 minutes, the police station, police housing areas, and military garrison came under heavy weapons fire. One police was killed and an unknown number of police were wounded.

A military convoy that wanted to intervene in the operation was ambushed by the guerrillas. One panzer suffered major destruction; two troops in the panzer were killed and three wounded. BİM stated that after this operation the entrance and exit to Çemişgezek was blocked and a counter-operation began.

On 9 July an operation was executed by guerrillas against the hill where the Turkish forces were located. The operation lasted 20 intense minutes. BİM said, "After the clash, four soldiers were killed; our guerrillas suffered no casualties."

Special unit under surveillance

On the same day near Dersim downtown, a mobile TSK special unit was put under surveillance by YJA-STAR forces, said HPG BİM. HPG-BİM continued,"In the operation carried out against the special unit, which wanted to position itself at night, two troops were killed and three were wounded."

4 soldiers killed in Malazgirt

BİM stated that YJA-STAR forces also implemented an operation against Malazgirt's Muğidi regional garrison, located on a hill. The hill came under heavy weapons fire. One military emplacement was hit, which resulted in four soldiers killed. The counter-operation begun after this clash is still ongoing.

Clash in Savur

BİM stated that there was a clash with TSK, during an operation implemented by TSK in an area that included the villages of Günde Belizan, Avina, Darman, and Kunive. After an operation that was carried out by guerrillas in Tepe Şere, where TSK troops were positioned, one soldier was killed and three were wounded in this clash.

German detainees have also been released and more information is due out tomorrow. In the meantime, here's the HPG statement:

In its statement, HPG Serhat State Command said that the German hostages were released completely within HPG's will.

The Serhat State Command said, "As a result of the calls and attempts primarily from KCK, and international and democratic institutions and associations, the three German citizens that were detained were released today at noon after insuring their security. A detailed information will be shared with the public tomorrow about the release which occured with the cooperation of institutions and associations, and with our complete initiative."

In other news, maybe this is why the US is suddenly making nice with the mullahs, from RIA Novosti:

Foreign ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) will decide on whether to lift a moratorium on bringing in new states at a meeting in Tajikistan on July 25, a Russian diplomat said on Friday.

"The moratorium has lasted for two years. We have now decided to consider the possibility of the SCO's enlargement," a source in the Russian Foreign Ministry said.

Iran and Pakistan, observer states at the SCO since 2005, have sought full membership in the regional bloc comprising Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan and widely seen as a counterweight to NATO's influence in Eurasia.

The group primarily addresses security issues, but has recently moved to embrace various economic and energy projects.

That also may be why there have been reports in Iraqi media describing the possible construction of a US military base near Helebçe. If the SCO accepts Iran's request to be admitted to the organization as a full member, a US military airport near Helebçe could be a continuation of the American plan to expand NATO to the east, right alongside the border of the largest country in the SCO--Russia. And so the Cold War v.2 grinds on.


Ufuk Uras, leader of the Turkish ÖDP and member of DTP's parliamentary group, shows us why the Ergenekon investigation is bullshit:

"Turkey's recent history is full of coup plotters, politicians and public servants who were responsible for illegal operations and who have not been tried but walk around as 'gallants,'" he said in Parliament yesterday. Uras said failed coup plots named "Sarıkız" (Blonde Girl) and "Ayışığı" (Moonlight) against the government came to the agenda of Parliament's Human Rights Commission in April of last year but that most of the deputies were against investigating the alleged plots.

Uras, who started a signature campaign in May in Parliament, presented a motion to Parliament yesterday with the aim of opening an investigation into Sarıkız and Ayışığı. His initiative received the support of 20 deputies from the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) and Hakkari independent deputy Hamit Geylani. Deputies from the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), the opposition Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Democratic Left Party (DSP) refused to sign the motion in the 550-seat Parliament.

DTP parliamentarian Emine Ayna has been blazing the trail on the same subject for DTP. Her position, and that of the party has been quite clear and consistent:


[Ayna] underlined that the success of the Ergenekon investigation depends on its enlargement east of the Euphrates River.

Ayna criticized the government and claimed that when dark forces attacked Kurds, Christians and Alevis, the AK Party did nothing -- but when these same forces turned against the AK Party, it was spurred into action.

"Our stand is very clear: We think that the investigations should go to the very end. Actions against the government and all murders by unknown assailants should be investigated. The government is dictating the idea of 'either you are with me or you are Ergenekon.' We are saying that we are not pro AK Party, we are not pro coups and we are not pro Ergenekon," she said.


There is no serious investigation into Ergenekon and no one should expect that there will be. If the Turkish ruling elites were serious about dismantling the Deep State that Ergenekon represents, they would have reopened the Susurluk investigation and people like Mehmet Ağar would not be walking free. Mehmet Eymür would be extradited from the US. Tansu Çiller would be detained, and all that just for a start.

As Fikri Sağlar, the chairman for the parliamentary committee that investigated the Susurluk Affair, noted after the Council of State attack in May 2006:

"To open the Susurluk file means challenging the system. Neither Erdogan nor Baykal have such a concern."

At the time, Sağlar further noted that CHP head Deniz Baykal dismissed the Susurluk Affair as "nonsense", which is exactly Baykal's characterization of the Ergenekon investigation.

Some things never change, do they?

For more on the insanity that is Turkish politics, make sure you stop by The Pasha and the Gypsy for Gordon Taylor's latest summation of the situation.

HPG'S WARNING TO VILLAGE GUARDS

A statement to the village guards from the HPG Headquarters Command, dated 20 February 2008:

Last warning to village guards: They will be particularly targeted if they become a part of the dirty war implemented by the Turkish army.

Besides the airstrikes against the Medya Defense Zones, the preparation of the Turkish state for a land operation continues.

In addition to reinforcing its forces in South Kurdistan, the Turkish state is preparing its forces located in Bamerne, Kanimasi, Amediye, and Şeladıze.

The mobilization in the Hakkâri, Şırnak, and Siirt regions is remarkable. Besides tank, artillery, and helicopter reinforcements, forces have been reinforced.

In meetings that took place in Siirt, Sirnak and Hakkari, the village guards have been ordered to join the operations. The use of village guards in warfare remains the policy of the Turkish state. In such meetings, the village guards' attitude is important. Our movement's policy toward the village guards is known. Several times we have mentioned that village guards must not be a part of the war. For this purpose, we legislated several amnesty laws.

By obeying the leadership's call, we have worked hard not to target the village guards and not to let them be part of the war effort. We had several calls. In previous years we were extremely cautious not to target any village guards. However, given the stage that we are in, it will be obvious that they will become targets if they join the operations.

Village guards who participate in land operations against our positions in South Kurdistan will be targeted. Village guards who participate in the operations will be as equally responsible as the Turkish state. The chiefs of village guards who incite other guards to participate in these operations will be specifically targeted. We do not want any guards to die. We do not want their families to suffer. However, if they participate in the operations, they will be punished severely.

No Kurds must become tools for the Turkish state's game. Land operations mean the deaths of thousands of troops. Village guards must also see this fact and not become a part of this dirty game for their sakes and their families' sakes.

Village guards, who previously received amnesty after our leadership's call, will be considered guilty if they participate in operations. Therefore, they will be punished severely for their crimes.

Village guards must know that the Turkish state could not achieve any result in 30 years: it implemented countless operations with hundreds of thousands of soldiers, airplanes, tanks, artillery, helicopters. Did they achieve any result? No! It is known that they will not achieve any result again. Then why should you die? Why leave your children as orphans? If the Turkish state can come against us with its army, let it come. Do not be a part of it. Stay in your village with your family.

We emphasize that the village guards must not accept the Turkish state's demands, oppression, or blackmail in order to participate in operations. If they participate, they will have to bear the results.

HPG Headquarters Command

GOALS AND A PLAN: ANALYSIS FROM ÖZGÜR GÜNDEM

"Here are Kurdistan's rebellious mountains, not Palestine's streets!"
~ PKK statement.

Özgür Gündem has a rundown of analysis on the current situation in Kurdistan. Beginning with a review of recent events, the bulk of which has also been posted earlier this week on Rastî.

ÖG then lists the likely goals and plan of the Ankara regime:

Dirty goals.

1. After the aerial operations, land operations for invasion started.

2. Turkey made the US accept its demands but, more importantly, Turkey promised to fulfill all the demands of the US.

3. Turkey's main agenda is the complete annihilation of PKK. For that reason, Turkey demands more effective solutions beyond support for aerial strikes. Turkey implemented more than 20 operations, however it did not achieve any result. This time, in order to achieve a successful result, Turkey demanded the following from the US, England, and Israel: Special forces will be used rather than the use of conventional force; provision of their training, weaponry, and technical support; point-target operations instead of a frontal war; the military and intelligence reinforcement for this type of operation; and finally, acquiring the support of the PUK and KDP. It is mentioned that, with the support of US and Israeli intelligence and technical support, PKK's top administrators will be targeted. Besides, Turkey wants to impede the annexation of Kerkuk to South Kurdistan, which, in exchange for South Kurdistan's cooperation against PKK, Turkey is willing to recognize without the inclusion of Kerkuk.

4. The US, Israel, and England will provide military, technical, and intelligence support to Turkey. In return, Turkey, to whom countless weapons have been sold, would take the side of the US, England and Israel, against Iran. In addition, Turkey would send troops to Southern Afghanistan, which most NATO countries refuse to do.

5. Talabanî accepted Turkey's demands. In return, he has been invited to Turkey.

6. In this invasion plan, more than Talabanî, Barzanî is concerned. It has been observed that there is a tremendous effort to convince Barzanî. However, Barzanî is not convinced because he knows that Turkey's only goal is not the annihilation of PKK but also the Kurdish authority in the South. For that reason, he wanted Turkey to take some concrete steps that would prove Turkey's only aim is PKK. Turkey, on the other hand, hinted that it could found a consulate in Hewler. In return, it wanted Barzanî to explicitly state that he is against PKK. At this point, the process stopped. Thus the operations began despite Barzanî. An implication of this action is "You do not have any options other than cooperating with Turkey or remaining silent; these are your only choices." The statement of the Turkish general staff, regarding the invasion operation, mentioning "blackmailing regional factors" confirms this fact.

7. Thus it is obvious that Turkey's only goal is not only the annihilation of the PKK, but all Kurds are targeted.


Seige plan.

1. Turkey is trying to cover the fiasco of the air strikes by mentioning that air strikes would not be effective so land operations are required. By doing so, Turkey is covering the billions of dollars that have been spent during the previous operations.

2. Thinking that PKK has been weakened by air strikes, Turkey aims to create a buffer zone in South Kurdistan parallel to the one in Şirnak, Siirt, and Hâkkari.

3. Turkey aims to lay seige particularly to PKK regions in South Kurdistan.

4. This policy benefits the US, which aims to gain Turkey's cooperation against Iran, because the US wants Turkey to increase its influence in the regions where PKK has a presence For that reason, the US supports Turkey.

ÖG notes that PKK will become stronger while under attack because the freedom movement has dominated the area for some time, with the guerrillas having far greater practical knowledge of the terrain as it actually is on the ground. We are also reminded that PKK has been preparing itself for Turkish ground operations--both invasion and point-target attacks--for the last two years. An example, from May 2005:

[TSK] unsuccessful with its operations

The HPG officials said that the [TSK] has been unsuccessful in its operations and that the HPG’s new way of actions on the basis of small groups of guerrillas with active and high action capacity led to [TSK]’s classical operation tactic to be in vain.

HPG officials said that as a result of this new way of action, [TSK] had difficulties in “imposing clashes on the guerrilla under its initiative” and that the [TSK] military troops have become an open target for the guerrilla teams who have spread well into the territory.

HPG officials drew attention that the guerrillas are no longer raid police stations but aim permanent points where [TSK] is well established in.

40% of HPG losses are as a result of informers and ambushes.

HPG officials said that this was “a reflection of the strategic changes made” and that the military strategy changed accordingly”. They underlined that “actions undertaken were no longer to establish free areas” but “to force the other side to a resolution”.

They also added that guerrilla losses, as a result, decreased in comparison with past years, but the [TSK]’s losses increased due to a change in guerrilla movement.

HPG officials said that in the last year [TSK] has been trying to gain control through on the spot operations based on intelligence and informants. Hence the 40% of the losses incurred has been due to informers and ambushes.

A decrease in the village guard losses

The balance sheet of one year also draws attention to the losses of village guards. It can be seen that after the decision of June it represents 1% of the total losses of the [TSK] as compared with hundreds of village guards losses in the 1990’s. It was pointed out that this is in accordance with the decision “if the village guards do not participated in active warfare they will not be treated as targets” of the HPG II Conference.

The clearest warning to the US-England-Israel-Turkey alliance is summed up in ÖG thusly: "Here are Kurdistan's rebellious mountains, not Palestine's streets!"

In the meantime, HPG freedom fighters have brought down a Cobra in Çemço, Zab region, and HPG has lost two guerrillas.

Şehîd namirin!

ERGENEKON BUSTED?

"There are three bases to the [organized] gang. First is the police, second is the [state] bureaucrats and third is the military. We can question the police and some of bureaucrats, but we cannot question the military."
~ Mehmet Elkatmış, Chairman, Susurluk Commission.

The most interesting news of the day comes from Bianet:

Retired Major General Veli Kücük, nationalist lawyer Kemal Kerincsiz, lawyer Fuat Turgut, who is the defense lawyer of Yasin Hayal, a murder suspect in the Hrant Dink case, Aksam newspaper journalist Güler Kömürcü, retired Colonel Fikri Karadag, who is the leader of the ultra-nationalist Kuvayi Milliye Association, and Turkish Orthodox Patriarchy spokesperson Sevgi Erenerol, are under police custody.

All 33 taken from their homes on Tuesday (22 January) are charged with forming a clandestine group to plot against the government, and attempts at the lives of Kurdish politicians, as well as storing weapons in a secret arsenal.

Photo Radikal. Article: "İşte Ergenekon."

That's right, folks, the Ergenekon gang is in police detention. The news appeared in Turkish online media late last night, US time, but it may have only a brief appearance, as noted in the Bianet article:

According to the NTV news, the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecution made a written statement about the detentions and then immediately announced a broadcasting and publishing ban on the case.

It's this ban that tells us we should not expect too much from this so-called "operation." If they're ordering censorship about the case, it means that there is something to hide on the part of the government. However, one should remember Veli Küçük in connection with the Susurluk scandal, as a close associate of the notorious Grey Wolf, Abdullah Çatlı and the infamous Turkish state assassin, Mahmut Yıldırım, aka Yeşil. Küçük was also named in connection with the 2006 Council of State attack and with Hrant Dink's murder. For a roundup of Küçük's crimes, see a Rastî post from last year.

Zaman has more about what Küçük and the rest of the Ergenekon gang has been up to:

The gang was plotting to kill Nobel Literature Prize-winning author Orhan Pamuk and had already hired the hit man to do the job, the investigation found. Thirty-three suspects accused of being part of the gang, which calls itself Ergenekon, were detained by the İstanbul Police Department's counterterrorism unit in İstanbul and other parts of the country in dawn raids on Tuesday, the culmination of an eight-month operation. The police have been observing the actions of the suspects for three-quarters of a year as part of an investigation into a house full of explosives and ammunition found in a shantytown in İstanbul's Ümraniye district in the June of 2007.

The investigation has found that the gang is linked to a clandestine phenomenon referred to as the "deep state" in Turkey that stages attacks using "behind-the-scene" paramilitary organizations such as Ergenekon to foment public opinion according its own political agenda. Ergenekon is the title of a legend that describes how Turks came into existence.

This particular gang is suspected of involvement in a number of political attacks on individuals and institutions, including the murder of ethnic Armenian journalist Hrant Dink. At least eight of the suspects are retired from the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK).

The suspects, who include retired military generals, journalists and underground bosses, have not yet been charged and are still under interrogation, but the police found a list of people the gang had planned to assassinate, including pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) deputies Ahmet Türk, Leyla Zana and Sebahat Tuncel; Diyarbakır Mayor Osman Baydemir; Nobel Prize-winning author Pamuk; and journalist Fehmi Koru, who is also a regular columnist for Today's Zaman.

Khaleej Times adds a little more information:

Police are also investigating whether the suspects were involved in several politically motivated attacks that shocked Turkey over the past two years, the daily Sabah said.

They include the murders of ethnic Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, Italian Catholic priest Andrea Santoro and a senior judge killed by a gunman who stormed into the country’s top administrative court, the daily said.

And, in what may be a very felicitous coincidence, Martin Lee--who's done more to expose the Deep State, Grey Wolves, and the likes of Veli Küçük, in English than anyone else--may now be connecting Sibel Edmonds' case about the Deep State criminals in the US with the Deep State criminals in Turkey. At least Consortium News, which ran Lee's original article on the Deep State in 1997, feels it's necessary to run the article again to give some background context to Sibel's story. From Consortium News, "Turkey's Drug-Terrorism Connection":

Edmonds, who left the FBI in 2002, said she stumbled upon this corrupt network – which also may have involved money laundering and drug trafficking – when she was hired after the 9/11 attacks to translate a backlog of tapes dating back to 1997.

That was the same year when Consortiumnews.com published a remarkable story by Martin A. Lee about Turkish government officials caught in a web of corruption with notorious drug traffickers and right-wing terrorists.

In view of the Sunday Times article and a follow-up on Jan. 20, we are republishing our earlier story to provide historical context for Edmonds’s allegations:

In broad daylight on May 2, 1997, 50 armed men set upon a television station in Istanbul with gunfire. The attackers unleashed a fusillade of bullets and shouted slogans supporting Turkey's Deputy Prime Minister Tansu Ciller.

The gunmen were outraged over the station's broadcast of a TV report critical of Ciller, a close U.S. ally who had come under criticism for stonewalling investigations into collusion between state security forces and Turkish criminal elements.

Miraculously, no one was injured in the attack, but the headquarters of Independent Flash TV were left pock-marked with bullet-holes and smashed windows. The gunfire also sent an unmistakable message to Turkish journalists and legislators: don't challenge Ciller and other high-level Turkish officials when they cover up state secrets.

For several months, Turkey had been awash in dramatic disclosures connecting high Turkish officials to the right-wing Grey Wolves, the terrorist band which has preyed on the region for years. In 1981, a terrorist from the Grey Wolves attempted to assassinate Pope John Paul II in Vatican City.

But at the center of the mushrooming Turkish scandal is whether Turkey, a strategically placed NATO country, allowed mafiosi and right-wing extremists to operate death squads and to smuggle drugs with impunity. A Turkish parliamentary commission is investigating these new charges.

The rupture of state secrets in Turkey also could release clues to other major Cold War mysteries. Besides the attempted papal assassination, the Turkish disclosures could shed light on the collapse of the Vatican bank in 1982 and the operation of a clandestine pipeline that pumped sophisticated military hardware into the Middle East -- apparently from NATO stockpiles in Europe -- in exchange for heroin sold by the Mafia in the United States.

Read the rest at Consortium News.