SPEAKING THE LANGUAGE THEY UNDERSTAND

"We are frankly Nationalist . . . and Nationalism is our only factor of cohesion. Before the Turkish majority other elements have no kind of influence. At any price, we must turkify the inhabitants of our land, and we will annihilate those who oppose Turks or 'le turqisme.'"
~ İsmet İnönü, 1925.

KCK Executive Committee member Bozan Tekin recently spoke to a graduating cycle of new HPG guerrillas. Here's what he had to say:

Bozan Tekin: From now on, we'll speak the language they understand.

At a time when the policies to take Kurds from the mountains are being used, the number of youths that join HPG is increasing. Forty-one warrior candidates were delivered to their units after successfully completing their Şehit Kemal training cycle.

In the closing session of the graduating cycle that was dedicated to Kemal Şêvişkî, who was murdered by the TSK at a time when the Kurdish movement had declared a ceasefire, KCK Executive Council member Bozan Tekin made a speech.

In his speech, Tekin mentioned that the Turkish state is conducting a new genocide under the name of "Initiative". Tekin said, "The discourses about 'initiative' that have been mentioned up until now are revealed clearly that it's a game. Despite all our goodwill and endeavors, the Turkish state conducts cultural, social, and political genocide against the Kurds with the policy of 'one nation, one state'. Despite our ceasefire decision, the level of military operations remained the same; in addition, our people's representatives have been thrown in jail. The Kurdısh party, the DTP, has been closed and its members have been arrested. My people, who were demonstrating their legitimate reactions, were raided and our youths were murdered. From now on, our movement and our people will speak the language they will understand."

After the swearing-in ceremony, the HPG guerrillas received their graduation documents and the ceremony ended with dancing.

According to a report from ANF earlier in the month of December 2009, the number of new guerrilla recruits joining HPG since March 2009 was 787, with 591 of those joining since August.

At this point, it is very likely that those numbers will increase in 2010.

MURAT KARAYILAN AND ÖCALAN'S ROAD MAP

"I have to state that those who couldn't weaken us during the most difficult years [for us], of 1999-2004, can't ever weaken us today."
~ Murat Karayılan.

There's an excerpted interview with Murat Karayılan featured at Zerkesorg. The most pressing question at this time is what PKK will do about the ceasefire at the end of Ramadan. Here's what Murat Arkadaş has to say:

We extended the conflict-avoidance phase until the end of Ramadan festivities for two reasons. The first reason is the respect we have for Ramadan. The second reason is that we expect the Turkish state to give us the roadmap during this time. Hiding the roadmap and not giving it [to us] will hurt the discussion environment. The process will not move forward without the roadmap. Let me put it clearly: it will be very problematic for us to extend the conflict-avoidance phase. Of course we are discussing the events from every angle. It is obvious that the current phase will face serious difficulties and problems unless the roadmap reaches us by some means. We too have sensitivities, we have a base, we have different organizations, forces. They [the state] say there is the army, the army will do this and that. We have an army too. There are organizations and matters we have to consider. We have to consider all these phenomena. Therefore, such approaches are not right. Our people make demonstrations for this and demand. Our people's expectation, our movement's and democratic organizations' expectation is that the state gives the roadmap right away. Because this is necessary for the continuation of the process. Not giving the roadmap, despite these, will mean that the state doesn't want a solution. Then it is up to them whether to give it or not.

Murat Arkadaş on "brotherhood":

You [the Turkish state] reject Kurdish identity and oppress Kurds and then talk about brotherhood. What kind of brotherhood is this? My language, culture, history, and names are forbidden, I can't own my identity but you say you are brothers. You say Kurds are our brothers but forbid everything belonging to them. This is slavery, slavery by force. We are in the 21st century and the Kurdish people have been enlightened with Apocu culture will not accept this [slavery]. Forcing slavery under the name of brotherhood and doing this by spilling blood with police batons and soldiers' weapons has nothing to do with brotherhood. In the current era this is not possible either. MHP and CHP need to understand this.

Murat Arkadaş has a message for the Turkish state and the international community, warning everyone that no one should "miscalculate":

It's being said that the international conditions are against us. No; that may be your opinion and it may seem that way to you. There is also the side that's visible to us. In this respect, we have reserves and potential to defend ourselves and advance our cause for years. Nobody should make miscalculations on this and approach correctly. We don't talk big. But we are not a simple force either. We are a force that successfully stood up, renewed itself, got stronger, and strengthened its belief and decisiveness despite the attacks against us, supported internationally. In this respect we are in a position in which we have established high morale and motivation, increased belief and decisiveness, and strengthened tenacity for success. I have to state that those who couldn't weaken us during the most difficult years [for us], of 1999-2004, can't ever weaken us today. There is no way for a movement that didn't weaken during that term to weaken today.

Let me add that there are those who have called for a "Sri Lankan Model" to be applied to the Kurdish situation. I would just remind all those with such ideas that the mountains of Kurdistan are not Sri Lanka's beaches.

Likewise there are those who complain about the deaths of Turkish soldiers and characterize the recent clashes as "PKK attacks". Those who are responsible for these deaths are the ones who send soldiers on operations; the guerrillas retain the right to their own self-defense. Such self-defense is hardly consistent with the characterization of "attacks". On the contrary, it is TSK which carries out "attacks" and we know this because we know when communications into the Kurdish regions are completely shut down. When communications are cut, it means TSK is conducting major "attacks", as it was doing during the first weekend in September. It was these TSK "attacks" that resulted in the needless deaths of Turkish soldiers. It is TSK which is trying to "block the peace process."

And while we're on the subject of the death of Turkish soldiers, let's look at an insightful analysis from Children of the Sun:

Turkish Ministry of Defence has published the statistics of dead security forces. Oral Çalışlar recently wrote an article about it. Of course, the data wasn't published widely in Turkish media. The data presents which cities the dead security forces are from. It turns out that in terms of highest losses, six of the top ten cities are Kurdish. The security forces from Kurdish cities (Kurds) are sent to the front lines to fight the PKK. The fascist regime's policy of pitting Kurds against Kurds continues regardless. A Kurd is worthless to the state even if he sides with the state.

Clearly it is in Kurdish interests to see an end to this conflict and that is why DTP and PKK are working for a solution. It's too bad there is no one from the state who is willing to work for the same solution. The fact remains that military-industrial complex and the Deep State continue to use Kurdish blood to lubricate the gears of The System.

And so we go from "Kurdish Initiative" to "Democratic Initiative" to "National Unity Initiative". Words, words, words with no more substance to them than air.

INTERVIEW WITH MURAT KARAYILAN

"An approach like 'I will not recognize your will, I will solve it my way, I will even talk to some sections of the society but I will not speak to you' will not bring complete solution. Kurdish question and the PKK problem are like nail and tissue, bound together. Separating them will not develop a solution."
~ Murat Karayılan.

Zerkesorg has just finished posting a three-part interview with the leader of the KCK Executive Council, Murat Karayılan. It's fitting that this interview comes now, just a few days before the twenty-fifth anniversary of PKK's first armed attacks against the Ankara regime, and right before we are due to hear from Öcalan.

You can find the interview here: Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3.

Let's do a little comparison and contrast between Murat Karayılan and the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, İlker Başbuğ.

From Part 1 of the interview, compare:

Stopping the operations is at the top of requests made by various factions. In fact, stopping the operations [against the PKK] is seen as the first and important condition toward solution [to the Kurdish Question]. We ask about operations and he [Murat Karayilan] says 'there are still operations conducted but not as much as before'. He adds, "which means the state can stop the operations completely and turn the no-attack [from the PKK] period into no-conflict phase. Together we can develop a phase for complete cease fire where everyone stays put at their locations. We demonstrate, with all our might, our will for developing this phase". Then he says environment for dialogue can be created.

Contrast:

The Turkish Army is determined to wipe out the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the military’s Chief of General Staff, Ilker Basbug, said on Monday.

“This problem can only be solved with the collective efforts of all nations and in particular allied nations,” said Basbug at the start of the two-day Silk Road 2009 General/Admiral seminar. “We believe that countries need to merge their positions and politics and adopt a common stance,”

“Our aim while fighting terrorism is to end all hopes of the terrorists and their supporters. We believe that alongside the fight against terrorism, state actions in the economic, socio-cultural, security, propaganda and international relations fields form a whole and complement each other,” said Basbug.

From Part 2 of the interview with Murat Karayılan, compare:

He reminds us the decision to pull outside Turkey in 1999. He himself announced to the PKK forces the decision to mocve them outside the borders of Turkey. He spoke to the forces for one hour. We ask him about his emotions during that talk. "If I put it honestly, I wasn't very hopeful. But our leader had asked. I was seeing it as a risky move but I was thinking it needed to be done. I remember it as a sad speech."

He tells about over 300 guerrillas were ambushed and killed while retreating to outside Turkey's borders. He talks about the traps, mass executions and massacres on the road [committed by the Turkish forces]. "But we still didn't change our mind and stood by our decision" he says.

He he asks a question and answers himself: "We didn't move for five years. Was any step taken? No! Was this period utilized? No! Now a lot people say that period was not utilized properly. We acted responsibly but the [Turkish] authorities of the time didn't act responsibly. The importance of our decision to retreat to outside Turkey's borders is being understood better today."

Contrast:

Gen. İlker Başbuğ said in Washington that Turkey's fight against the PKK will continue until the terrorist group is eliminated.

Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ vowed on Monday to continue the ongoing fight against terrorist attacks by the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) until the organization is completely eliminated, while also underlining the need for “winning hearts and minds,” along with the fight against the terrorist organization.

From Part 3, compare:

[Karayılan] stresses that they [the PKK] have been acting extremely responsibly and they would try their best to open the doors for any positive development. He wants to make sure what he says is not misunderstood: "Why am I saying these? We have to be realistic. If we are really going to discuss the solution, we have to consider these facts."

He says that wrong information is being distributed about their situation. Their persistence on solution [to Kurdish question] is being interpreted differently and that it's not realistic to interpret their persistence as they are losing strength. "We are not desperate. But we are saying now that let's stop the violence. This is a societal problem and it can be solved with dialogue, with modern methods. The role of violence in solving societal problems is over now. Now the problem is in a form that can be solved through dialogue and democratic means. This is our strategy."

Contrast:

Basbug said: "We would say that in 2009 we are having a chance with which we could achieve more concrete results in the fight against the terror organisation. What is this chance? You may call it the elimination of the terrorist organisation... or destruction... or weakening... we have now a chance. And we say, let's use this chance..We have seized the opportunity. The terror organisation is in a very difficult situation. We must profit from this opportunity." Basbug gave the following answer concerning the search for a dialogue: "The state won't establish a relation with a terror organisation, it won't have any discussions and there will be no dialogue. Sometimes it is being misunderstood, as if the state will have a meeting with the terror organisation, this is not true. This would be the biggest mistake in the struggle against the terror. The state does neither respect the terror organisation nor have any relation to it."

Thus it remains crystal clear where the violence is coming from. As Karayılan remarked in Part 1, "[The] Kurdish question is not a problem that formed yesterday. It's not a problem created by the birth of the PKK either. [The] Existence of this problem has given birth to the PKK." Additionally, PKK is not a separate issue from that of the Kurdish question.

A few other of Karayılan's points should be noted: First, Karayılan recalls the massacres of guerrillas by TSK when PKK moved outside of Turkey's borders in 1999. That's some history to learn, if you don't know it.

Secondly, there is no trust of the state on the part of PKK, so there need to be concrete steps taken toward a peaceful solution and no one should insist on immediate disarmament or movement of PKK outside of the region it inhabits now. Either insistence would be seen by the PKK as a first step toward Başbuğ's much recently touted annihilation.

Thirdly, everyone should remember that after the retreat from the borders in 1999, the KDP, PUK, and "international forces" worked as the proxies of the Ankara regime and also attempted the annihilation of the PKK. This point reinforces my belief that neither the US nor the KRG need to have any part in "solving" the Kurdish situation in Turkey. As Karayılan notes in Part 3, Kurds in Turkey have elected representatives so there's no need for two-timing outside meddlers.

Fourthly, for all the retards who still don't get it on the phony "separatism" charge, Karayılan says that even if independence were offered, PKK would not want it and he explains why.

I highly recommend a read of all three parts of the interview in preparation for Öcalan's Road Map.

On another subject, please check out the new podcast at Sibel Edmonds' place. This one features the CIA's former chief of base in Istanbul, Philip Giraldi. There's a lot of interesting stuff there about Turkish spies, Israeli spies, espionage tactics, the police state, and much more.

NOTES FROM KANDIL 3: WHERE THERE'S A WILL . . .

"Before the election, we spent the most silent winter of the last 25 years. That means whenever soldiers want, they can wait."
~ Murat Karayılan.

The first of June will see the end of the current PKK ceasefire period, at least as far as we can tell at the moment. Whether the ceasefire is continued is something we will know after the first. In the meantime, here is the continuation of the interview by Hasan Cemal with KDK Executive Committee Chairman Murat Karayılan, as excerpted from Cemal's column at Milliyet:

"For Silencing Weapons, The Will Is Important"

"First silence weapons, let no one attack another!" So says Murat Karayılan . . . Is it so hard to achieve this? For this firstly PKK must disappear from sight. It is a must for them to retreat to places where they will have no contact with troops. As Talabani said, "PKK declares a ceasefire, but they do not retreat far enough. They stay in the places where, every time, they meet soldiers." Whereas Murat Karayılan says, "We decide about being non-operational, we retreat but soldiers continue to advance. In this situation, we need to defend ourselves." In this situation, what's going to be done? To put it simply: Two sides will stop! No one is going to pull the trigger.

[ . . . ]

Two Sides Will Stop; No One Will Pull the Trigger.

"First silence the weapons, let no one attack another!" So says Murat Karayılan. Is it so hard to achieve this? For this firstly PKK must disappear from sight. It is a must for them to retreat to places where they will have no contact with troops.

This is an important point.

In October 2007 Iraq's president Talabani told me in Baghdad, "Well, okay, PKK declares a ceasefire, but they do not retreat far enough. They stay in the places where, every time, they meet soldiers." At this point, Murat Karayılan blames the soldiers. "We decide about being non-operational, we retreat but soldiers continue to advance. In this situation, we need to defend ourselves." In this situation, what's going to be done?

To put it simply: Two sides will stop! No one is going to pull the trigger.

This was a hot issue, too, during PKK's 1993 ceasefire. Demirel, who was sitting in the prime minister's chair, told me, "The man sees the fire, even saying that he is willing to lay his arm down, you are going over him with your tanks and your artillery. This has to be thought about."

In April 1993 Talabani came to Ankara with the following message after having a talk with Öcalan in Damascus:

Turkish security forces, too, must obey the ceasefire; If there is an operation called "Spring Operation", this must be deferred; Some signs of a general amnesty must be given; For a political solution, different dialog channels must be opened.

This was the message from Öcalan in 1993.

Öcalan had drawn the framework of the message to me in the talk that I had in Bekaa during April 1993 with him.

Right in those days, with the Bingöl attack--which has not been revealed even today but accepted as an attack from PKK--33 soldiers were martyred, the ceasefire ended; meanwhile, Özal died. The watershed in The Southeast grew. Unfortunately, with 17 thousand-plus extrajudicial murders, a door was opened wide to unlawfulness, to Susurluk, and even to Ergenekon.

If There Is Willpower, Weapons Will Be Silenced

This was the ceasefire in 1993 which Murat Karayılan, at our meeting in Kandil, mentioned as a "missed opportunity".

Sixteen years have passed; Öcalan was captured, [and is] now in Imralı.

But PKK is not finished; it's still in the mountains!

However, I think it wants to come down. And today it can be mentioned about one more peace opportunity. I am thinking about the things Karayilan told me and the messages that he wanted to give while coming down from Kandil to the valley.

There are similarities with 1993.

Can weapons really be silenced? Can provocation be avoided?

It is still a fresh incident: The ones who made that terrible massacre in Mardin, the village guards, admitted that they had planned their bloody raid to blame PKK.

So, what should be the first step?

Silencing weapons . . .

Is it so hard?

Both sides will not pull the trigger, thus weapons will be silenced.

Here the important thing is will power and determination.

If it exists, weapons will be silenced.

Obviously there are warmongers on both sides. We have to be alert to "provocations"; this is the most critical point in such a process.

Yes, a ceasefire will be declared.

PKK will pull back farther.

Soldiers will not advance after!

In short: Triggers will not be pulled!

In Kandil, Murat Karayılan told me, "Before the election, we spent the most silent winter of the last 25 years. That means whenever soldiers want, they can wait," by this, I guess, he was pointing out this reality.

Why shouldn't the required political will power be shown in Ankara for this? Since the most silent winter of the last 25 years passed, and while soldiers can wait, why can't this time period be extended?

Yes, why?

In an environment where weapons are not being fired, a different mechanism may be operated behind the screen, the dialog process may start.

To be continued.

NOTES FROM KANDIL 1

"It's not our goal to make propaganda. We have hope for peace. That's why we decided to meet you . . . "
~ Murat Karayılan.

Here is the first part of Hasan Cemal's interview with KCK Executive Council Chairman, Murat Karayılan, which will be carried here on Rastî. I'd like to extend my thanks to the comrade who volunteered to work on this translation, and the ones that will follow. This work and his tenacity in completing the task while I have been too busy in the last week to attend to it, is much appreciated by me and I'm certain it will be much appreciated by all the others who read it.

This translation is a portion of the original piece, which can be found at Milliyet.

Karayılan: We have hope for peace

PKK's number one man Murat Karayılan says 'The first thing is to silence the weapons; nobody should attack. Let's talk this issue ourselves... Let's start the work with talks, not with weapons'. Karayılan offers a mechanism composed of [unbiased] intellectuals, if necessary. He said "We are at an important juncture. There was opportunity for peace in 1993 [and] it was missed. Let's not miss it again. We don't want blood to be spilled anymore'.

Qandil Mountain, North Iraq [South Kurdistan]

For many years now the PKK is being managed from Kandil mountain. They say "the leadership's office is İmralı [Öcalan's island prison]," but today PKK's number one man is in Kandil, living in the mountain, Murat Karayılan.

I met Murat Karayılan in a short, two-room village house made of mud bricks on the skirts of Mount Kandil last Monday for four hours.

Where we were was not at a PKK base but, as they [the PKK] call it, in 'PKK territory'. This was obvious from the women and men PKK members with arms on their shoulders, whom we saw while arriving at our meeting location through picturesque views.

Murat Karayılan came with two members of the PKK's Leadership Council, which is made up of five people. They were assistant commander Bozan Tekin, who was from Urfa, Bozova. He went to the mountains after staying in jails for 20 years, from 1980 to 2000. The other assistant commander was Sozdar Avesta, whose real name was Nuriye Kesbir. While living in The Netherlands, her extradition to Turkey came up and she ran away and came to Kandil. The third person with Murat Karayılan was Ahmet Deniz, who is in charge of PKK's communications with the media and civilian organizations.

[...]

Saturday at 12, Murat Karayılan met us in front of the village house.

Karayılan said "I think it's your first time at the PKK's rural area". If we don't count Zeli, my meeting with Öcalan at Bekaa, that was the case.

[...]

I said to Karayılan:

"I am here as a reporter. I am not bringing any kind of message or anything like that from anyone in Turkey. Don't think like that. I came as a reporter to learn what PKK's administration thinks".

Then I added:

"Please don't record this meeting on camera. As reporters, we make news rather than being news".

Karayılan:

"We will make a 5 to 10 minute recording for our archive, that's all."

They put their tape and we put ours on the plastic covered table and started the conversation.

Murat Karayılan's first sentence:

"It's not our goal to make propaganda. We have hope for peace. That's why we decided to meet you . . . "

Positive messages

Karayılan gave positive messages. He didn't speak negative but positive. He said "The first thing is to silence the guns, nobody should attack anyone". He said this when he offered a definitive mechanism for dialogue:

"We are at an important juncture!"

He stated that in 1993, too, with the ceasefire at the time, there was a "big opportunity for peace"; however because of the "lack of political willpower," the government of the time forwarded the issue to the military and the opportunity was wasted.

He continued: "Let's not miss the peace opportunity this time".

He added:

We don't want blood be spilled any more. Because years will pass and we will end up at the same point. Turkey will lose blood. PKK cannot be finished with military methods; they were tried for 25 years and they didn't work."

Karayılan, who didn't say anything about whether they would extend their unilateral ceasefire beyond 1 June, said this:

"The first thing is to silence weapons."

"Not laying down arms?"

Karayılan:

"Laying arms down is a later phase . . . First weapons must be silenced. Nobody should attack anyone. Let's talk this issue ourselves . . . Let's start the work with dialogue, not with weapons; let's talk among ourselves'.

I interrupt:

"How is this going to happen? On one side the state and on the other the PKK? Is this possible?"

Intellectuals Mechanism

Karayılan's mechanism is like this:

"At the first phase, the weapons will be silenced . . . Then dialog will begin . . . İmralı is the place for dialog . . . If that's not accepted, we are the party for dialog . . . If we are not accepted, it is the elected political party (He is not mentioning the name of DTP but when I mention he nods in agreement) . . . If this is not workable either, then a joint commission will be formed somewhere and intellectuals will meet. For example, people like İlter Türkmen (former Minister of External Affairs and Ambassador) and you will gather; a mechanism like this will start and begin to work . . . A mechanism like this will be accepted by the state as an addressee for dialog . . . "

Murat Karayılan adds:

"Why not, why shouldn't a mechanism like this be formed?.."

Karayılan asks then:

"Is there no political willpower? Is there a vacuum in the political area? One wonders where the Prime Minister of 2005 is . . . "

"We are sorry for the 10 martyred soldiers"

I asked Karayılan this:

"You declared a unilateral ceasefire, you said no attacks, and you said you were extending this until 1 June. But on the other hand, what were the PKK attacks in Diyarbakır and Hakkari that martyred 10 soldiers about?"

His first reaction was this:

"We are sorry for that too."

Karayılan continued:

"It wasn't a move planned from the headquarters. It was in the field, a decision taken at the local level with their own incentive. They see soldiers in the field and feel that soldiers are coming at them with an operation and they take measures to protect themselves. They lay a mine. We are sorry too."

For a little more on what you might expect from Murat Karayılan through Hasan Cemal, check this short overview from Bianet.

Some seem to think that "indirect negotiations" have already started. Apparently Abdullah Gül, Cemil "Chicken Little" Çiçek, and the new foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, wanted to meet Hasan Cemal on his return from South Kurdistan and Gül stated last week that the Kurdish "question" is Turkey's priority.

For Ahmet Türk's recent comments on the subject to the DTP parliamentary group, check here.

There is also a great post at Zerkesorg that addresses the discussion about the possibility of peace talks between the Ankara regime and the PKK. I agree with his conclusions there and would like to point out this quote:

PKK doesn't need to rush. PKK doesn't have a Kurdish problem, Turkish state has a Kurdish problem it needs to solve.

And being that the Turkish state is the state, and since the founding of the PKK is an effect of state policies (as opposed to the cause of state policies), the Turkish state has the moral burden of finding a peaceful solution to the problem it has caused.

But, then, I'm the skeptic; I won't believe anything before I see it. We all need to see concrete steps from the Turkish state before we can believe anything. Given what Karayılan and Türk have said, it seems to me that the proper first concrete step would be an end to TSK operations in North Kurdistan in order to allow HPG to keep its side of this most recent unilateral ceasefire.

There are other "hidden hands" involved here, belonging to groups that can be trusted as much as the Turkish state, and the Americans are not the least of those untrustworthy "hidden hands".

In other words, the time for unilateral ceasefires has ended. Now is the time for that first monumental opportunity--a bilateral ceasefire.

KERKUK, A CASE OF POISONING, THE CIA PROFILE DATABASE

"I believe that the people in power -- not only political power, but also economic and social power -- will not non-violently give up that power to the people. Power is not a material possession that can be given, it is the ability to act. Power must be taken, it is never given."
~ The Anarchist Cookbook.

By now, everyone has heard of the bombing that took place in Kerkuk on Thursday. KCK issued a statement condemning the bombing, emphasizing that Turkey, Iran, Syria, and their collaborators, are responsible for the bombing in Kerkuk, and that their aim is to separate Kerkuk from Kurdistan. As far as I know, Heval Cuma's offer to help fight in Kerkuk, if necessary, still stands:

Kurdish leaders in Iraq have promised to raise the issue of the northern oil city of Kirkuk which they demand be integrated into a Kurdish autonomous zone after a cabinet is formed. Iran is “trying to help some factions in Iraq work against the Kurdish nation so that Kirkuk doesn’t join the (autonomous zone). This is happening as the new government is being created and the Kirkuk problem is discussed,” Bayik said.

“If the Kurds go to war with the Arabs over Kirkuk we will help them. We don’t just fight for ourselves,” Bayik said adding that such a conflict was “possible.”

Turkey's intent to meddle in Kerkuk was clear in August 2007. In addition, Turkish mercenaries based in Maryland are also operating in Kerkuk.

Thanks to the heval who sent the link, KurdishMedia has a report on a news item that appeared on Kurdistan TV last week:

Last week the Hewler-based Kurdistan-TV Satellite Network reported that a well-known Turkish company has been allegedly sending poisoned food in what many have claimed is a calculated attempt to harm Kurdish citizens in the Iraqi or Southern Kurdistan region. Critics of Turkey find little surprise in this recent allegation claiming that after having publicly failed to justify their torture and even executing of anyone who speaks out for human rights in Turkey, the Turkish government has employed new strategic plan to harm innocent civilians of Kurdish descent.

Turkey, a country that is often falsely labeled as a democracy, has become familiar to many critics for its countless human rights abuses. The government has been regularly condemned by human rights group for imprisoning anyone who speaks or writes about the Kurdish issue in the country.

Recent trade increases between Turkey and the Kurds in Iraq have been viewed as a positive developments in the two group's relations. Turkey is responsible for shipping a very large percentage of foods and other products into South Kurdistan. However, critics say that the Turkish government's policy towards Kurds is unchanged and this recent discovery is proof of that.

Turkish companies ship cooking-oil into South Kurdistan and recent discoveries indicate that it comes with poison. The experts who reported these claims say the recurring incident is far from an accident. The President of the Science Department of the University of Salahadin in the Kurdish capital, Hewler, noted that the food from Turkey containing the poison is a perfect mixture to harm and even kill any person who consumes it.

Critics speculate that there are many reasons as to why Southern Kurdistan could have possibly been a target; a major one being that Southern Kurdistan has become a representation of Kurdish identity and national pride in the region. Critics say it has been Turkey's aim to wipe it out.

Well, if you lie down with dogs, expect to get up with fleas. This is what happens when one relies on an enemy government to provide your food supply and it harkens back to the experiences of many Southern Kurds who fled into Turkey after the 1991 serhildan, only to find that the bread and water supplied by the Ankara regime was poisoned.

Check out some of the photos of Greek police on fire, from Hürriyet. Here's a sample:





Don't you wish . . .

More on the activity in Greece, from the BBC:

When Greeks say no, they mean it in spades.

Rebellion is deeply embedded in the Greek psyche. The students and school children who are now laying siege to police stations and trying to bring down the government are undergoing a rite of passage.

[ . . . ]

The latent Greek contempt for the police, which has now erupted so volcanically, has its roots in the dictatorship, when the police were regarded as the colonels' enforcers and traitors to the people.

[ . . . ]

In an editorial entitled "Anger's teen martyr", Mr Konstandaras wrote that Mr Grioropoulos' blood would be "used to bind together every disparate protest and complaint into a platform of righteous rage against all the ills of our society.

"It will quickly become a flag of convenience for anyone who has a grudge against the state, the government, the economic system, foreign powers, capitalism and so on."

"If Greece had already appeared difficult to govern, it will now be out of control."

"The latent Greek contempt for the police . . . " Ah, now there's the proper attitude to cultivate. Greek police are reportedly out of tear gas and are urgently begging Germany and Israel to renew their supplies. See more at TIME, which describes the area the area in which the 15-year-old Alexandros Grigoropoulos was killed as a neighborhood sort of like Tarlıbaşı:

For Athens police, the Exarchia neighborhood is enemy territory.

Exactly! I like it already.

There's also an update on yesterday's post about the morons at Facebook. Basically, they think "we"--whoever "we"are--are afraid of them. However, they are so fearful of PKK than they can't even mention the term. Instead, they say "those guys".

You would think that Turkish ultra-nationalists would know their own language very, very well. Unfortunately, that is not the case in this situation. I feel so much pity for such a poorly educated ülkücü, that, as an Apocu, I would like to provide a corrected version of poor little ülkücü's statement, so that his friends will be able to understand exactly what he means . . . assuming that their literacy skills are better than his, that is. By the way, I also took the liberty of adding consistent punctuation:

ARKADAŞLAR,

GÖSTERMİŞ OLDUĞUNUZ İLGİ İÇİN HEPİNİZE TEK TEK TEŞEKKÜR EDERİM. FAKAT SESİMİZİ DAHA DA DUYURMAK İÇİN SAĞ TARAFTA BULUNAN PAYLAŞ SEÇENEĞİ İLE GRUBUMUZU PROFİLİNİZDE PAYLAŞA BİLİRSİNİZ.

BİZİM ÖYLE DİĞER GRUPLAR GİBİ BİR KORKUMUZ YOK. ARKADAŞINIZI DAVET ETMEZSENİZ, GRUBA KATILMA GİBİ BİR DÜŞÜNCEMİZDE YOK. [ANLATIM BOZUKLUĞU].

ÇÜNKÜ BİZ GÜCÜMÜZÜ BİLİYORUZ. BU GRUPTA HERKES KENDİNİ BİR BİREY OLARAK TEMSİL EDİYOR.

İŞTE GERÇEĞİN BELGESİ

SİZE İYİ BİR HABERİM VAR ÇÜNKÜ BAZILARI O KADAR KORKMUŞLAR ki KENDİ WEB SİTELERİNDE BİZİM GRUBUMUZUN REKLAMINI DA YAPMIŞLAR.

http://rastibini.blogspot.com/

SÖZDE KENDİLERİNİ SAVUNUP ELİ KANLI OLANLARIN BİZ OLDUĞUNU İMA ETMİŞLER. ONLAR GERÇEKLERDEN KAÇSIN ÖNEMLİ DEĞİL.

BİZ ADIM ADIM AMACIMIZA ULAŞACAĞIZ. ONLAR ÖNDERLİK İÇİN WEB SİTELERİNDE ÖZGÜRLÜK YÜRÜĞÜŞÜ DÜZENLESİNLER BİZ NE DE OLSA ONU ENİNDE SONUNDA İPİN UCUNDA SALLANDIRACAĞIZ.GEBERDİKTEN SONRA İSTEDİKLERİ YERE YÜRÜĞÜŞE GÖTÜREBİLİRLER.


KATILAN VE KATKIDA BULUNAN ARKADAŞLARA TEŞEKKÜR EDERİM
SAĞLICAKLA KALIN

Troy İSUS

[Note to Troy: It's okay to be a poorly educated ülkücü but you don't need to disclose the fact to the whole world.]

I guess they all missed the news that Facebook is a CIA profile database. That information was on Youtube a while ago . . . OOPS!! They can't see Youtube in Turkey! For those of you who can see Youtube, here you go:

In the meantime, I guess the CIA will continue to collect their addresses, hometowns, phone numbers, emails, jobs, birthdates, sexual orientations, interests, daily schedules, relations to friends, pictures, political affiliations . . .

SERKEFTIN!

MORE TSK WAR CRIMES AND AN INTERVIEW

"Today we have nearly 10,000 men and our response capability is greater than ever. Neither Alexander the Great nor Saddam Hussein could ever control this region, and it is clear that Erdogan and his generals will not get it either."
~ Bozan Tekin, Commander-in-Chief, HPG.

Please take note of a recent post from Hevallo that documents more war crimes and atrocities by the TSK. You'll find it here, with a link to Zinar Ala, who is carrying the images. Also in Zinar Ala's post is a link to an interview with HPG commander-in-chief Botan Tekin. The interview was carried on what appears to be a Basque site and is in Spanish. The following is a translation of the GARA interview:

Trip to the heart of Kurdistan

"Europe must see with their eyes what's happening in Kurdistan"

Bozan Tekin
Commander in chief of the guerrillas of the PKK

From the mountains of Qendil, the guerrilla commander Bozan Tekin said that the struggle of the PKK against Turkey has succeeded in imposing a change of mentality in the Kurds, which previously were ashamed of their culture and that thanks to Abdula Ocalan Kurds have learned to feel and also people. In this interview, he lamented that "unfortunately, no European government has offered us a hand yet."

[by] Karlos Zurutuza

The commander Bozan Tekin greets us with a smile and a friendly handshake at our arrival at one of the humblest villages in Qendil. He is interested in the operation that has enabled us to overcome the information blockade imposed by the Kurdish autonomous government of South Kurdistan, and then invites us to sit down to carry out the ritual of tea. In this adobe house with a roof of wood and straw, Tekin confessed himself an admirer of the Russian classics and, especially, George Orwell, all of whose work he [Tekin] claims to have read. Probably he had much more time during the 20 years that he spent in Turkish prisons.

Soon he turns on his laptop. He wants to give us some pictures taken by Turkish soldiers that he has recently obtained. He does not specify whether they [the photos] had reached a Kurdish conscript or if they [the guerrillas] have snatched them from a Turkish soldier, dead or alive. In them appear tanks and helicopters in the military quarters; young soldiers posing with heavy weapons near the Turkish flag or next to bodies of guerrillas of the PKK, whose guts they have emptied and whose intestines were entangled in the undergrowth. "May the whole world see it," Tekin asks us (Soon they will be displayed in zinarala.blogspot.com).

For the interview we move away from the village and so that it avoids being identified and then bombed by Turkish aircraft. Two guerrillas accompany us, a Kurd from Damascus and a Kurd from Sirt (North Kurdistan). We take the camera and tripod, and they do the same in an almost simultaneous manner. We record the commander and they us. That's the deal.

"They say that internationalism died with Che Guevara, but this interview is good evidence that it is not true," says Tekin, with a smile that imprisonment and life in the mountains have not yet been able to erase.

The Turkish army has escalated attacks on Qendil in recent weeks. What do you think is the reason?

Erdogan's AKP has lost its prestige, for that reason these operations are carried out. They [the AKP] have disappointed the Islamists, the Turks and the Kurds who voted for them, and now they want to seek support among the nationalists. Moreover, the PKK has carried out numerous operations successfully and this has undermined the morale of the Turkish army. On the other hand, we are just a few months from the elections in Turkey, so the party in power will be used thoroughly so that there be no doubt about the strength of its "fight against terrorism."

But you say they are completely deployed and away from the camps.

It is true. The situation has not affected us but we have adapted to it. Today we have nearly 10,000 men and our response capability is greater than ever. Neither Alexander the Great nor Saddam Hussein could ever control this region, and it is clear that Erdogan and his generals will not get it either.

In addition to the guerrillas, it seems that people have been mobilized also in major cities of northern Kurdistan. Is this a new uprising of Kurds in Turkey?

Without a doubt. People on the street have responded to the torture inflicted on our leader, Abdullah Ocalan. He was tortured both physically and psychologically, and has said repeatedly he prefers to die than be insulted. He's been 10 years locked up and deprived of all his rights. But our people continue to support him and increasingly mobilize themselves more. Following the most recent torture, Erdogan traveled to Amed (Diyarbakir) and found a city paralyzed by the strike. The response has been massive in Wan (Van), Colamerg (Hakkari), Mus ... People have said "enough" and went into the street. Any Kurd that reacts now is a guerrilla.

However, Erdogan is co-chair of the "Alliance of Civilizations' together with Rodriguez Zapatero. What do you think about this?

It is at least ironic that someone who complains about the assimilation of peoples as an 'aberration', ignores, deprives of all rights and represses 20 million Kurds in their own country. Zapatero is therefore complicit in the barbarity suffered by our people and that should make you think about both him and the other European leaders. Zapatero and Erdogan are leading a false project with which false Turkey seeks, in turn, to deceive the EU. Simply, they agreed to exterminate the Kurds.

The PKK has been fighting for decades. Did it get something?

The PKK has been fighting ideologically for 35 years and for 30 with arms, under the leadership of Abdullah Ocalan. We have offered a hand towards peace on more than one occasion but, far from negotiating, Turkey has responded to us with a state of emergency. There is no difference between the Turkish generals and Franco or Salazar. We are fighting against Turkish imposition and it is more than evident that there has been a significant change in the mindset of the people. The Kurds felt ashamed of their culture, of being Kurds. Until we learn to be `best Turks' at school. But Apo (Ocalan) taught us to feel ourselves not only Kurds but also persons. Our people have become aware of their own existence and that we owe in great measure to our leader, Abdula Ocalan. He opened the way and we will support him until the day of his death.

Do you dream about an independent Kurdistan?

We are pursuing a democratic confederalism. The PKK is an internationalist movement and has in its ranks fighters of many other nationalities. Among us there are Kurds, but also Russians, Germans, Armenians ... and even Turks. We are not nationalists, not fighting for statehood but for our rights and our freedom. We fight against imperialism and we believe in real democracy based on socialism and coexistence between peoples. We have always lived alongside Persians, Turks and Arabs, and we think that we can continue to do so but in a peaceful manner.

But the Kurds have fought among themselves until recently and are still divided.

It is true. The PKK was at war against Barzani's KDP and it, in turn, with Talabani's PUK. We have created the KCK (Democratic Confederation of Kurdistan) to bring together the Kurds of Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran into a single body that promotes democratic and socialist ideals. PJAK in East Kurdistan is one of its components and struggles to replace the theocracy in Tehran with a federal government that respects the rights of all the peoples of Iran. There is also the PYD, the most important party among the Kurds of Syria, that shares the ideals of Ocalan. Furthermore, both Barzani and Talabani are aware of the support that KCK's ideas are having in South Kurdistan.

What is the first step towards a resolution of this conflict?

The Turkish government has to withdraw or negotiate peace with us. The PKK became very powerful in the 90s and today it's not only the guerrillas but [it's] the entire community. We have 22 deputies in the parliament in Ankara and the Turks still remain determined that there are no Kurds in Turkey. The laws are of no use in Kurdistan because the state of war continues.

Would Turkey's entry into the EU improve things?

If Turkey had to import the European model of democracy, of course. Unfortunately, no European government has offered us its hand yet. Turkey interests Europe and the United States by the potential of its market and, above all, for its strategic location, which gives it a predominant role in NATO. Without going much further, Ankara bombards us using the information about our situation that the United States offers it. Until this changes, we will continue to be victims of the disastrous Western policy in the Middle East.

For now, both the EU and United States considers you "a terrorist group."

The Turkish Constitution makes no mention of the Kurds. Arrests and torture occur on a daily basis. Ankara's repression during the last decades has claimed thousands of destroyed villages and four million displaced. Among the multitude of Kurds murdered there are about 5,000 dead through "bizarre circumstances", many of them victims of the dirty war of Ergenekon, orchestrated by the same Turkish state. You had Guernica; we have Diyarbakir, Mus, Sirnak, Wan ... And the remains of the missing still continue to appear. Europe considers us as "a terrorist organization" since 2000, since the Turkish government controls the means of Western information, it "drinks" from them then. The people, the European parliamentarians, would have to come here and see what is happening with their own eyes.

I have placed three new links in the blog column on the right-hand margin. They are Bersiv, a Kurdish blog from Sweden, Kurdistan Commentary, which reads like it's coming from the US, and Zinar Ala's Kurdish blog in Spain. Please take a look at those and, if necessary, avail yourself of Google's translation tools to help you out if you need it.

HPG VIDEO OF THE BEZELE (AKTÜTÜN) OPERATION

"The very intense operation against the three hills began at 1300 hours and lasted until 1700 hours. Meanwhile the Bezele garrison was fired upon with heavy weapons. After the intense and severe conflict, the three hills belonging to the enemy were destroyed and finally captured by our guerrilla forces."
~ HPG-BİM Statement on the Bezele Operation.

HPG has released the video our guerrillas shot during the Bezele operation at the beginning of October, as promised:

The video may also be viewed at GerilaTV: http://www.gerila.tv/index.php?option=com_seyret&Itemid=26&task=videodirectlink&id=284


Serkeftin!

WAR AND PEACE IN KURDISTAN: ÖCALAN'S PERSPECTIVE, PART 2

"The Kurdish liberation movement is working for a system of democratic self-organization in Kurdistan with the features of a confederation."
~ Abdullah Öcalan, War and Peace in Kurdistan.

Öcalan's War and Peace in Kurdistan: Perspectives for a political solution of the Kurdish Question, continues (Part 1 here):

New strategic, philosophic, and political approaches of the Kurdish liberation movement.


A comprehensive treatment of the main strategic, ideological, philosophical, and political elements at the base of the process of change cannot be accomplished in this essay. However, the cornerstones can be outlined as follows:

* The philosophical, political and value-related approaches that the newly-aligned PKK embraces find adequate expression in what is called “democratic socialism”.

* The PKK does not derive the creation of a Kurdish nation-state from the right of self-determination of the peoples. However, we regard this right as the basis for the establishment of grassroots democracies, without seeking new political borders. It is up to the PKK to convince the Kurdish society of their conviction. This is also true for the dialogue with the hegemonial countries exercising power in Kurdistan. It is to be the basis for a solution of the existing issues.

* The countries that presently exist here need democratic reforms going beyond mere lip service to democracy. It is not realistic, though, to go for the immediate abolition of the state. This does not mean that we have to take it as it is. The classic state structure with its despotic attitude of power is unacceptable. The institutional state needs to be subjected to democratic changes. At the end of this process, there should be a lean state as a political institution, which only observes functions in the general field of security and in the provision of social services. Such an idea of the state has nothing in common with the authoritarian character of the classic state, but would rather be regarded as a societal authority.

* The Kurdish liberation movement is working for a system of democratic self-organization in Kurdistan with the features of a confederation. Democratic confederalism understands itself as a coordination model for a democratic nation. It provides a framework, within which inter alia minorities, religious communities, cultural groups, gender-specific groups and other societal groups can organize autonomously. This model may also be called a way of organization for democratic nations and cultures. The democratization process in Kurdistan is not limited to matters of form but, rather, poses a broad societal project aiming at the economic, social, and political sovereignty of all parts of the society. It advances the building of necessary institutions and creates the instruments for democratic self-government and control. It is a continuous and long-term process. Elections are not the only means in this context. Rather, this is a dynamic political process which needs direct intervention by the sovereign, the people. The people are to be directly involved in the decision-finding processes of the society. This project builds on the self-government of the local communities and is organized in the form of open councils, town councils, local parliaments, and larger congresses. The citizens themselves are the agents of this kind of self-government, not state-based authorities. The principle of federal self-government has no restrictions. It can even be continued across borders in order to create multinational democratic structures. Democratic confederalism prefers flat hierarchies so as to further decision finding and decision making at the level of the communities.

* The model outlined above may also be described as autonomous democratic self-government, where the state-related sovereign rights are only limited. Such a model allows a more adequate implementation of basic values like freedom and equality than traditional administrative models. This model need not be restricted to Turkey, but may also be applicable in the other parts of Kurdistan. Simultaneously, this model is suitable for the building of federal administrative structures in all Kurdish settlement areas in Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran. Thus, it is possible to build confederate structures across all parts of Kurdistan without the need to question the existing borders.

* The decline of real-socialism was also a result of how the socialist countries used their power both internally and externally, and in the fact that they misconceived the importance of the gender issue. Women and power seem to be quite contradictory things. In real-socialism, the question of women’s rights was a rather subordinate issue, which was believed to be resolved anyway once the economic and other societal problems would be solved. However, women may also be regarded as an oppressed class and nation or an oppressed gender. As long as we do not discuss freedom and equal treatment of women in a historical and societal context, as long as no adequate theory has been devised, there will not be an adequate practice either. Therefore, women’s liberation must assume a main strategic part in the democratic struggle for freedom in Kurdistan.

* Today, the democratization of politics is one of the most urgent challenges. However, democratic politics need democratic parties. As long as there are no parties and party-affiliated institutions committed to the interests of the society instead of fulfilling state orders, a democratization of politics will be hardly possible. In Turkey, the parties are only propaganda tools of the state enjoying public alimentation. Their transformation into parties committed exclusively to the interests of the society, and the creation of the necessary legal basis in this context, would be an important part of a political reform. The founding of parties bearing the word Kurdistan in their name is still a criminal act. Independent parties are still obstructed in many ways. Kurdistan-related parties or coalitions serve democratization and are not advocates of separatism or the use of violence.

* There is a widespread individual and institutional subservient spirit, which is one of the biggest obstacles in the way of democratization. It can only be overcome by creating an awareness of democracy in all parts of the society. The citizens must be invited to actively commit themselves to democracy. For the Kurds, this means building democratic structures in all parts of Kurdistan and wherever there are Kurdish communities, which advance the active participation in the political life of the community. The minorities living in Kurdistan must be invited to participate as well. The development of grassroots-level democratic structures and a corresponding practical approach must have top priority. Such grassroots structures must be regarded as obligatory even where basic democratic and legal principles are violated as in the Middle East.

* Politics needs independent media. Without them the state structures will not develop any sensitivity for questions of democracy. Nor will it be possible to bring democracy into politics. Freedom of information is not only a right of the individual. It also involves a societal dimension. Independent media have also always a societal mandate. Their communication with the public must be marked by democratic balance.

* Feudal institutions like tribes, sheikdom, aghast, and sectarianism, which are essentially relics of the Middle Ages, are like the institutions of classic nation-states obstacles in the way of democratization. They must be urged appropriately to join the democratic change. These parasitic institutions must be overcome with top priority.

* The right to native language education must be warranted. Even if the authorities do not advance such education, they must not impede civic efforts for the creation of institutions offering Kurdish language and culture education. The health system must be warranted by both state and civil society.

* An ecological model of society is essentially socialist. The establishment of an ecological balance will only be accomplished during the transition phase from an alienated class society based on despotism to a socialist society. It would be an illusion to hope for the conservation of the environment in a capitalist system. These systems largely participate in the ecological devastation. Protection of the environment must be given broad consideration in the process of societal change.

* The solution of the Kurdish question is attempted within the framework of the democratization of the countries exercising hegemonial power over the different parts of Kurdistan. This process is not limited to these countries, though, but rather extends across the entire Middle East. The freedom of Kurdistan is tied to the democratization of the Middle East. A free Kurdistan is only conceivable as a democratic Kurdistan.

* The individual freedom of expression and decision is indefeasible. No country, no state, no society has the right to restrict these freedoms, whatever reasons they may cite. Without the freedom of the individual there will be no freedom for the society, just as freedom for the individual is impossible if the society is not free. A just redistribution of the economic resources presently in the possession of the state is eminently important for the liberation process of the society. Economic supply must not become a tool in the hands of the state for exercising pressure on the people. Economic resources are not the property of the state but of the society.

* An economy close to the people should be based on such redistribution and be benefit-oriented instead of exclusively pursuing the accumulation of surplus value and turnover increase. The local economic structures here do not only damage the society but also the environment. One of the main reasons for the decline of the society lies in the effects of the local finance markets. The artificial production of needs, the more and more adventurous search for new sales markets and the boundless greed for ever growing profits lets the divide between rich and poor steadily grow and enlarges the army of those living below the poverty line or even dying of hunger. An economic policy like this cannot be tolerated anymore. This is therefore the biggest challenge for socialist politics: implementing an alternative economic policy, which is not exclusively oriented by profit but rather by a just distribution of resources and the satisfaction of natural needs.

* Although the Kurds assign the family a high value it is still a place where freedom does not abound. Lack of financial resources, lack of education, lack of health care do not allow for much development. The situation of women and children is disastrous. So-called honor-killings of female family members are a symbol of this disaster. They become the targets of an archaic notion of honor, which reflects the degeneration of the entire society. Male frustration over the existing conditions is directed against the supposedly weakest members of the society: women. The family as a social institution experiences a crisis. Here, too, a solution can only be found in the context of an overall democratization.

Tomorrow: The present situation and suggestions for a solution.

WAR AND PEACE IN KURDISTAN: ÖCALAN'S PERSPECTIVE

"In April 1973 a group of six people came together in order to form an independent Kurdish political organization. They acted on the assumption that Kurdistan was a classic colony, where the population was forcibly refused their right to self-determination."
~ Abdullah Öcalan, War and Peace in Kurdstan.

Since I have posted the complete English version of DTP's Democratic Autonomy Project, which was brought before the TBMM, I now have another political document, portions of which I will serialize over the next few days.

This document is titled War and Peace in Kurdistan: Perspectives for a political solution of the Kurdish Question by Abdullah Öcalan. It's available online as a pdf document from the International Initiative Freedom for Öcalan.

The first half of the document discusses background information of the Kurdish situation, including the ideological bases of colonial oppression and power politics in Kurdistan, as well as a short discussion of Kurdish identity and resistance. For those needing a brief introduction to the Kurdish Question, the first half of Serok Apo's document will be useful.

The portions I will post here begin with a discussion of the PKK because, as I noted in the closing of yesterday's post, the DTP is able to engage in politics because of the sacrifices of PKK fighters. Understanding the foundation and evolution of PKK is critical to understanding Kurdish political activity in Turkey today.

Without further ado, Serok Apo may speak for himself:

The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) Short outline of the history of origins of the PKK


In April 1973 a group of six people came together in order to form an independent Kurdish political organization. They acted on the assumption that Kurdistan was a classic colony, where the population was forcibly refused their right to self-determination. It was their prime goal to change this. This gathering may also be called the hour of birth of a new Kurdish movement.

Over the years, this group found new followers who helped them spread their conviction in the rural population of Kurdistan. More and more they clashed with Turkish security forces, armed tribesmen of the Kurdish aristocracy and rival political groups, which violently attacked the young movement. On November 27, 1978 the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) was founded in a small village near Diyarbakir. Twenty-two leading members of the movement took part in the inaugural meeting in order to set up more professional structures for the movement. In an urban environment the movement would not have survived, so they focused their activities on the rural Kurdish regions.

The Turkish authorities reacted harshly to the propaganda efforts of the PKK. Detentions and armed clashes followed. Both sides experienced losses. The situation in Turkey, however, was also coming to a point. The first signs of the imminent military coup were already visible in 1979. The PKK responded by withdrawing from Turkey into the mountains or into other countries of the Middle East. Only a small number of activists remained in Turkey. This step helped the PKK to secure their survival. On September 12, 1980 the Turkish military overthrew the civil government and seized power. Many of the PKK who had remained in Turkey were imprisoned by the military junta.

In this situation, the PKK had to determine whether they wanted to become an exile organization or a modern national liberation movement. After a short phase of re-organization a majority of members returned to Kurdistan and took up armed resistance against the fascist junta. The attacks on military facilities in Eruh and Semdili on August 15, 1984 proclaimed the official beginning of the armed resistance. Although there were deficits, the move towards becoming a national liberation movement had been made.

Originally the Turkish authorities - Turgut Ozal had just been elected prime minister – tried to play down the incident. The state propaganda called the guerilla a “handful of bandits”, which is telling about the mindset of those in charge there. A political approach to the conflict was not perceptible. The clashes grew into a war, which demanded numerous victims from both sides.

It was only in the 1990s that the situation became less gridlocked, when the state seemed to become ready for a political solution. There were statements by Turgut Ozal and Suleyman Demirel, then president, indicating that they might recognize the Kurdish identity, raised hopes for an early end of the conflict. The PKK tried to strengthen this process by declaring a ceasefire in 1993.

The sudden death of Turgut Ozal deprived this process of one of its most important protagonists. There were other obstacles, too. Some hardliners among the PKK stuck to the armed struggle; the situation among the leadership of the Turkish state was difficult and marked by conflicting interests; the attitude of the Iraqi Kurdish leaders Talabani and Barzani was also not helpful in deepening the peace process. It was the biggest opportunity for a peaceful solution of the Kurdish question until then, and it was lost.

Subsequently the conflict escalated. Both parties experienced high losses. However, even this escalation did not lift the dead- lock. The years of war between 1994 and 1998 were lost years. In spite of several unilateral ceasefires on the part of the PKK, the Turkish state insisted on a military solution. The ceasefire of 1998 remained without response as well. Rather, it stirred up a military confrontation between Turkey and Syria, which brought both countries to the edge of a war. In 1998 I went to Europe as the chairman of the PKK in order to promote a political solution. The following odyssey is well known. I was abducted from Kenya and brought to Turkey in violation of international law. This abduction was backed by an alliance of secret services and the public expected the conflict to further escalate then. However, the trial on the Turkish prison island of Imrali marked a political U-turn in the conflict and offered new perspectives for a political solution. At the same time this turn caused the PKK to reorient ideologically and politically. I had been working on these points already before my abduction. This was truly an ideological and political cut. What, then, were the real motives?


Main criticism

Doubtlessly, my abduction was a heavy blow for the PKK. It was nonetheless not the reason for the ideological and political cut. The PKK had been conceived as a party with a state-like hierarchical structure similar to other parties. Such a structure, however, causes a dialectic contradiction to the principles of democracy, freedom, and equality, a contradiction in principle concerning all parties whatsoever their philosophy. Although the PKK stood for freedom-oriented views we had not been able to free ourselves from thinking in hierarchical structures.

Another main contradiction lay in the PKK’s quest for institutional political power, which formed and aligned the party correspondingly. Structures aligned along the lines of institutional power, however, are in conflict with societal democratization, which the PKK was declaredly espousing. Activists of any such party tend to orient themselves by superiors rather than by the society, or as the case may be aspire to such positions themselves.

All of the three big ideological tendencies based on emancipative social conceptions have been confronted with this contradiction. When real-socialism and social democracy as well as national liberation movements tried to set up social conceptions beyond capitalism they could not free themselves from the ideological constraints of the capitalist system. Quite early, they became pillars of the capitalist system while only seeking institutional political power instead of putting their focus on the democratization of the society.

Another main contradiction was the value of war in the ideological and political considerations of the PKK. War was understood as the continuation of politics by different means and romanticized as a strategic instrument.

This was a blatant contradiction to our self-perception as a movement struggling for the liberation of the society. According to this, the use of armed force can only be justified for the purpose of necessary self-defense. Anything going beyond that would be in violation of the socially emancipative approach that the PKK felt itself obliged to, since all repressive regimes in history had been based on war or had aligned their institutions according to the logic of warfare. The PKK believed that the armed struggle would be sufficient for winning the rights that the Kurds had been denied. Such a deterministic idea of war is neither socialist nor democratic, although the PKK saw itself as a democratic party. A really socialist party is neither oriented by state –like structures and hierarchies nor does it aspire to institutional political power, of which the basis is the protection of interests and power by war.

The supposed defeat of the PKK that the Turkish authorities believed they had accomplished by my abduction to Turkey was eventually reason enough to critically and openly look into the reasons that had prevented us from making better progress with our liberation movement. The ideological and political cut undergone by the PKK made the seeming defeat a gateway to new horizons.

Tomorrow, new strategic, philosophic, and political approaches of the Kurdish liberation movement.

BLACK OPERATIONS IN IRAQ BY TURKISH CONTRA-GUERRILLAS

"Turkey is working in Iraq with 3 major Sunni radical groups: Ansar al-Sunni Army, Iraq Islamic Army, and the 1920 Revolution Battalion, especially within the last 6 months. Turkey is supplying technical and logistic support to them."
~ Özgür Gündem.

Someone else from the US military comes along and tries to spread propaganda for Washington's puppet government in Ankara. Posted over at the MoJo Blog:

Evidence is piling up that the Turkish government will commit its armed forces against the de facto Kurdish state in Northern Iraq sooner rather than later. . .

[ . . . ]

What most Americans don't know is that the Turkish government has tried to negotiate a settlement with the Kurds through its new Special Envoy for Iraq, Murat Ozcelik. People who know Ozcelik insist he is the best person to negotiate Turkey's peace with the Kurds. Unfortunately, his Kurdish counterpart, Massoud Barzani, has turned out to be a fool who thinks he leads a pan-Kurdish movement inside Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey.

What the hell is Murat Özçelik doing "negotiat[ing] Turkey's peace with the Kurds" in South Kurdistan (Northern Iraq)? Turkey needs to negotiate peace with the 20 million Kurds inside Turkey and I've got a news flash for Özçelik and Douglas Macgregor, the author of the piece at the MoJo Blog: Mesûd Barzanî does not speak for the 20 million Kurds of Turkey. There are 20 DTP parliamentarians in the TBMM who were elected by the Kurds of Turkey as their representatives, and they are the ones that Özçelik must begin negotiations with.

Then we have the KCK Executive Council which also represents the Kurds of Turkey. Özçelik must also bring them into negotiations and then we can have a dialog along the lines already proposed by KCK in August 2006 (http://www.kurdish-info.net/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=3467):

The framework for the steps that need to be developed mutually in the second phase for a permanent solution:

1- The acknowledgement of the Kurdish identity and the constitutional guarantee of all identities under the identity of a Citizen of Turkey as the main identity,

2- The lifting of obstacles on the development of the Kurdish language and culture, the acknowledgement of education in the mother tongue and Kurdish acknowledged as the official second language alongside Turkish in the Kurdistan region, and with this to show respect to other minority cultures,

3- The acknowledgement, on the basis of freely practicing politics and organizing, of the right to thought, belief and freedom of expression, the lifting of all social inequalities in the constitution and laws, firstly being those of gender discrimination,

4- A social reconciliation project with the aim of mutual forgiveness of both people’s for the development of a peace and freedom union, on this basis the release of political prisoners including the PKK Leadership, and no obstacles to them participating in politics and social life,

5- The removal of forces in Kurdistan there for the purposes of special war, the abolition of the village guard system and the necessary social and political projects to be developed for the return of displaced villagers,

6- In parallel to the realization of the above articles, the initiation, with a timetable determined by both parties, of the gradual disarmament and legal participation into the democratic social life.

All of this, of course, would take place within the current borders of Turkey:

We would like as a movement to emphasize once again that the right solution is a democratic autonomy within the borders of Turkey. We believe that a solution in the unity of Turkey will be for the benefit of firstly the Kurdish people and all the people of the region.

Contrast that with the propaganda of Macgregor:

. . . the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a militant group that seeks to establish a Kurdish state in the region.

Macgregor actually admits that current tension between Kurds and Sunnis in Iraq is the result of Turkish black operations:

Much of the violence that is picking up between the Kurds and the Sunnis may well be the first sign of a Turkish counter-offensive to punish the Kurds for their continued support of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a militant group that seeks to establish a Kurdish state in the region.

Thanks, pal, for confirming what was reported one year ago by Özgür Gündem and carried on Rastî:

According to Özgür Gündem, a contra-guerrilla base has been founded in Amed (Diyarbakır) by the Ankara regime. These contra-guerrillas not only will operate against Kurds in the region of Amed and North Kurdistan, but also against Kurds in Iraq, Iran, and Syria.

The goal of the contra-guerrillas is to delay the Kerkuk referendum through black operations. Since Turkey cannot conduct a military operation in the South, it's initiating black operations through this contra-guerrilla group, operating in the same way it did in Şemdinli, in the Council of State, and in the Hrant Dink murder. JITEM and the Patriots Movement were behind those operations.

Ostensibly the contra-guerrilla group raised donations from $500,000 per month to $1,000,000 per month for the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF). I say "ostensibly," because it's more likely that the "donations" are coming directly from the Ankara regime. In addition, the contra-guerrillas give rewards for each successful ITF operation.

Turkey is working in Iraq with 3 major Sunni radical groups: Ansar al-Sunni Army, Iraq Islamic Army, and the 1920 Revolution Battalion, especially within the last 6 months. Turkey is supplying technical and logistic support to them.

The contra-guerrillas contacted some Arab tribes in Mosul and promised economic assistance to the tribes if they encourage the Sunnis to attack KDP and PUK offices.

Turkey has also been in contact with Arabs in Kerkuk, who had moved there during Saddam's arabization. Turkey organized these Arabs into death squads and provided them with assassination lists of Kurdish leaders. Attacks against Turkmen leaders, including Iraqi Turkmen Front leaders, would be encouraged in order create chaos.

They have assassination plans for some Arab and Turkmen leaders in order to turn Kurds and other peoples against each other and create a basis for the justification of the assassinations of Kurdish leaders.

The goal is to delay the Kerkuk referendum and not to allow Kerkuk to become part of Kurdistan.

The Ankara regime has invaded South Kurdistan in pursuit of PKK a number of times in the past and the TSK has always left with its tail between its legs. If the Ankara regime thinks it will insert itself in order to save Kerkuk for the ITF, then it had better learn the meaning of the word "quagmire", from Andrew Lee Butters almost one year ago:

So this is going to be a slow motion disaster rather than a spectacular one. Turkey will have to go deeper and deeper into Iraq, committing itself more and more to a course that will at best be ineffectual and at worst drag it and Iraqi Kurdistan into the great sucking sound that is the American project in Iraq. The only way out of this is for the Turkish state to begin political negotiations with the PKK, an internal enemy that it has been unable to defeat for more than 20 years. But the US, which labels the PKK a terrorist group, is hardly in a position to preach to its allies about talking to terrorists.

At the same time, Murat Karayılan confirmed the potential "quagmire":

Speaking to The Associated Press deep in the Qandil mountains straddling the Iraq-Turkish border, some 150 kilometers (94 miles) from the northern Iraqi Kurdish city of Sulaimaniyah, Karayilan warned an incursion would "make Turkey experience a Vietnam war."

[ . . . ]

"Iraq's Kurds will not support the Turkish army," he said. "If Turkey starts its attack, we will swing the Turkish public opinion by political, civil and military struggle."

[ . . . ]

Karayilan said the PKK was only defending itself against attacks by the Turks.

"This was not the first time. It happened many times before and no one talked about it, so why this time," he said, adding the clashes took place at least 100 kilometers (62 miles) from the border, within Turkey, not Iraq.

He said he believes the Turkish attacks are meant to destabilize Iraq, not remove the rebels.

"Turkey is only making pretexts to enter the Kurdistan region in Iraq," he added.

For those hard of understanding: Quagmire = Vietnam.

Not only should we expect meddling by the Ankara regime in the refusal to allow elections in Kerkuk, but we should also consider the recent turmoil in Xanaqîn as the result of Turkish contra-guerrillas, including recent roadside bomb attacks that resulted in the deaths of six peşmêrge.

Furthermore, let's not expect much from the KRG, Barzanî, or Talabanî. They have too much money tied up in business interests with Ankara for them to take a stand against Turkish black operations aimed against Kurdistan.