TURKEY IN DEFEAT

"Defeat is a school in which truth always grows strong."
~ Henry Ward Beecher.

Many thanks to the comrade who sent this along for your reading enjoyment--a translation of a recent opinion piece by Ahmet Altan at Taraf:

How Was the State Defeated?


This didn't happen with weapons.

Just the "existence" of the PKK was enough for the state to get defeated.

Actually, it wasn't possible for the PKK to defeat the state with weapons.

If the state could stand as a real state, such a defeat would not be the case.

But all the awkwardness of the state was revealed by the Kurdish war that PKK started.

This defeat has arrived as a result of the state seeing itself as "agha" and its people as "servants".

Our "agha" state, which takes every demand from a "servant" as "arrogant disrespectfulness", when faced with Kurds' demand, went into a state of complete "frustration".

These very rightful and just demands could be solved without getting guns involved.

But the disaster called 12 September [the 1980 coup] could not even tolerate Kurds' demands that were as weak as murmuring.

It attacked those people [the Kurds] like a death machine.

As if Diyarbakır prison was used intentionally to make Kurds go crazy because of "anger and pain".

In that prison it [the state] made people live such horrific pains, applied such horrific torture, and belittled people so badly that it did not leave any other way for for Kurds than "going to the mountains".

The state completely lost its mind when Kurds took up arms.

The state never thought about the reason for this uprising, neither did she look for a solution. It shut its ears to the people's complaints and turned down their demands.

It [the state] even denied that they were "Kurds".

It only chose one goal for itself: to supress the uprising at whatever cost.

It didn't even wonder "if there was another solution".

The PKK had a very strong support base among the people and it found external support too.

When the state couldn't annihilate the PKK with weapons, and could not suppress the uprising, it made the mistake that opened the way for its big defeat; the state, with all its institutions, was hurled outside the law.

Today, from almost every corner of The Southeast, bones of murdered people are surfacing.

The state's officers commited these horrific massacres.

The state turned its commissioned officers into "murderers" in those places.

It made the members of its legal system "co-conspirators"; it made its politicians into "inciters of murder"; and used its police as "torturers".

When the state, that should stand by and guard the law, stepped out of the law, then that huge organization [the state] turned into a gang.

Think about the Susurluk gangs, and Ergenekon.

Think about the cooperation with the mafia, murders, drug trafficking, and racketeering clashes.

The state, which was founded defectively anyway, lost its functionality as a "state".

"Criminal freedom" got larger and larger in the state's body, like a cancerous cell, and fed on all its establishment.

Then the state's flesh started falling off.

It turned into what it is today.

We are in a country in which the Constituional Court can violate the constitution.

Forensics medicine can do things bizarrely enough to get the attention of the president.

There is a murder organization named JITEM inside the state and its existence is constantly denied.

With its current structure, our state is not a state anymore.

And this is the big defeat that it experienced against PKK anyway; Not being a state anymore.

The state, in the name of destroying the PKK, destroyed itself, its legitimacy, and its very reason for existence.

PKK still stands.

But our state is vanished.

Now this state must be re-established.

We will re-establish a state which is respectful of people's demands, which serves its people, in which the Constitutional Court is respectful of the constitution, in which the soldiers will do what soldiers must do, and the police maintain law and order.

The state's "agha-hood" is finished. This people is not a "servant" anymore either.

The state's defeat, in fact, opened the road for transformation we should have lived long ago.

The state's and the peoples' roles are being redefined.

Of course there are still some who want to continue the old habits and act like a "agha" but their power is not enough anymore to make people accept this monstrosity as a "state".

To establish a new state, first, peace will be made with Kurds.

Then, the state will stop labeling the people, who are the true owners of this country, as "with--without head scarf", "left wing--right wing", and "Alevi--Sunni".

The sins of the past will be revealed one by one, the perpetrators will be put on trial, and the state and society will make a serious self-criticism.

Then we will have a new state and a new society.

We will establish a state which will not make any of its citizens to have to "take up arms" and which will not torture.

Defeat of a defective state will give birth to a healthy society.

I don't think anything else needs to be added given the context in which Altan writes. I really do like the part about making "a serious self-criticism". That's so very Apocu.

PKK IS NOT A "TERRORIST ORGANIZATION"

"International law calls this organization's actions "terror" if it conducts an armed struggle when it has an alternative way of struggle through the open door of politics and law."
~ Ahmet Altan, Taraf.

Ahmet Altan explains why PKK is not a "terrorist organization", from Taraf:

You Cannot Solve It by Saying It's Terror


I don't know how our generals came to the point that they believe they know the best of everything.

I guess they are getting educated like that in military schools.

They have ideas for every subject and they want their ideas to be implemented.

If the thing they wanted does not come about, they show their weapons.

For instance, they say, "A president whose wife wears a scarf cannot sit in Çankaya."

For this they write memoranda.

Then, in elections when people say, "Sure it can, why shouldn't it," they get surprised.

In addition to having ideas about the scarf issue, they have uncriticizable ideas about the Kurdish question, too.

While talking about the Kurdish question, the general staff talks about, "hitting the 'terrorist' organization."

Is this a solution?

The army is hitting against PKK for twenty-five years.

What is the result?

Thousands of dead, hundreds of millions of dollars spent.

And the Kurdish question remains unsolved in front of society.

PKK continues its existence in the mountains.

I guess before everything, we have to decide what PKK is.

Is PKK a terrorist organization?

The thing that you say as a terrorist organization has ten members, fifty members, one hundred members at the most.

However, PKK is an organization that has thousands of militants, fighting with an army for twenty-five years, can establish an electric power plant, builds a dam, has an organization that is spread throughout the world, has a large financial source, and has the support of an important number of people.

This cannot be called a "terrorist organization."

International law calls this organization's actions "terror" if it conducts an armed struggle when it has an alternative way of struggle through the open door of politics and law.

However this doesn't make PKK a "terrorist organization" but makes it an organization that conducts "terror".

If you think the reverse, I think it will be better understood.

There have been seventeen thousand extra-judicial murders in The Southeast.

Slowly it is revealed that most of these murders have been committed by JİTEM, which is under the authority of the army.

The informers tell everything; at the addresses where the secret witnesses point, bodies come out.

Collecting seventeen thousand people from the street and killing them is certainly terrorism.

Does this conduct make the army a "terrorist organization"?

No.

It makes it an organization that implements terror in The Southeast.

If we cannot understand what PKK is, we cannot comprehend the reason for its existence, and how it survived despite twenty-five years of war, and thousands of its casualties.

PKK is an organization that has its roots in people.

The Turkish view of PKK and the Kurdish view of PKK is very different.

PKK, for some Kurds, is a "holy" organization.

Among Kurds, it has several opponents, people who are angry with it, people who criticize it, but in general all the Kurds think the "Kurdish question" was brought to the country's attention by PKK.

Without understanding these, planning a strategy of "war" or "peace" is convicting yourself to failure.

I know that seeing the realities in this country discomforts some people, but it is impossible to solve the problems without seeing the truth.

Both Turkish and Kurdish politicians, the army, and PKK, too, must get out from the "cyber-world" which was created by a war that lasted for twenty-five years and confront the realities.

If the state's goal is the annihilation of PKK, this is a wrong goal.

Firstly, it is impossible to annihilate PKK with arms.

Secondly, even if you annihilate PKK, you will not be able to solve the problem. A new organization will show up in its place.

The problem is the usurpation of the rights of fifteen million people.

As long as the Turks hold the power of "granting rights" to the Kurds, this problem will continue.

We have to form a state in which no one has a right to "grant a right" to another and we have to form a state in which the rights of all people are guaranteed through a social contract.

The chief of the general staff says, "Cultural rights can be given, but on an individual basis."

He says Kurds cannot do politics.

He cannot say this.

In a normal country society will tell such a general, "It's none of your business."

These are the decisions that civilian politicians will decide.

Whether cultural or political rights will be given, who is going to talk with whom, are not the jobs of the military.

If the soldiers are going to do politics, who is going to do the military's job?

We have to take the military out of these issues.

Then we have to sit and evaluate the situation realistically.

The Kurdish question is not a question that can be solved by reducing it to a "terrorist" question by calling PKK a "terrorist organization", and passing the issue of "who will give rights to whom" to the military.

The Kurds and the Turks are going to sit and talk.

They will seek ways where everybody can feel themselves as "first-class" citizens, secured, comfortable, and happy.

Furthermore this is not an option anymore for the two sides. This is a "must"; because life commands it with its fearsome power.

For more on PKK's position on this subject, see:

Notes from Kandil, 1

Notes from Kandil 2: This Isn't Your Dad's PKK

Notes from Kandil 3: Where There's a Will . . .

Notes from Kandil 4: Possibilities

Karayılan in The Times

TALKING THE TALK AFTER WALKING THE WALK

"Until this very day, when a Kurd asks for his identity, culture, language he is declared as a PKK member. Kurdish people’s demand for its identity, culture and language was considered as treason, as ethno-nationalism, as a movement to divide the country. Actually the state is telling us this: 'Either you will shut up, or I will see you as PKK members and treat you as PKK members as well.'"
~ Ahmet Türk.

My friend over at Azadîxwaz has done us all a big favor. He did a favor for me by taking somethign off my to-do list; he did a favor for all of you by translating Ahmet Türk's recent interview with Neşe Düzel at Taraf.

Here are a few highlights:

ND: Are you saying that the operation against the DTP officials is just a result of the local elections?

AT: That is the first reason. The second reason is PKK’s statement after the elections. PKK stated this: “Kurdish people supported DTP in the elections. We value this support. To open the road for the peaceful solution we will silence (Ceasefire) the weapons until June 1st”. They also hinted that if there was any positive development that they will extend the ceasefire. This is it. The ones are getting richer from this… the warlords got worried. Because they know that if the Kurdish Question is resolved by democratic means, Turkey’s EU process will accelerate and they will lose power. The ones opposing to the peaceful solution of the problem, stepped in. The third reason for the operation against DTP is …

ND: Yes, what is it?

AT: The possibility of peace in the Kurdish region. The Kurds live in four countries Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria in the Middle East. Kurdish politicians of all four parts are in search for reaching a common decision of what the demands of the Kurdish people are, and to start the peace period in this region. This also disturbed the state. To stop all of these peaceful developments it attacked the DTP.

ND: PKK ended its ceasefire because of this operation; do you think it is the right decision to end the ceasefire?

AT: PKK did not end the ceasefire. They made a statement on last Thursday saying, “ It is obvious that the state does not want solve the Kurdish Question. But we will honor our decision as we stated before until June 1st”.

[ . . . ]

ND: Have you held any kind of meetings with the AKP government or the prime minister as DTP?

AT: We cannot see the government when we look for it. We have asked them to have talks but this did not come to fruition.

[ . . . ]

ND: It is alleged that the DTP officials that were arrested have links to the PKK. Do you know anything about these allegations?

AT: Until this very day, when a Kurd asks for his identity, culture, language he is declared as a PKK member. Kurdish people’s demand for its identity, culture and language was considered as treason, as ethno-nationalism, as a movement to divide the country. Actually the state is telling us this: “Either you will shut up, or I will see you as PKK members and treat you as PKK members as well”.

[ . . . ]

ND: Once you stated, “ We have the same support base as the PKK”. Is it possible that there are some links between the DTP officials and the PKK other than this common support base?

AT: We need understand the developments in the world well. Say, some steps are taken for peace and we as the DTP had talks with the government and the state. At the end of these talks, will the state not ask us “OK, so if I do these, will the PKK lay down the arms”? Yes, it will. So then, the PKK is a reality and has a role in all these. If you consider identification of this role as having link with the PKK you cannot get any results. You have to take into account whether the PKK will accept the policies and projects for the peace.

ND: An armed group, whatever this group is, is a criminal against the laws. This is so in the world as well. Do you, as a parliamentarian, accept the fact that every armed group is criminal?

AT: We need to clarify the term “terror”. We need to understand Al-Qaida or Hamas correctly. We need to understand the PKK, Mandela’s party, and old Palestinian Liberation Organization correctly.

[ . . . ]

ND: What should be done to solve the Kurdish Question within a peaceful framework?

AT: We are very clear and open about this subject. The (identity) rights of the Kurdish people should be guaranteed and put in the constitution. A new constitution should be prepared and this constitution should be written in a manner that accepts the differences as richness. We also are citizens of the Republic of Turkey. The Kurdish citizens should be granted whatever rights the Turkish citizens have. Within the framework of the Democratic Autonomy Project, regional governments should be strengthened/supported and regions based on their needs should be able to make decisions about their economic, social and educational matter. The schools that teach in Kurdish should be opened. For instance they show TRT6 (Şeş) as a development.

ND: Is it not a development?

AT: But the Kurds cannot determine the programs of TRT6. I actually asked in England. There are three million Welsh people. They have to learn Welsh in Wales and it is obligatory. They told me that: “ We are so much assimilated that only 5% of our population could speak Welsh. But now it is 20%. And among the young generation it is 40%”. English government distributes 120 million pounds every year to private television channels to support the improvement of the Welsh culture. This is a recognition and protection of a right. TRT6 is, on the other hand, abuse of a right. These are what we want…

ND: If these conditions are prepared will the PKK lay down its arms?

AT: There is not a difference between what we say and what they say. The demands are almost the same. These are Kurdish people’s general demands. I have to abide by the demands of the Kurdish people. So does the PKK.

Read the whole thing at Azadîxwaz because Ahmet Türk makes a lot of important points.

I find it interesting that Neşe Düzel says, "An armed group, whatever this group is, is a criminal against the laws. This is so in the world as well. . . " Of course she's right. Look at the armed group of the Ankara regime, the TSK, and the criminal behavior it has inflicted on the Kurdish people. Look at the armed group of the Washington regime, the US military, and the criminal behavior it has inflicted on people in Central America, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, to name a few. Look at the armed group of the Israeli regime, the IDF, and the criminal behavior it has inflicted on the Palestinians. And I could go on and on and on . . . Britain, France, Russia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka . . .

Of course, then we have the question of "laws", which Düzel brings up in her statement. There is a problem with "law" and that is that it is meaningless unless it is also moral and ethical. Just because something is defined as "legal" doesn't mean it is moral or ethical. In fact, it can be quite the contrary. Check out some of the eugenics or racial laws of Nazi Germany or some of the eugenics laws of the US--or the Jim Crow laws. Or even the whitewashing of torture as "harsh interrogation techniques". They might have been approved but they are still torture and torture is, of it's very nature, immoral.

And at the end of the interview, Ahmet Türk replies to this question of the violence of the state, and it seems to me that he agrees with my assessment of the armed groups of nation-states. Again, this is consistent with PKK's stance on the matter.

THE MAKING OF A KURDISH GUERRILLA

"But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security."
~ The Declaration of Independence.

First let me ask if you've seen it? The latest video from Hakkari? Here it is:

Okay. That was a Special Operations police beating a fourteen-year-old Kurdish boy last week.

Do you remember last year, during Newroz, what the police did to another fourteen-year-old from Hakkari? Here's a refresher:

Both were violent actions of Turkish police, which has enjoyed impunity for such actions--and worse--in North Kurdistan for decades.

Now, here's Ahmet Altan channeling what most of us have been saying for decades:

It's Easy to Say "PKK Is a Terrorist Organization"


Have you watched it?

In a wide, rural area fifty or sixty kids were "demonstrating", so they say they were throwing stones at Special Operation police with heavy weapons.

What will happen if the police never go there?

The kids will shout for a while, then disperse.

These are kids, aged thirteen or fourteen, the place where they "demonstrate" is a huge rural area.

Oh, no! Kurdish kids cannot demonstrate; they cannot shout in rural areas.

The police, with weapons in hand, are attacking the kids with pressurized water.

One of the police is capturing a skinny fourteen-year-old boy and knocking him on the ground. . .

And is starting to hit the boy's head with the butt of his weapon.

He is hitting to kill.

There is no reason to hit the boy, however.

Since the police cannot control his own anger, he is hitting the boy violently with the butt of his weapon.

Then another police is congratulating the police who beat the boy.

This is not the violence of one or two police.

In the Southeast the entire state is like this.

How can a state rule there while having such hatred and abhorrence toward a people?

Besides, why should it rule there?

Why should Turkey resist ruling a people that it hates so much?

If you see them and their small children as "enemies" that much, to knock them on the ground and crack their skulls with the butt of your weapon, then you cannot stay there.

Whoever watched those scenes remembered the Israeli troop who smashed and broke a Palestinian's arm with a rock.

They remembered the English who coldly raked demonstrators with machine guns in India.

This state does not see the Kurds as its own.

For that reason, it behaves like an "occupying force" there.

It is killing and throwing them into wells, burning the villages, and filling jails with [Kurdish] children.

In the "calm" times when we are closest to peace, it is knocking them down on the ground and trying to smash their heads with the butt of a gun.

We saw these scenes because there were cameras there. They are behaving like this in front of the cameras.

You can imagine what they are doing in the mountain villages, towns, streets in the middle of nowhere, where they don't have cameras.

If they act like this to you, they hit your children's heads with the butts of their weapons, what would you do?

Who is going to protect those people?

Do you understand why this war continues for twenty-five years?

Do you understand why those Kurdish children go to the mountains knowing consciously that they will die?

They do go.

What can they do?

If you do not give them the opportunity to protect their lives, their honor, and their children, what are they going to do? Who are they going to trust? Where are they going to shelter?

They go to the mountains.

The newspapers write, "PKK is a terrorist organization" and politicians say so.

Many people, including me, say "PKK should finish the war".

It is easy to say "PKK is a terrorist organization".

Then what is JİTEM that shoots people in the back of the head?

Then what is Special Operations [police] that smash children's heads with the butt of a weapon?

Isn't what they're doing "terrorism"?

If you terrorize a people, without discriminating children or anyone, what is that people going to do?

How will these people defend themselves?

You tell me . . .

Tell me how this people will protect their children.

If you label a people as an enemy, you burn their villages, you insult their women, you imprison their men, you hit the children's head with the butt of a gun, that people will go to the mountains.

In fact, they did go . . .

Then you will fight for years and be the cause of the death of more people.

After watching those scenes on TV, that horrible violence, the satisfaction those police derived from that violence, I thought that the state cannot rule there and also I thought that it does not have a right to rule there either.

You are going there, saying "I am your state"; is this the way to be their state?

Is making armed soldiers walk in the provinces that are 90% Kurdish, stressing "Turkishness" and giving the message that "We will smash you with weapons," the way to be their state?

What does this state want?

War? Peace?

By torturing an entire people, you cannot win a war. Throughout history, no one won.

It is possible to win wars against armies, but it is impossible to win against people.

Do you want peace?

There cannot be any "peace" by hitting children's heads with the butt of a weapon.

Savages can win neither war nor peace.

I saw how they hit that boy's head with the butt of their weapon . . .

What difference is it if that land belongs to you or not?

That land might be yours but that people is not.

The people, that you hit their child with the butt of your gun, neither will be yours nor will be with you.

That land will belong to the one who can provide them an environment where their children can run without being shot, without being beaten, without being hit with the butt of a gun, and where they can laugh and can play.

Then you will not be afraid of saying that land's name, which is known for centuries; you will say Kurdistan with great comfort. You will sit with those children and sing a song, and read a poem from Ahmet Arif.

The breaking of an arm, the smashing of a skull, the "voiding" of votes, the mass arrest of DTP politicians and political workers . . . these are the actions that send new recruits to the mountains in streams.

And let me remind you that the state bears the greater responsibility because it has failed miserably to live up to its responsibilities as a state. Here is the principle:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, — That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.

Furthermore, from UN Resolution 3103 of 1973, the UN:

Solemnly proclaims the following basic principles of the legal status of the combatants struggling against colonial and alien domination and racist régimes without prejudice to their elaboration in future within the framework of the development of the international law applying to the protection of the human rights in armed conflicts:

1. The struggle of peoples under colonial and alien domination and racist régimes for the implementation of their right to self-determination and independence is legitimate and in full accordance with the principles of international law.

2. Any attempt to suppress the struggle against colonial and alien domination and racist régimes is incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations, the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples21 and constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

3. The armed conflicts involving the struggle of peoples against colonial and alien domination and racist régimes are to be regarded as international armed conflicts in the sense of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the legal status envisaged to apply to the combatants in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and other international instruments is to apply to the persons engaged in armed struggle against colonial and alien domination and racist régimes.

4. The combatants struggling against colonial and alien domination and racist régimes captured as prisoners are to be accorded the status of prisoners of war and their treatment should be in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, of 12 August 1949.

5. The use of mercenaries by colonial and racist régimes against national liberation movements struggling for their freedom and independence from the yoke of colonialism and alien domination is considered to be a criminal act and the mercenaries should accordingly be punished as criminals.

6. The violation of the legal status of the combatants struggling against colonial and alien domination and racist régimes in the course of armed conflicts entails full responsibility in accordance with the norms of international law.

So when Ahmet Altan says, "I thought that the state cannot rule there and also I thought that it does not have a right to rule there either," he is right. And when HPG fights a defensive war from the mountains, it is not only right, it is obligated.

THE KURDS' MANDELA

"If you want to make peace with your enemy, you have to work with your enemy. Then he becomes your partner."
~ Nelson Mandela.

Newroz celebrations continue in North Kurdistan. And as DTP is pressing more and more for Öcalan's freedom in their Newroz speeches, and since DTP is making its position on the upcoming Kurdish summit well known, I thought it would be appropriate to include a translation of a recent piece by Ahmet Altan.

Apo and Mandela

The other day Hürriyet's general publication manager Ertuğrul Özkök wrote an interesting article. He mentioned that Apo could take a place in the peace process.

I don't know if I am doing an injustice to Özkök but I see such writings came out in Hürriyet as the state's forerunner for its preparations. I think they are written to prepare the public for what is planned or the plans are in the process of preparation.

If this is Özkök's own idea or if it's written by the order of the state, the result doesn't change. This is, I think, a positive step.

A couple of days before this article was published, I encountered another piece of news just as interesting.

It was mentioning that 12 more cells would be built on İmralı Island. I mean twelve more people would be taken to reside with Apo. When these two things are evaluated together the idea that something is changing gets stronger.

The name of Apo is like the god Janus, which has two different appearances. Most of the Turks hate this name. Furthermore some of the newspapers add descriptions like "terrorist leader" or "baby killer".

For the Kurds, however, this name has almost a holy meaning. For them, Apo is the leader who enabled the Kurdish Question to be discussed concretely in this country. He is an indivisible part of the Kurdish identity. Moreover, PKK members call him "the leadership", not Apo or Ocalan. His description has almost a mystical influence.

A couple of months ago I had watched a movie about South Africa's black leader, Nelson Mandela. Mandela's name was the same as Apo's in South Africa. A "murder" for the whites; a "holy" leader for the blacks. The movie was telling Mandela's imprisonment adventure through a white guard's perspective. Mandela first was kept in a cell. Then some of his friends from his own organization were put beside him. Then altogether they resided in a more comfortable "place". Later on, Mandela was provided a farmhouse with protection. Then he was released and joined the elections.

This was a "horrible" period for several whites. For the blacks, however, it was a period to be celebrated. The feeling of hatred or revenge is not sufficient to solve this kind of social problem, an ethnic clash. Even if you presume the non-existence of millions of people, their identity, language, and traditions, life imposes its reality.

There is a Kurdish reality in Turkey. Because this "reality" was not admitted it first turned into a problem then into a war. Thousands of people died. Hundreds of billions of dollars that were supposed to be spent for the welfare of this country's people, were spent on weapons. The problem has not been solved yet.

Today even the retired generals admit some mistakes were made in the Kurdish Question. Turkey is tired of the war. The world wants Turkey and the Middle East to arrive at peace.

A great Kurdish conference is being prepared. Apo, in Imrali, stated that he sees this initiative as positive. Although the Turks become uncomfortable by hearing this idea, still Apo is an important one for "peace".

Like Alev Er always says "Whoever you are fighting with, he is the one you make peace with". Apo started the war. Today he has the power to start peace. A peace without Apo and PKK is not possible.

Turks, being very angry at Apo or PKK, even hating them, does not change this reality. Today keeping Apo aside from the peace process, pretending the non-existence of PKK, does not fit reality. I know how several Turkish readers will be angry when they read this article. But how far can we disregard realities by being afraid of anger and reactions?

Today Apo is the Kurds' Mandela; he is their national hero. Now I want to ask my Turkish readers: Is taking revenge on Apo, or punishing him, important, or is it important for Turkey to arrive at a decent level of welfare; kids are not being killed anymore, and living in this country where everyone lives in peace together?

Revenge is not such a feeling that results in a positive outcome.

The two parties suffered in this war, the two parties were hurt, and the two parties cried for their children. What good is it going to do to maintain this?

Is it possible not to see the great profits that will be gained by including Apo in the peace process? Turkey is on the brink of peace. With a little bit of determination, we can pass over this line. Even a country like South Africa, which went through hatred and blood, succeeded in this. Why shouldn't we succeed?

Okay, you got it, we are good at fighting, however . . .

Doesn't being able to have peace have as much value as fighting?

From Taraf.

Note that I do not know what statement of Öcalan's that Altan is referring to when he says that Öcalan "sees this initiative as positive". It may be a statement that Öcalan made in reference to PKK's suggestion of a summit or it may be a statement referring to a more general suggestion of a summit. However, given DTP's current stance on the summit, as expressed by Talabanî during his visit to Turkey last week, it's highly unlikely that Öcalan sees as positive the hidden agendas that will be brought to the table when that summit occurs.

THE ADVENTURES OF AHMET ALTAN

"I have been in this job for 27 years, I started from the bottom and climbed to the top. I can say that the Turkish press is coward: it comes out to hide the truth."
~ Ahmet Altan.

Last week I criticized a recent article in the neoconservatives' The Middle East Quarterly particularly for its claim--parroted from the paşas--that Taraf was a Fethullahçı paper. I cited the financial troubles Taraf has recently had and asked why, if Taraf were Fethullahçı, it wasn't able to secure funds from a Fethullahçı bank.

Another reason for doubting the paşas' and the neocons' claim that Taraf is Fethullahçı is the fact that Taraf's editor-in-chief is Ahmet Altan, whose father was a leftist politician. Ahmet Altan may be more familiar to Kurds for his famous article, "Atakurd", written in 1995 and for which he was fired from Milliyet.

A month ago, it was brought to my attention that Ahmet Altan appeared to have gone missing. I chalked it up to vacation time but now it appears that Ahmet Altan has not been on vacation. After "long adventures" he has returned and here's what he has to say on the state of affairs at Taraf:

After Long Adventures . . .


In 19th century adventure novels, there is a cliche ending that my father really loved about their heroes: "After long adventures, he returned to his home."

It is not being mentioned what the poor novel hero went through in those "long adventures", what he had lived through, what he had suffered for. No one cares anyway.

I also returned after "long adventures".

I must admit I went through a lot.

All the troubles of attempting to found a real newspaper which opposes the system in a place like Turkey, where the system is poor and based on corruption, robbery, murder, and gangs, and criticizing both the political rulers and the army's hidden rule were directly on our shoulders.

I am not even counting the fact that everyone, from the boss to the tea-deliverer, was sued.

This was expected in our country anyway.

However, wrestling with merciless financial seizures which would even be surprising to the system itself, gave us a difficult time.

We have lived through times where we came to the brink of closure.

I have talked to as many people as I have never talked before; while being proud of not asking anything from anyone, I have asked for something from almost anyone in order to let this newspaper live.

I undertook the shame of asking due to the belief that such a newspaper is a necessity; I have been through nights where I never slept until mornings, suffering and smoking.

There have been times when I was angry for seeing the burden of making a democratic newspaper that tells the truth in a country of 75 million, left on the shoulders of two young men, Başar and Savaş Arslan. There have been moments when I felt angry for not being able to do anything while seeing this heavy burden on their shoulders. There have been times when I was hurt by emotional confusion when these two young people entered my office always with a smile, even during the hardest days.

I have been through days from waking up and saying, "Damn it, just shut it down," to "No, we will resist to the end, we will fight."

Especially seeing those inferior publications of newspapers which are pro-coup and pro-army regarding "Ergenekon"; witnessing the nerve of those who define the capture of coup-makers and coup-instigators as the "silencing of the opposition of political government", increased my resistance and perseverance.

Every time I read them, I believed in the necessity of this newspaper.

Not only I but also everyone at this newspaper believed that.

They worked without pay for two-and-a-half months, with great self-sacrifice.

They couldn't take money home; they couldn't pay their rent; there have been some whose electric meter was dismantled; and there have been times when they couldn't find money for transportation to get to work.

Başar and Savaş encountered hardships that they have never seen in their entire lives.

Our readers shared their little bit of money with us; in order to let us live, they joined the fight.

All of them endured, all of them resisted.

Then Mehmet Betil came.

We did all our accounting.

First of all we saw that, in order to maintain a newspaper like this, an amount of money which would be equal to the two-week's rent of a super luxury yacht would be enough for us.

Not being able to find that much cash money suffocates us.

Mehmet put more than enough fresh money.

We breathed.

We set the strategy for the next ten years.

We all know that a newspaper which brings foreigners and even enemy groups together, introducing themselves to each other, bringing them closer to each other, and making them gather under a common belief, "democracy", is a nominee of being this country's greatest newspaper.

Knowing this empowers us.

However, we aren't satisfied with this.

In order to keep this newspaper strong in this country where there are revenge-seeking politicians, angry generals, slick bankers, cowardly rich, friends who break their promises, we decided to open up to the world.

We have kept in touch with the establishments which open funds for the world's democratic newspapers. We have agreed with some of them; there are some with whom we are still talking. We came to the last stage for an agreement with Europe's most prestigious newspaper for a publication partnership.

Finally, with the support of our readers in our most difficult time, with the confidence of being a global newspaper, we came to a point where the shaky situation in Turkey no longer affects us.

We are solid and comfortable now.

Turkey's efendis, who say, "If I want, I create; if I want, I destroy," can try their best now.

We will explain all the truths as we promised when we first began this publication.

Our readers long ago became our friends. We have embraced each other with unprecedented power and we will increase the number of our "friends" when we walk together.

After "long adventures" I returned.

But I'm very tired.

Now I'm at a point that I can't bear a bird's song let alone a human voice.

I want to be buried in absolute silence and remain there for a few days without moving, without speaking. without telling, and without listening.

One week from now I'll be here.

We have left the pains behind but I want to live by myself the happiness and gratitude in the struggle that was given and created by the resistance of the people, our readers, newspaper staff, columnists, adminstrators, and the newspaper's owners.

I generally try to be solid in hard times but now when I think of those people and how they struggled in the hardest time, maybe sometimes tears come to my eyes and I don't want anyone else to witness this. After all, I am a man.

You can find more backgrounder on Ahmet Altan here and here.

Although I don't agree with everything Taraf writes, even if I do present translations of some of the Taraf staff's work here, I think that they would be a bit offended if I did agree with everything. I do, however, happen to agree with Altan's assessment of Taraf as Turkey's "greatest newspaper". Taraf has written stuff that I never thought I would see in print in a Turkish paper and, what's more, the journalists at Taraf have forced discussions of some of their most controversial reporting into the pages of every other Turkish daily.

Can you imagine how much more improved the state of the lapdog American media would be if there were an American Taraf that would force a discussion of its most controversial reporting through the journalistic wilderness of the US? Such an American paper might actually report the truth. Such an American paper would have taken up Sibel Edmonds on her offer to go public with everything she knows.

Besides, I'm all for feeding frenzies, especially when the paşas are the main course with the Fethullahçı as appetizer.

THE NEOCONS AND FETHULLAH GÜLEN

"Turkey, a country of about 70 million Muslims, most of whom are religious, is ruled today by a conservative party with an Islamic pedigree and a humane, tolerant, and democratic track record."
~ Thomas Patrick Carroll.

The neocons are upset with Turkey again and particularly with Fethullah Gülen's AKP. This month's edition of The Middle East Quarterly, a publication of the neoconservative Middle East Forum and whose editor is the extremely anti-Kurdish Michael Rubin--also of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI)--has an article on Gülen that was most likely dictated by the paşas. The author is the director of the Turkish Media Project at MEMRI.

Here's something on MEMRI from Sourcewatch:

According to its website, founded in February 1998 "to inform the debate over U.S. policy in the Middle East, MEMRI is an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit, 501(c)(3) organization. MEMRI's headquarters is located in Washington, DC with branch offices in Berlin, London, and Jerusalem, where MEMRI also maintains its Media Center. MEMRI research is translated to English, German, Hebrew, Italian, French, Spanish, Turkish, and Russian."

MEMRI's stance is that it is opposed to Islamic fundamentalism, not Islam itself, although the integrity of this position may be questioned because of links on MEMRI's website to certain evangelical Christian organizations who take a harder line on Islam. Yigal Carmon, MEMRI's founder, is a former advisor on terrorism to the Israeli Prime Ministers, Yitzhak Shamir and Yitzhak Rabin, so he actually worked for both Labor and Likud governments. Praise for MEMRI should be taken with a grain of salt since it is almost always motivated by politics, not the quantity or quality of MEMRI's work.

MEMRI has gained currency with most pro-Israel writers, as well as right-wing publications. For example, New York Times writer Thomas Friedman, a influential foreign affairs columnist, has used MEMRI translations a number of times in his columns. MEMRI is cited in several publications, such as The Times, The Washington Times, The Weekly Standard, The Jerusalem Post, The National Review, The Toronto Sun, Wall Street Journal, Libertad, FrontPageMagazine, Columbia Journalism Review, Associated Press, etc.

Also, from Rightweb:

According to MEMRI—which maintains offices in Washington, Berlin, London, Tokyo, and Jerusalem—its main subjects of interest include jihad and terrorism, U.S. and Mideast politics, reform in the Arab and Muslim world, Arab-Israeli conflict, inter-Arab relations, economic studies, and Arab antisemitism. MEMRI's slogan, "Bridging the Language Gap Between the Middle East and the West," does not convey the institute's stridently pro-Israel and anti-Arab political bias. MEMRI was previously more forthcoming about its political orientation in its self-description and in staff profiles on its website. But its website now offers no information about its staff, board of directors, or funding.

[ . . . ]

The background of MEMRI's founders illuminates its political orientation. Yigal Carmon is a reserve colonel in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), having served in the IDF/Intelligence Branch from 1968 to 1988. In that capacity, Carmon, who was born in Romania, was acting head of the civil administration in the West Bank from 1977 to 1982. He served as counterterrorism adviser to premiers Shamir and Menachem Begin from 1988 to 1993. In 1991 and 1992 Carmon was a senior member of the Israeli delegation to peace negotiations with Syria in Madrid and Washington.

Meyrav Wurmser, an Israeli-born analyst of Mideast affairs, received her doctorate from George Washington University in Washington, DC, where she wrote on Zeev (Vladimir) Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Movement. According to Arab Media Watch , Jabotinsky "brokered the marriage between Zionism and fascism." Wurmser, who has taught at Johns Hopkins University and the U.S. Naval Academy, is a central figure in the right-wing's web of Middle East policy institutes, as is her husband, David Wurmser. According to the Hudson Institute, "Through her work at MEMRI [she] helped to educate policymakers about the Palestinian Authority two-track approach to 'negotiating peace' with Israel: calling for peace in the English press and with Western policymakers while inciting hatred and violence through official Arab language media." Before joining the George W. Bush administration as a State Department policy adviser under John Bolton, her husband was an American Enterprise Institute scholar and associate of the Middle East Forum.

Just as during the last few years Michael Rubin has written paşa-inspired anti-AKP articles at The Middle East Forum and the AEI, so the current anti-Fethullahçı piece at The Middle East Forum is an interesting work of propaganda and, like all good propaganda, it uses truth to weave together a number of whoppers. For example, on the number of mosques and imams in Turkey:

Today, Turkey has over 85,000 active mosques, one for every 350 citizens—compared to one hospital for every 60,000 citizens—the highest number per capita in the world and, with 90,000 imams, more imams than doctors or teachers. It has thousands of madrasa-like Imam-Hatip schools and about four thousand more official state-run Qur'an courses, not counting the unofficial Qur'an schools, which may expand the total number tenfold.

On Fethullahçı education:

Nurettin Veren, Gülen's right-hand man for thirty-five years, estimated that some 75 percent of Turkey's two million preparatory school students are enrolled in Gülen institutions.[12] He controls thousands of top-tier secondary schools, colleges, and student dormitories throughout Turkey, as well as private universities, the largest being Fatih University in Istanbul. Outside Turkey, his movement runs hundreds of secondary schools and dozens of universities in 110 countries worldwide. Gülen's aim is not altruistic: His followers target youth in the eighth through twelfth grades, mentor and indoctrinate them in the ışıkevi, educate them in the Fethullah schools, and prepare them for future careers in legal, political, and educational professions in order to create the ruling classes of the future Islamist, Turkish state. Taking their orders from Fethullah Gülen, wealthy followers continue to open schools and ışıkevi in what Sabah columnist Emre Aköz called "the education jihad."[13]

The overt network of schools is only one part of a larger strategy. In a 2006 interview, Veren said, "These schools are like shop windows. Recruitment and Islamization activities are carried out through night classes ... Children whom we educated in Turkey are now in the highest positions. There are governors, judges, military officers. There are ministers in the government. They consult Gülen before doing anything."[14]

Just remember that whenever you think about the new Fethullahçı university that's recently opened in Hewlêr and don't be shocked when the next generation of Southern Kurdish leaders "consult Gülen before doing anything."

On the Turkish police, no surprise here:

Fethullahists have also made inroads into Turkey's 200,000-strong police force. Their infiltration has had a compounding effect, as Fethullahist officials have purged officials more loyal to the republic than the hocaefendi. According to Veren, "There are imam security directors; imams wearing police uniforms. Many police commissioners get their orders from imams."[21] Adil Serdar Saçan, former director of the organized crimes unit within the Istanbul Directorate of Security, confirmed these statements in reports he prepared on the Fethullahist organization within the security apparatus. In a 2006 interview, he said . . . At present, over 80 percent of the officers at supervisory level in the general security organization are members of the [Gülen] cemaat.[22]

Now you know why the police were beating the shit out of Kurdish women and children last Newroz and why I blamed it on AKP--the Fethullahçı.

On the TSK and its Islamists:

According to Veren, Gülen has argued that the military expels no more than one in forty Islamist officers; the rest remain in undercover cells. While such allegations may seem the stuff of conspiracy theory, recent leaks to pro-AKP media suggest a number of Islamist sources within the military ranks, creating speculation that followers of Gülen now populate the senior infrastructure of the Turkish General Staff. Such speculation gained additional credence after the August 2008 Supreme Military Council (Yüksek Askeri Şura, YAŞ), which, for the first time, declined to expel suspected Islamists from military ranks.

Just like you read here in August.

There's much more at the article, here, at The Middle East Quarterly.

Of course, I have a really difficult time believing the paşas propaganda which says, as it does in the article, that Taraf is a Fethullahçı paper. If that's true, then why has Taraf had trouble getting advertising revenue? Why couldn't Taraf just get funding from a Fethullahçı bank? Simple answer: Taraf is not Fethullahçı. Why is this neoconservative author complaining about the severe police crackdown against Turkish leftists at Taksim Square last May Day? Since when have neoconservatives ever cared about Leftists or trade unions? Where were the neoconservatives or the extreme right-wing fascist Americans when Leftists were massacred in Taksim Square on May Day in 1977? Well, they don't bitch about that because at the time the paşas were in full control.

The fact also remains that Gülen is a resident of the US, recognized as an educator of "extraordinary ability" even though his only formal education consists of five years of elementary school.

But this article is an expression of frustration between the neoconservatives and the Israeli lobby against the Fethullahçı government's anti-Israel statements over Gaza. They needn't be alarmed, however; in spite of Vecdi Gonul's lie that the AKP government has never signed an arms deal with Israel, Cemil Çiçek, and others, assures everyone to the contrary. In fact, the AKP government did sign a deal with Israel in 2005 for Israeli Heron UAVs, with a pricetag of at least $150 million.

At one time the neoconservatives did support the AKP, with Bush giving his blessing for Erdoğan's takeover of the Prime Ministry, when he was not in any position to take that job due to his conviction for crimes against laiklik.

The US thought it could control the Islamists it backed in Afghanistan and it thought it could control the Islamists it imported into Bosnia. That's just like both the US and Israel thought they could control HAMAS and the paşas thought they could control Turkish Hezbollah. These idiots have always thought this way and they've always been dead wrong.

Well, there's one thing the neoconservatives, the Israel lobby, Gülen, and the paşas all have in common--none of them have ever shed a tear over the Ankara regime's severe repression of the Kurdish people.

A MATTER OF TIMING

"Since the Ergenekon case represents the advanced level of classical Turkish chaos, this is not a good time to start learning about Turkey unless you are experienced in this ‘lonely and beloved country’."
~ Ece Temelkuran.

Some weird shit--more weird than usual for Turkey--is going down with these recent detentions in the Ergenekon fiasco. They're going deeper into the Susurluk Affair, to include the "soft coup" of 1997:

In fact, the apprehension of former Special Police Operations Deputy Chief İbrahim Şahin, who served six years in jail for links to Susurluk, in the latest wave of detentions signaled that the Susurluk case will also be included in the Ergenekon investigation.

[ . . . ]

Meanwhile, the fact that 10 active officers -- five colonels, two majors and three captains -- were detained over their alleged links to the Ergenekon terrorist organization in this latest wave has served to strengthen the previous indictment, which established links between the group and some active officers within the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK).

The indictment in question, which an İstanbul court accepted prior to opening the ongoing trial, read: "It has been understood both from the attached documents as well as from tapped telephone conversations that the Ergenekon terrorist organization has been engaged in secret organizational work within the TSK and that there have been members of this organization who come from the TSK, from the lowest to the highest ranking (officers)."

ARABASLIK Generals linked to Feb. 28 postmodern coup

The detention of three former generals and a number of civilians, including former Higher Education Board (YÖK) President Kemal Güriz, in the 10th wave of operations on Wednesday brought to the agenda their links with the Feb. 28, 1997 postmodern coup.

Several papers established the links of those detained on Wednesday with the Feb. 28 coup that resulted in the overthrow of an Islamic-oriented coalition government under then Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan.

This was the fourth military coup staged in Turkey since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. The fifth, and last, military intervention in Turkish politics came in 2007 in the form of an e-memo posted on the TSK's Web site.

What made the Feb. 28 intervention a postmodern one was the mobilization of an army of civilian allies who voluntarily defended the military over "fundamentalism" by evoking the reactions of the press and many nongovernmental organizations as well as YÖK and the judiciary.

The TSK carried out the aforementioned coups based on Article 35 of the Internal Service Law. The problem with Article 35 is that the authority designated to appoint the duty of protection and supervision is the TSK and not a civilian political authority.

There's more on the characters involved in this latest round of detentions at Zaman with information gleaned from Taraf. Check also another article at Zaman, in which it looks like AKP is going to go after the Kemalists under Article 288 of the Turkish penal code (TCK), which reads:

A person who explicitly makes a verbal or written declaration for the purpose of influencing the public prosecutor, judge, the court, expert witness or witnesses until the final judgment is given about an investigation or prosecution will be imprisoned for a term from six months to three years.

If this offence is committed through press or media, the penalty to be imposed shall be increased by one half.

The article has a small discussion of Büyükanıt's influence in the media over the Şemdinli bombing as an example. There's also a discussion of what legal experts are saying about Ergenekon at Hürriyet. Of note, also, is the meeting that the paşas held among themselves late Wednesday and Turkish chief of general staff Başbuğ met with Erdoğan for an hour and a half before his weekly meeting with Gül. Details, such as they are, from Reuters and the Guardian.

Reuters remarks:

Critics of the ruling AK Party say Erdogan's government is using the case as revenge for court moves by the secular establishment last year to outlaw the party for anti-secular activities. The AK Party denies any link.

And the Guardian quotes Gareth Jenkins:

Some analysts believe that yesterday's response shows its patience may be wearing thin. Gareth Jenkins, an Istanbul-based expert on Turkish security affairs, said: "The army will have issued a stern warning to the government to back off and that this has to be the last of such arrests. Most of those arrested on Wednesday were not involved in the Ergenekon plot.

"It was just a political move, and has destroyed any hope that the probe will find the real culprits. The question is what happens next. What we are going to see is a power struggle between two fundamentally undemocratic forces using their influence in the judicial system."

Another interesting thing about these recent detentions is the timing, which takes place as the Turkish media has stirred up a frenzy over the crisis in Gaza. Olmert visited Erdoğan and Gül on December 21. My money says Olmert told them about Israel's upcoming operations in Gaza. Here's a hint:

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is visiting Turkey in order to discuss the latter's mediation in the indirect peace talks between Israel and Syria, but Monday's meeting with President Abdullah Gul also focused on the ongoing fire from Gaza.

"Israel cannot refrain from responding to the criminal fire on its citizens," Omert told Gul during their meeting in Ankara.

More:

Olmert met President Abdullah Gul before holding talks with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan over dinner.

"What you don't do today in the Middle East – you may not be able to do tomorrow," Olmert said to Erdogan regarding the progression of the negotiations, adding that efforts must be focused on promoting direct talks with Syria.

The two leaders met in private for nearly an hour, and were then joined by their respective entourages for further discussion. After dinner the two resumed their tête-à-tête.

Earlier in the day Olmert met with Turkish President Abdullah Gul. "Israel cannot refrain from responding to the criminal fire on its citizens," Omert told Gul.

There's no reason to believe that the Israelis did not inform their only military ally in the region of their plans for Gaza, so Erdoğan knew. And the AKP decided to use this timing to make another Ergenekon sweep. What AKP's exact intentions are with these recent detentions and where they'll go from here, I haven't figured out yet. Is the US involved, as another Zaman article suggests? It's possible. Are Turkey, Israel, and the US working together? It wouldn't be the first time. Will the paşas allow it to continue? We'll definitely know when the troops leave the barracks.

I have to echo Jenkins: "The question is what happens next"?

One thing is for certain: The Ergenekon investigation has not gone east of the Fırat (Euphrates), so this certainly isn't about cleaning out and dismantling the Deep State.

One last item . . . the editor of Taraf, Adnan Demir, faces five years' imprisonmnent for Taraf's reporting of the Bezele (Aktütün) operation and TSK's major FAIL at the time. From Reporters Without Borders:

Reporters Without Borders today voiced support for Adnan Demir, editor of the liberal daily Taraf, who is facing trial for publishing confidential military information.

The worldwide press freedom organisation said it hoped the Turkish justice system would prove itself capable of resolving a case which involved a journalist who had done his job with professionalism.

"Adnan Demir has revealed information that is telling about the actions of the Turkish Army and raises several questions about possible mismanagement. The people have the right to be informed about the circumstances in which its citizens risk their lives."

[ . . . ]

The prosecutor at the Istanbul higher court yesterday called for a sentence of three to five years against Demir.

Isn't democracy wonderful?!

THE TURKISH CONSTITUTION AND THE FACADE OF DEMOCRACY, PART 3

"And the closer the elections get, the following messages will be delivered secretly: "If we can weaken DTP and militarily control PKK, we will recognize your rights without facing any clashes by convincing the general staff."
~ Mithat Sancar, Ankara University.

Below is the third and final part of the interview Taraf's Neşe Düzel conducted with Ankara University's Mithat Sancar. Part 1 can be found here and Part 2 is here.

ND: Why did AKP become so hawkish on the Kurdish question and see that military operations is the only solution? Can it be the only party with this way?

MS: Someone had convinced AKP that with such hawkish strategies it could finish DTP and weaken PKK. AKP thinks that the more it becomes hawkish, the more powerful it would become in the Southeast. And the closer the elections get, the following messages will be delivered secretly: "If we can weaken DTP and militarily control PKK, we will recognize your rights without facing any clashes by convincing the general staff." In the election, they will show the candidates who will give the messages that they have not given up the policies they had promised. In this way, AKP is planning to annihilate the Kurdish political movement. There is a thesis that if AKP loses the Southeast, the only bridge between the Turkish east and west will collapse.

ND: What kind of thesis is this?

MS: This is very dangerous because with this thesis is the understanding that ignores the importance of political representation with one's own identity. However, the demand for representation with one's own identity is very important for a democratic solution in ethnic conflict. DTP, or a party like that, their existence will reinforce Kurdish unity with Turkey because it will make Kurds feel they are represented. If DTP is annihilated, the possibility of speaking out [with] Kurdish identity and the feeling of political representation will weaken. And it will be that point that the dissolution of Kurds from the country and from the state will begin. DTP's loss will not facilitate the problem. On the contrary, it will make the solution difficult.

ND: In AKP's cadres, it's as if there's a chauvinistic discourse. The national defense minister said that if the Rom and Armenians didn't go, we could not be a nation-state the way that we are today. How do you comment on this speech?

MS: With one word. I read his speech with great fear. The mentality which approves of the Armenian Genocide and confesses it wants to base its problem-solving on homogeneity. This mentality cannot solve all of its Kurdish and non-Muslim problems. On the contrary, it will make more violence occur and make more pains felt on the Kurdish question.

ND: Does the minister advocate Armenian forced immigration?

MS: Clearly, he says forced migration was necessary, it had to be. My main concern is this: there wasn't any criticism from either the government or the prime minister about Vecdi Gönül's words.

ND: Where does he find this courage?

MS: This is the problem. AKP is facing tides since 2005. The more it gets away from its democratization goal, the more deeply nationalistic AKP is revealed [to be]. Today the nationalistic vein in AKP is greater than ever because, to date, there were three main traits that kept AKP from being a statist, right-wing party. These are the EU, the democrats in AKP and outside AKP. Today the AKP administration excludes these three elements.

ND: Is Turkey sliding into racism?

MS: In terms of political culture and daily life, Turkey is becoming a society that has a powerful racist vein. Daily racism has increased a lot in Turkey. I mean racism became normal. The disasters which are created by the normalization of racism can be understood by looking at world examples and the pains that result [from racism]. This racism destroys the base of democracies and it makes it easier in Turkey to polarize society and then drag people to the point that they can slaughter each other. In fact, in the last year, torture incidents in Turkey, deaths in prison and in detention, and shooting on the streets have increased. All these incidents are related to each other.

ND: Has Turkey become militarized?

MS: The pace of the last five months is not a civilian pace, but it is a militarized pace. The things that we live today are the signs that we are being dragged into militarism, nationalism, authoritarianism. If the prime minister maintains hawkish discourses, Turkey will have deeper polarizations and will move farther away from democracy. Nationalism, authoritarianism, racism will wrap up all parts of Turkey. Turkey will become a ghetto. However, we must not forget that in Turkey, there exists democrats whose power is not proportional to their numbers.

ND: How can they be effective.

MS: They are effective because Turkey has a powerful conscience. I trust in Turkey's conscience. And let's not forget that there are also democratic people in AKP.

By the way, there was a little something a few days ago on Southern Kurdish reaction to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in Iraq. From IPS via Alternet:

"Kurdish leaders have very fervently talked about approving the agreement and have appeared to be like the number one attorneys for this deal," Nawshirwan Mustafa, a former deputy to Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, wrote in Sbeiy, a Kurdish news website he founded. Mustafa resigned from Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan after disagreements over the party management style. "They [Kurdish leaders] have thought they should unconditionally support whatever America does and consider it as good."

Ooooh . . . Bad idea. Very bad idea.

Now, the extent of fears are such that senior Kurdish lawmakers broke their silence in the past few days demanding amendments to the deal in a way that would curb the central government's hand in using the country's military to "settle scores" with its political opponents.

What makes it even more worrying for Kurds is that the deal commits the U.S. military to back the Iraqi army in its operations. But Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has firmly rejected any changes, saying that parliamentarians should either accept the deal in its entirety or reject it altogether.

I guess these guys have already forgotten the betrayals of the past. Shame, shame, shame.

THE TURKISH CONSTITUTION AND THE FACADE OF DEMOCRACY, PART 2

"AKP is dragging the non-nationalistic, mild conservatives into nationalism. The discourse that it uses regarding the Kurdish question empowers the authoritarian, nationalistic vein. This is a disaster for Turkey."
~ Mithat Sancar, Ankara University.

The following is part 2 of Neşe Düzel's interview with Mithat Sancar. Part 1 is here.

ND: AKP said they would make a civil constitution, but then it retreated. Did anyone scare AKP do you think?

MS: It is not only about fear but also about various profits, balance of power, and tactics. This is AKP's effort to be "the state's favorite elite." AKP is trying to be accepted by military and civilian bureaucracy in order to enter the salon and this is the effort for that. In this, pragmatism is AKP's essential trait anyway. If this pragmatism unites with opportunism, it will be a disaster. Because in AKP there is not only pragmatism, but also an opportunistic vein. This kind of pragmatism, short-term tactical calculations, and opportunism occurs especially at election time. For that reason, AKP is engaging in authoritarian, nationalist slogans. However, since September 12, including Özal's ANAP, AKP had the most democratization potential among all the parties.

ND: Isn't it still so?

MS: It is still so, however the destructive potential of AKP is incomparably greater, compared to the other parties. AKP might be destructive. With AKP's civil attempts, the people who had problems with the system, the people which the military excluded, the people which the civil bureaucracy did not respect were all abandoned to nationalism and military understanding. However, now when AKP is getting closer to having a deal with authoritarian forces, it might drag these people back to nationalism again.

ND: Does AKP make such crowds nationalistic?

MS: AKP is now dragging portions of the population, which are mildly conservative, to nationalism. AKP is dragging the non-nationalistic, mild conservatives into nationalism. The discourse that it uses regarding the Kurdish question empowers the authoritarian, nationalistic vein. This is a disaster for Turkey. For instance, during Tansu Çiller's prime ministry, the support that she provided to the military was only a political support. Çiller did not have a social support to present to the military because the military and Çiller were standing on the same ground. AKP and the military, however, are not standing on the same ground. The more AKP gets closer to the military, the more it brings authoritarian and nationalistic support. And this is a great danger for democracy. This AKP becomes more fearful after its constitutional court closure case. The closure case precipitated the ways AKP sought to have a deal with the general staff and the civil bureaucratic elites, its bargaining and the period to get close to them. But another reason for using this kind of nationalistic language is the chief of general staff İlker Başbuğ's concept regarding the Kurdish question. Some people say Başbuğ made some room for a civil governing party for solving the Kurdish question.

ND: Don't you think it did?

MS: Quite the contrary. The general staff's new concept is as follows: "We are ready to make the gestures that you like. I can come to the government and give briefings. In appearance, I can give the impression that I am under civil authority but you are also going to cooperate with us in terms of our red lines." In short, to AKP they say, "You be on the field, but you do what we say. Implement our policies without making us appear." Now, apparently, the general staff conveyed its Kurdish policy to AKP.

ND: Did the AKP government have an agreement with the general staff regarding Kurdish policy?

MS: Now it seems so. Let me put it this way: In this country, the Kurdish question is a key problem. Any party that becomes hawkish and that goes far away from a democratic solution regarding the Kurdish question, without any exception, will be nationalistic and authoritarian. Demirel's DYP, Karayalçın's SHP, Yılmaz's ANAP, Çiller's DYP, and Erbakan's Refah all shared this end. Being hawkish on the Kurdish question does not bring anyone anything.

ND: Does PM Erdoğan's discourses result from fear or are there any other reasons for these policy changes that we don't know?

MS: AKP never had a comprehensive democratic program and Kurdish policy anyway, to let us speak of its policy change today. AKP only worked on the EU's project architecture in a good way. It's goal was limited to get a negotiation date for candidacy. Then, since the period of membership was long, it could just loosen it and sometimes it could precipitate it. Whenever AKP domestically feels weak, it gets closer to the EU project and whenever it feels strong it moves away from the EU. Now I think AKP will feel strong. As you see, the general staff also does nothing that would give a hard time to AKP.

ND: Okay, so today what exactly is the point that you say AKP got close?

MS: The center is statist. It reversed the state and whenever it gets stuck it engages in nationalistic enmity and it will say, "One state, one nation, one flag, one homeland." The center does not see the crowd's discomfort as a democratic discomfort or a demand for democracy, but rather it sees a source of disturbance. In the center of the state, there is a rigid, rude, primitive nationalistic spirit. Erdoğan's recent example, such as "love it or leave it" is an example of the central understanding. AKP's Yozgat parliamentarian's statement, "I would love to shoot whoever comes against my nation and state" is also this understanding.

ND: Does AKP want to solve the Kurdish question?

MS: AKP never had a Kurdish policy. It didn't go beyond messages. Today, at the point we are at, we see that AKP neither has the capacity, nor the power, nor the courage to get to the bottom of the Kurdish question. AKP thinks it can solve the Kurdish question by finishing DTP, which is doing politics on behalf of the Kurds. Indeed, today, all the statist environment is saying we have to support AKP in the Southeast. This is a very dangerous calculation. If AKP wins the elections, do they think the Kurdish question will end? On the contrary, the dissolution of the Kurds from the system will be deepened. Clashes will be sharpened.

ND: Why?

MS: The main barrier in front of AKP that will lead it to become a hegemonic party is not CHP; it is DTP. A hegemonic party, in appearance, is a multi-party system. However, in fact this system is de facto a one-party system, because there is no functionality of the other parties anymore. AKP is calculating to get Southeast from DTP and become Turkey's hegemonic party. There is a danger of a hegemonic party in Turkey.

Part 3 tomorrow.

THE TURKISH CONSTITUTION AND THE FACADE OF DEMOCRACY

"AKP can be destructive with the discourse it uses about the Kurdish question. It transforms the non-nationalistic, mild grassroots to nationalism. This nationalism is a disaster for Turkey."
~ Mithat Sancar, Ankara University.

Here's another interview from Taraf's Neşe Duzel. This time she interviews Mithat Sancar, a professor of constitutional theory at Ankara University.

By the way, Taraf has been having difficulty raising revenue, mainly from advertisements, which it needs to continue publication. This seems to be a result of its reporting matters of which the Turkish general staff does not approve. Taraf is taking some steps to maintain itself and I sincerely hope it is able to survive this difficult time. Taraf's staff has consistently worked toward journalistic excellence, something that is, for the most part, completely lacking in reporting from the so-called "civilized" world of the West.

Anyway, without further ado, here is the first part of Neşe Duzel's interview with Professor Mithat Sancar of Ankara University:

Mithat Sancar: "The military is making the Kurdish policies implemented by AKP."

"AKP agreed with the military. The Turkish general staff conveyed it's Kurdish policy to AKP. Başbuğ goes through the gestures of briefing the government, however [he says]: 'You be on the field, but do whatever we tell you to do'".

"There are dangerous calculations. If AKP wins the election in the Southeast, do they think the Kurdish question will end? On the contrary, the dissolution of the Kurds from the system will be deepened. Conflict will be sharpened."

"There is the danger of a hegemonic party in Turkey. AKP is calculating to take the Southeast from DTP, to become the hegemonic party. This is a one-party system in which the other parties exist only in appearance."

"A minister says, 'Clearly there must be forced immigration". My main worry is that there isn't any reaction to these words from neither the Prime Minister nor from the government. Today, AKP's nationalistic vein is greater than ever."

"AKP can be destructive with the discourse it uses about the Kurdish question. It transforms the non-nationalistic, mild grassroots to nationalism. This nationalism is a disaster for Turkey."


Why Mithat Sancar?

Turkey is going through an agitation for the last two years. First, the presidential election, then the general elections, and now the local elections that will be held in four months. Turkey shut itself down inside remarkably. AKP, which gave up on proceeding with the EU process, which also always engages in nationalist enmity. And AKP raised this nationalism to the level of racism. Within this era in Turkey, only "terrorist" incidents did not increase. Also, state violence against citizens exploded. Okay, but what's happened? Only one year ago, when this country was debating about a civil and democratic constitution, now even the chief of the constitutional court is scared to talk about the contstitution. How did this happen? Why did AKP turn into such a fearful and status quo party? Did it have any secret deals not to free society and solve the Kurdish problem in democratic ways? What kind of consequences will such policy changes by AKP have? What did the democratic vein in AKP do? We talked about all this with Professor Mithat Sancar, who is a faculty member of Ankara University's law department. Professor Sancar especially studies constitutional theory, the birth of modern Turkey, the state of law, and human rights.


ND: Last week in Bilkent University there was a symposium organized and the immutable articles in the constitution were debated. Do you think there can be any immutable articles in a constitution?

MS: Yes there may. In the constitutions of many developed countries there are immutable regulations; however, these are generally the articles which guarantee a democratic legal state. For example, in Germany's constitution, the article related to human dignity, human rights, cannot be changed.

ND: What are the articles that are immutable for us?

MS: Indeed, we have an armageddon in the second article of our constitution. This article, that is related to the republic's qualification article, has turned this article into Atatürk's nationalism loyalty principle. It makes Kemalism a constitutional principle.

ND: Developed countries can debate the immutable articles in their constitutions. Can we debate our immutable articles in Turkey?

MS: This is the problem: we cannot debate. In addition, those parts which do not want the immutable articles in the constitution to be changed have more control over this. However AKP did not keep its promise regarding the preparation of a civil constitution.

ND: Which of the other nations' constitutions does our constitution resemble?

MS: Right now our constitution is not a very bad text because a lot of articles were changed. The problem is this: the spirit of this constitution did not change because constitutions convey the spirit of the era in which they were prepared. A constitution that is prepared in a free environment, even if it has some shortcomings compared to today's constitution, if it is backwards compared to today's constitution, it would have potential for more freedom. Because that constitution would carry the era's pluralism and color. In our constitution, however, the ghosts of the "revolutionaries" are roaming. This spirit of the coup sees society as a dangerous focus that must be controlled and any attempts to deepen freedom have backfired.

ND: I had asked which country's constitution does our constitution resemble?

MS: In appearance, in terms of basic institutions, it is no different than western constitutions. Elections are held, parties are founded. In our constitution we have superficial rules for democracy. However, there are no arrangements to deepen freedoms. Because the understanding of the national security mentality hasn't been left yet. Domestically, the military and bureaucratic elites, outside [of Turkey], the US, both of these together imposed a model of a state of national security in Turkey in the 1982 constitution. They defended that Turkey could be ruled by a crippled democracy that is peculiar to Turkey itself. There were several changes in the constitution, but this model never changed. This is a Turkey-type democracy.

ND: In international politics, is there any term called "Turkey-type democracy"?

MS: Of course there is! In the world arena, political science scholars use this term. For instance, for Turkey and Russia they say, "peculiar democracies belonging to the same family". And now, today, AKP is inclined toward the Turkey-type democracy. In the EU, the sides which do not want Turkey's membership are inclined to see a Turkey-type democracy.

ND: Can there be any democracy as a "peculiar" democracy?

MS: There can't be. Peculiar to itself means being far away from universal measures. This is a democracy type which never had an inside to deepen rights and freedoms. There is authoritarian administration. This is a kind of democracy that does not have any inside to deepen justice and freedoms, but is eager for authoritarian administrations. Of course, this is not democracy. This is a monstrosity! Today, AKP is settling for a Turkey-type democracy. There is a coalition between the AKP government, the state elites, and some forces in the EU that a Turkey-type democracy is sufficient for Turkey. That is why the EU is not pushing so hard about freedoms.

ND: Did AKP make a deal with opponents of Turkey in the EU?

MS: The government has not given up the progress of the EU yet. It seems that it wants the EU, but it has an alliance with military, civil, bureaucratic forces not to enhance democracy. The government tells the EU, "Turkey's conditions do not enable us to enact the norms that you want us to enact. Forgive us." The government's alliance with the state elites makes Turkey go far away from the EU's goals. In one way, the AKP government is doing the will of the authoritarian, fascist forces in the right-wing of the EU.

Tomorrow, Part 2.